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K aLi T aL
I am proud to introduce the first issue of Vietnam Generation:
A Jo urna l o f Recent H istory and Contem porary Issues. We have put
to g e the r a very fine collection of articles, representing disciplines as
diverse as econom ics, literature, education, sociology, history, film ,
and p op ula rculture. Each article also representsan individual response
to the highly charged term 're v isio n ism '.
Ben K ie rn a n 's article, "Th e Am erican Bom bardm ent of
Ka m p uchea, 1969-1973', is an exam ple of classic revisionist scholarship
— the revision of historical narrative based on new or reinterpreted
inform ation. Tom R id d e ll's article, "Th e Inflationary Im pact o f the
Vietnam W a r', also deals w ith revisionism in the classic sense: Riddell
cha llenges the revisionist scholarship of econom ists W a lke r and Vatter,
and charges tha t th e ir reinterpretations of the past are ill-founded.
David B e rm a n 's article. "In Cold Blood: Vietnam in Te xtb o o ks' ta kes a
historiographical approach tow ard revision, and exam ines the w a y in
w hich historical narratives are rewritten over time. M ariam Frenier, in
"Tw o Q uiet Am ericans:
Turning British Literature into Am erican
P ro p a g a n d a ', and Don Kunz, in “First Blood Re d ra w n ,' exam ine the
revision of popular concepts of history through the m edium s of literature
and film. Larry Rottm ann, in "O n e Hundred Happy Sparrows: An
Am erican Veteran Returns to V ie tn a m ', explores the personal revision
process as he describes his em otional journey. Harry Haines, in “Disputing
the W reckage: Ideolog ica lStrug glea tthe Vietnam Veterans M e m o ria l',
dem onstra tes how the process of of personal revision intersects with
the generation of public history at the site of the Vietnam M em orial in
W a shing ton, DC. M y own article, "O n the C over of the Rolling Stone:
Tow a rd a Theo ry of C ultural Th e ra p y ', deals w ith the cause and effect
of the revisionist im p ulse , and suggests a new approach to the problem.
Despite the high calibre of the individual articles represented in
this collection, it is a pparent that articles on a num b er of topics are
conspic uously absent. Included here are no papers devoted to the
top ic s of race o r gender and the Vietnam W ar, no papers w hich deal
w ith Vietna m ese perceptions of the Am erican presence in Vietnam ,
no papers on the PO W -M IA obsession, and no papers on the subject of
these sub jects are absent tha t they are inconseguential. W hat is
m issing is often at least as im portant as w hat is included.
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Th e re is o n ly o ne a rtic le b y a w o m a n in th is issue. Th e re a re no
a rtic le s b y V ie tn a m e se sc h o la rs; in fa c t, th e re a re n o a rtic le s b y n o n 
w h ite m en. Th is im b a la n c e c rie s o u tfo ra n e xp la n a tio n . It is n o t e n o u g h
m e re ly to sa y th a t no p a p e rs w e re su b m itte d b y m e n o r w o m e n o f
c o lo r. It is n o t e n o u g h to sa y th a t o n ly th re e p a p e rs w e re su b m itte d by
w h ite w o m e n sc h o la rs, a n d th a t w e a c c e p te d o ne o f th e m fo r p u b li
c a tio n . W e c a n n o t e xc u se o u rse lv e s fo r fa ilin g to in c lu d e th e se
p e rsp e c tiv e s b y sa y in g th a t w e w o u ld h a ve b e e n o p e n to p u b lish in g
th e m if th e y h a d b een subm itted .
Vietnam G e nera tion is in te n d e d to p ro vid e a fo ru m fo r V ie t
n a m W a r, V ie tn a m e ra . a n d V ie tn a m g e n e ra tio n sc h o la rs. If o u r fie ld ,
a t th is p o in t in tim e , is so n a rro w th a t it d o e s n o t in c lu d e th e w o rk o f
sc h o la rs o f c o lo r, o r o f w o m e n , th e n w e m u st b ro a d e n o u r to p ic a re a
u n til it d o e s in c lu d e th is w o rk. W e a re d e v o tin g o n e issu e th is first y e a r
to a n e xp lo ra tio n o f ra c e issu e s a nd V ie tn a m , a n d a n o th e r issu e to a
stu d y o n g e n d e r a n d w a r. B ut e v e n th is is no t e n o u g h . W e a re
c o m m itte d to m a ke a sin c e re a nd c o n siste n t e ffo rt to in c o rp o ra te
q u e stio n s o f ra c e a nd g e n d e r in to e v e ry issu e o f Vietnam G enera tion.
In th e fu tu re w e w ill no t sim p ly w a it fo rth e se a rtic le s to c o m e to u s in th e
m a il; w e w ill m a ke a d ire c t e ffo rt to so lic it th e m . A n d if. a t tim e s, w e fa il
to p re se n t th e se a lte rn a tiv e v ie w s, w e w ill a lw a y s try to be h o n e st a b o u t
w h a t w e h a ve n o t p u b lish e d , c a re fu l to p o in t o u t th e m issin g a rtic le s in
o u r ta b le o f c o n te n ts.

The A merican BoMbARdMENT of
K am puc Nea, 1969-197?
B en KiERNAN
On M arch 18,1969, the United Sta tes A ir Force began its secret
B-52 b om ba rdm ent o f rural C a m b od ia '. Exactly one ye a r later, that
c o u n try 's ruler. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, w a s overthrow n and the
Vietna m W a r, com bined w ith a new civil w a r, to te a r the nation apart
fo r the next five years. The United States bom bing of the countryside
continued (now publicly) and increased from 1970 to A ugust 1973.
w hen C ongress im posed a halt. Nearly half of the US bom bing tonnage
w a s dropped in the last six months. The total w a s 540,000 tons. Rural
C am bodia w a s destroyed, and 'D em ocra tic Ka m p uchea' rose in its
ashes. The em ergent C om m unist Party of Kam puchea (CPK) regim e,
led by Pol Pot, had profited greatly from the U.S. bom bing. It used the
w id esp rea d devastation and m assacre of civilians as propaganda fo r
recruitm ent purp oses, and as an excuse fo r its brutal, radical policies
and its purge o f m oderate Khm er com m unists. This is evident not only
from contem p ora ry press a ccounts, but also from p o st-1978 interview s
w ith dozens of peasant survivors o f the bom bing w ho w ere unable to
te stify to th e ir experiences during the Pol Pot period, and from U.S.
G overnm ent docum ents new ly declassified under the Freedom of
Inform ation Act.
By O cto b e r 1972 the US and Hanoi had reached a greem ent on
te rm s fo r a ceasefire and Am erica n w ithdra w a l from Vietnam .
W a shing ton had dropped its dem and fo r a North Vietnam ese
w ithd ra w a l from the south, and Hanoi had dropped its dem and fo r
Nguyen Va n Th ie u 's rem oval. Both dem ands had previously been
p reconditions fo r a settlem ent.
Henry Kissinger, o f course, still insisted on Hanoi securing, from
Pol P o t's C PK 'C e n te r', a greem ent to a settlem ent in Kam puchea as
w ell. But it w ould have been c le a rto him tha t this w ould be im possible,
d espite his ow n stated threa t to achieve it by concentrating US air
p ow er in Ka m puchea2. The antagonism of the C PK C e nte r (the Pa rty's
na tiona l leadership — Pol Pot, Nuon C hea. and leng Sary) to Hanoi
m ade it very unlikely tha t the C PK w ould coordinate its stra te g y w ith
th a t of Vietnam . Further, a ceasefire in Kam puchea w ould have
prevented the C enter consolidating w ha t it called its “m astery o ver the
re volutiona ry group(s) in every w a y ", w hic h w a s fa r from com plete.
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Sihanoukists. moderates, and pro-Vietnamese communists still
predominated in the rural areas. As CPK Southwest Zone documents
had explained in 1971, “We want to and must get a tight grasp, fitter into
every c o rn e r'3 of the diverse revolutionary m ovem ent in the
Kampuchean countryside. A negotiated peace, or even an early
victory, would not serve this aim.
In Vietnam,Thieu was also proving recalcitrant. It was apparently
to appease him that Nixon ordered the “Christmas Bom bing' of Hanoi
and Haiphong in December 1972. Within a month, the Paris Agreement
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam had been signed
by all parties to the conflict there. It was to apply from January 27,1973
(and its terms were little different from those agreed in October)4. The
USA began withdrawing its troops from Vietnam. However, it saw
Kampuchea as an integral part of the conflict, and as fighting
continued the US soon switched the rest of its air arm there.
Washington portrayed this bombardment as an attempt to
force the Khmer insurgents, now on the threshold of complete military
victory, to negotiate with Lon Nol's pro-American government in
Phnom Penh. The then CIA Chief Strategy Analyst in Saigon, Frank
Snepp, has described the 1973 bombing of the Kampuchean countryside
as “the centerpiece of the Administration ceasefire strategy'5. Whatever
its aim, the political effect was twofold: to prevent a complete
revolutionary victory at a time when the CPK C enter's grasp over the
revolution was still relatively weak, and to strengthen that grasp, which
held the country on a course of continuing violence and warfare that
lasted for the next decade and more.
In the words of William Shawcross, “within a few months an
enormous new aerial campaign had destroyed the old Cambodia
forever.'6 The campaign was certainly new in scale. During all of 1972,
American B-52s and fighter bombers had dropped 53,000 tons o f
bombs on targets in Kampuchea, nearly all in the Eastern Zone of the
country7. In the six months from February to August 15,1973 (when the
US Congress imposed a halt), the figure was 257,000 tons, and they fell
on all populated rural areas of the country (shown on Shawcross's
map)®.
Whatever the reasons for the 1973 bombardment, the Nixon
Administration was absolutely committed to it. The Secretary of the Air
Force, Robert Seamans, later said:
the President wanted to send a hundred more B-52s. This was
appalling. You couldn't even figure out where you were
going to put them all, you know.... I think It was a t the same
time the President was going over to Moscow.... so, anyway.
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a message was sent to the airplane - this was that timely - as
to why we couldn't send those B-52soverthere. As I understand
It, the response when he touched down really burned the
wires, and he said he wanted them over there... The total
never did quite reach one hundred, but It was a pretty large
number10.

In his book Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction o f Cambodia.
Shawcross takes up the story: “The bombing of Cambodia was now so
intense that the Seventh Air Force was faced with serious logistical
problems. At one stage B-52 sortie rates were as high as eighty-one per
day. In Vietnam the maximum had been sixty per d a y.' Air-traffic
congestion made it impossible to warn other aircraft of impending
strikes. The confusion was such that in one case a bombing strike took
place sixty miles from the target area, according to the Seventh Air
Force history, which “does not record its results'11.

TAblE 1. KAIVipUchEA
U S BoivibiNq
Y ea r

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

ancJ C P K

A rmec I F o rc es G r o w t H, 1969-197?

BoivibiNq S o r t I es

3,600°
8,000°
61,000°*
25,000°*
c. 130,000(7)
c.227,000(7)

a) to March 1970

b) to May 1970 (B-52s only)

BoivibiNq
TONNAqE

108,000b
c. 121,000
in both years
53,000
257,000

C P K ARiviEd
STREN qTh

1,000
75,000
150.000
200.000
(June) c.220,000'’

539,129
c) July 1970 to Feb. 1971

d)US and Saigon sorties

The impact of the bombardment had been severe enough
from 1970 to 1972. As early as April 1970, a combined aerial and tank
attack on the village of Chithou in Kompong Cham province took the
lives of 200 people and killed all of the village's herd. Soon afterwards.
In nearby Kandol Chrum, American bombs destroyed six houses and
killed seven people. A local peasant recalls: “As a result of this, some
people ran away to live far from the village. Others joined the
revolution. *12 The pattern of recruitment of bombing victims to the CPK
was to increase over time, as we shall see. In some cases, too. the
Vietnamese communists were blamed, as the nearest possible culprit
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for deaths from bombing by the remote aircraft. The CPK Center
encouraged such popular reactions as well.
This was ironic, in that much of the bombardment was the work
of anti-communist Vietnamese. Shawcross wrote:
Cambodia was open house for the South Vietnamese Air
Force... They behaved as If they were conquering a hostile
nation, ralherthan helping a new ally; every Cambodian was
a VC and a target. Perhaps the most chilling evidence o f the
pleasure the pilots took in It all was contained In a cable sent
by (the Commander o f US Forces In Vietnam, Creighton)
Abrams to the Pentagon. He reported tha t until now It had
been virtually Impossible to Induce the Vietnamese to fly on
Sundays. Now they were paying bribes of 1,000 plasters each
to be allowed to go out seven days a week — over Cambodia.
...According to a CIA report from Phnom Penh, the ARVN
commander. Captain Le Van Vlen, frequently called In air
strikes “to drive the people from the villages'; he and his men
would seize the villagers' animals and force them to buy them
back’3.

Communist troops were not always the targets of the US
bombing either. According to Shawcross again: "B y the end of the
summer much of the country was a free-fire zone for United States
aircraft, and since their postoperational reports were almost all
deliberately inaccurate, there was little follow-up to see what targets
were actually being attacked. Pilots had far more liberty than in
Vietnam to bomb any target they w a nte d .'14 The pro-US Lon Nol
regime in Phnom Penh was also to blame in this respect. In September
1970, US intelligence reported: “It was recently discovered that many
of the 66 'training camps' on which (the Lon Nol army) had requested
airstrikes by early Septemberwere infact merely political indoctrination
sessions held in village halls and pagodas.' The report went on to
quote a 'recent' Lon Nol regime intelligence assessment, to the effect
that “the population has been largely taken in hand by the enemy and
could become in a relatively short time a trump for him'. The communists
had won this popularsupport not only because they “are well-behaved
and respectful of the needs and cares of the p o p ula tio n , but also
because “aerial bombardments against the villagers have caused
civilian loss on a large sca le'. Unsurprisingly, the peasant survivors of
the bombing were turning to the CPK for support16.
One casualty was Pol Pot's family home in Kompong Thom,
which burnt to the ground after a US bombing strike there in July 1970.

8 V ietnam Generation
In November, an F -105 napalm raid on Kompong Svay village in the
same province left ten villagers dead. According to a local man, Kun
Chhay, however, the “cruellest of a ll' were the Cluster Bomb Units,
which US planes began to scatter through the nearby forest and
countryside in 1971. These bombs would detonate when people
unwittingly stepped on them 16.
The bombings also led to large population movements. The
two-m onth US ground invasion of Kampuchea in 1970 created 130X00
Khm er refugees17. In 1971, sixty percent of refugees surveyed in the
towns of Lon N o l's Khmer Republic gave the continued bombing as the
main reason fo r their displacem ent18. A contem porary report on how
bombing turned villagers into refugees also quoted a young Khmer
peasant w ho said he had joined the revolutionary army a few days
after an aerial attack on Kompong Cham province took the lives of 50
people in his village of Thm ar Pich19. This youth defected a year later,
but another such victim of a 1971 bombing raid, w ho by the age of
tw enty had become a CPK com pany commander, told journalists on
the Thai border in 1979 how his village in Pursat had been bombed eight
years before, killing 200 of its 350 inhabitants and propelling him into a
career of violence and absolute loyalty to the CPK20.
Not all the bombing was the work of Am erican or ARVN pilots.
The T-28 fleet of the Lon Nol air force, strafing and dropping napalm as
well as explosives, took a toll in villages behind com m unist lines
throughout the war. In 1971, T-28s destroyed the rice mill and houses in
Prey C hhor village of Prey Veng province, and 200 houses were burnt
down in nearby Dong village. In Kompong Speu, Kbar Chen village
near Oudong lost six of its civilian inhabitants in a 1971 attack and two
more in a second bombardment the next year21. Such T-28 raids
probably struck the greatest number of Kampuchean villages. A
peasant from Sam rong in Svay Rieng recalls what he witnessed: “One
day in 1971, a T-28 arrived on reconnaissance and before leaving it fired
on people growing rice — they were considered 'V C '. Three planes
then returned and dropped napalm. All the trees and many houses
were destroyed, and more than ten people kille d .'
However, the most dramatic incidents involved direct hits by
US B-52s. The same peasant recalls:
Then In 1972 B-52s bombed three times per day, fifteen minutes
apart, three planes a t a time. They hit houses In Samrong and
thirty people were killed. There were no troops In these
villages. A ttha ttlm e there were some Vietnamese (communist)
troops on the border (nearby), but they d id n 't bomb the
border; they bombed Inside It, people's houses.
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The town of Chantrea was destroyed by US bombs... The
people were angry with the US, and that Is why so many of
them Joined the Khmer communists.

When troops did approach villages, the planes came again.
Another peasant from SvayRieng recalls: “In 1972, during a fierce battle
between North Vietnamese and Thieu troops right in my village, six
houses and all the trees were destroyed by napalm. There were no
deaths though, because the people had all run away.'22
Attempts by communist troops to escape bombing by lodging
in villages often proved fruitless. A CIA report describes the destruction
by bombing of three-quarters of the houses in a Kompong Cham
village in 1972; the surviving inhabitants in this case expelled the North
Vietnamese troops23. Not far away in the same province, bombs fell on
O Reang Au market for the first time in 1972, killing twenty people24.
All but one of these 1972 incidents occurred in the Eastern Zone
of Kampuchea, where US strategic (B-52) bombardment was
concentrated almost exclusively at the time. But the bombing there
did not let up the next year (even though it spread equally intensively
to the rest of the countryside, over all Zones but the Northwest)25.
O
Reang Au was bombed twice more in 1973. The first time, the
rice mill was hit, killing anothertwenty people, and then it was hit again
and completely destroyed along with a number of houses nearby. Five
more people died, including two Buddhist monks26.
Bombs also hit Boeng village in the same vicinity. It was burnt
to the ground, and according to peasants from the area, many people
were caught in their houses and there were “thousands of deaths',
undoubtedly an exaggeration of the more accurate “many'. Again
in the same district, Chalong village lost over twenty dead when the
village and its pagoda were hit by T-28s during a battle. In this case,
all the monks escaped unhurt, but an inhabitant notes:
On the river many monasteries were destroyed by bombs.
People In our village were furious with the Americans; they did
not know why the Americans had bombed them. Seventy
people from Chalong Joined the fight against Lon Nol after
the bombing27.

In a direct hit on Trey Chap village in Prey Veng, a raid by four
F - l l l s killed over twenty people. The village was destroyed and
subsequently abandoned. Meanwhile, Lon Nol's T-28s kept up their
campaigns. Two kilometers away, Anlong Trea village was napalmed
and bombed, killing three people and destroying four houses. “Over
sixty people from this village then Joined the Khmer Communist army

10 Vietnam Generation
out of anger at the bombing', locals rec a ll.'28
B-52s also scored a direct hit on Trapeang Krapeu village in
Kompong Cham. At least twenty people died. Other raids in the area
destroyed hundreds of hectares of rubber plantations29.
Still In the Eastern Zone, a 1973 bombing strike killed five elderly
people near Krachap village in Prey Veng (CPK Region24). Asubsequent
visit to the area by a reconnaissance plane was followed by four
Dakota helicopters bringing troops. According to a local peasant
woman, the troops “drove our cattle away and stole clothes, pots and
pans, everything. There was nothing left here*. (In 1970. Saigon troops
had already killed three of Krachap's inhabitants and stolen threequarters of the cattle-herd.) The woman says that at this point, in 1973,
she had yet to even meet a “Khmer Rouge'30.
The CPK Secretary of Region 24, a man known as Chhouk, was
then based further north, in a village which his widow claims was
bombed twice a month:
(The pilots) could see motorcycles coming and going and
they knew that an office was there. While I was there over
thirty people were killed by bombs. In their houses. In the
trenches, or while running to the trenches. Some entire
households were killed In their homes'.

Presumably this involved accurate targeting of a Khmer Rouge
base. In a similar incident, a Khmer Rouge cadre recalls a direct hit on
the district office in Komchay Meas, in which forty people were killed.
(He adds tha ta number of otherpeople, who were merely foraging or
trading along the roads, also died in raids by B-52s, Phantoms, and F105s.)32 A third case occurred in the same area, according to a female
cadre .when a jungle office was bombed in one of many attacks, each
of which took several lives. “There were spies inside,' she claims, not
only revealing the accuracy of the bombing, but also touching on an
increasing Khmer Rouge tendency to punish alleged culprits who were
simply more accessible than those actually performing the raids33. As
we shall see. innocent village people suffered at the hands of the
Khmer Rouge as a result of the bombing raids, even if they had
escaped direct bombardment by US or Lon Nol aircraft.
In January and February 1973, the heaviest B-52 bombing was
in the northern part of the Eastern Zone, known as Region 21. One local
cadre from Memut says that O Klok village suffered a direct hit “right
through the villa ge' in this period. Thirty people were killed and over a
hundred wounded, and 100 houses were destroyed34. In March 1973
the bombing spread across the whole country, but remained heaviest
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in the East35. Associated Press reported popular com plaints “about the
bom bing by the US B-52s and je t fighters, w ith increasing reports o f
bombs killing civilians and destroying villag es'35. Even around Phnom
Penh itself, international relief officials in the capital estim ated th a t “no
few er than 3,000 civilians' were killed in the last three weeks o f March37.
According to a United Press International dispatch a t the end o f the
month:
Refugees swarming Into the capital from target areas report
dozens of villages, both east and southeast of Phnom Penh,
have been destroyed and as much as half their population
killed or maimed In the current bombing raids by B-52s and
F-l 11 tactical fighter-bombers38.
W ithin days o f this report, the US bom bardm ent intensified,
reaching a level of 3,600 tons per day on April 2 -3 ,197339. B-52 carpet
bombing was reported w ithin ten miles o f Phnom Penh, as well as on
the outskirts of Kompong Thom city. A fter thirty consecutive days of
intensive American bom bing, a US intelligence offic e r w ho had
interrogated refugees from the village o f Ban Krom, sixteen miles from
Phnom Penh, remarked: "Ban Krom has been com pletely leveled.
There have been many dead, many wounded and many secondary
explosions. W e judge the bombing results quite sa tisfa c to ry.'40 Ban
Krom may even have been a military target. But large-scale civilian
casualties m ust have been anticipated and accepted. As Elizabeth
Beckerwrote in the Far Eastern Economic Reviewon April 16, “according
to m ilitary reports, the targets o f these devastating missions are in
heavily-populated a re a s'41. One “source' was cited by Associated
Press to the e ffe ct th a t "the Americans are reluctant to call in air strikes
on villages where the opposition forces are mingling w ith the civilian
inha b ita nts'42.
But considerable evidence exists th a t even villages
which did not house opposition forces were bom barded, resulting in
massive loss o f civilian life. One reason was later outlined to William
Shawcross by the chief o f the political section in the US Embassy in
Phnom Penh, William Harben. Shawcross w rites th a t Harben was
appalled by the bombing toll “and now did w hat others m ight have
d o n e ':
He cut out, to scale, the 'box' made by a B-52 strike and
placed it on his own map. He found that virtually nowhere In
central Cambodia could It be placed without 'boxing' a
village. "I began to get reports of wholesale carnage', he
says. 'One night a mass of peasants from a village near
Saang went out on a funeral procession. They walked straight
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Into a 'box'. Hundreds were slaughtered.'43

Shawcross also tells the story of Donald Dawson, a young Air
Force captain who flew twenty-five B-52 missions over Cambodia in
1973. A report that ’ a Cambodian wedding party had been 'boxed'
by B-52s... forced him, he said, to realize that the Cambodians were
human beings and to recognize that nonmilitary targets were being
h it'. On June 19,1973, Dawson refused to fly another mission. (He then
joined in a lawsuit to have US courts declare the bombing of Cambodia
illegal. Topreventthepossibilityofsuchajudgement.theUSGovemment
granted Dawson conscientious-objector status, and the High Court
never heard the case.)44
The B-52s needed ground radar beacons to guide them to their
targets. One had been sited on top of the US embassy in Phnom Penh,
but it was removed in April 1973 for fear of an accident. Shawcross
continues: "A t the same time more and more beacons were installed
in Cambodian towns to cope with the expansion of the bombing. On
August 7 one navigator who was using the Neak Luong beacon forgot
to flip his switch. Six miles above the town the plane's belly opened and
the long thirty-ton string of bombs 'boxed' without warning onto the
people below .' 137 townspeople were killed and 268 wounded46.
Even apart from the death toll, as in earlieryears the population
movements forced by the 1973 bombing were enormous. As Richard
Blystone reported from Phnom Penh for Associated Press: ‘ No one can
say with confidence how many refugees there are in Cambodia... The
governm ent's latest estimate is 520,000 registered displaced persons
country-wide, with another 200XXX) unregistered. A consultantto a US
Senate Subcommittee estimated recently that as many as 3 million
people have been forced to leave home at one time or another during
the country's three-year w a r,' out of a population of seven million.
Blystone then added:
Among dozens o f refugees Interviewed, many said fear o f US
bombing was one of their reasons for fleeing, but few told of
actually being bombed. A t a pagoda outside o f Phnom
Penh one woman said her 13 year-old son and two cousins
died two weeks ago when a bomb hit a Jungle bunker where
the family had taken shelter.
Asked whether they wanted the bombing stopped whatever
the consequences for the Phnom Penh government, her
neighbors grew enthusiastic. They said "Y e s'46.

From April to June 1973 the bombing was most concentrated in
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the Southwest and Northern Zones of Kampuchea47. April also saw the
heaviest bombing of the Northeast. Then in July and August the
Southwest was carpet-bombed in the most intensive B-52 campaign
yet. while tactical bombing raids increased by 21 percent, flouting
Nixon's agreement with Congress that the intensity of the bombing
would not be raised after July l 4*. The heretofore delicate CPK
factional balance in the Southwest Zone49warrants close attention to
the bombing's impact there. Did it tip the balance in favor of the Pol
Pot Center group ?
In many cases, careful digging of trenches by locals was
sufficient to reduce deaths. Am pilTuk village in Region 15, for instance,
was bombed eight times in 1973; twice by B-52s, four times by US jets,
and twice by Lon Nol T-28s. "There were wounded but no one was killed
because everyone hid in trenches," a villager reports50. However,
another man from the same Region says that, only three days before
the bombing halt on 15 August:
Three F-l 1Is bombed right center In my village, killing eleven
of my family members. My father was wounded but survived.
At that time there was not a single soldier In the village, or In
the area around the village. 27 other villagers were also killed.
They had run Into a ditch to hide and then two bombs fell right
Into It. The bombs seemed to be guided Into It like they had
eyes51.

Even where civilian casualties were not known to be high, the
CPK were nowable to recruit large numbers of peasants by highlighting
the damage done by US air strikes. An Intelligence Information Cable,
dated 2 May 1973, from the C IA's Directorate of Operations made this
point after investigations in Region 25 of the Southwest Zone:
1. Khmer Insurgent (Kl) cadre have begun an Intensified
proselyting (ste) campaign among ethnic Cambodian
residents In the area of Chrouy Snao. Kaoh Thom district,
Kandal province, Cambodia, In an effort to recruit young
men and women for Kl military organizations. They are using
damage caused by B-52 strikes as the main theme o f their
propaganda. The cadre tell the people that the Government
o f Lon Nol has requested the alrstrlkes and Is responsible for
the damage and the ’suffering o f Innocent villagers' in order
to keep himself In power. The only way to stop ’the massive
destruction of the country' Is to remove Lon Nol and return
Prince Sihanouk to power. The proselyting (s/c) cadres tell the
people that the quickest way to accomplish this Isto strengthen
Kl forces so they will be able to defeat Lon Nol and stop the
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bombing.
2. This approach has resulted in the successful recruitment of
a number of young men for Kl forces. Residents around
Chrouy Snao say that the propaganda campaign has been
effective with refugees and In areas of Kaoh Thom and Leuk
Dek districts which have been subject to B-52 strikes52

In Chamcar Ang village. Tram Kak district of Region 13 (Takeo
province), in the same Zone locals say more than eighty people died
when B-52s hit the village and its pagoda53. In the same Region, a CPK
cadre recalled that Wat Angrun village was annihilated; a single family
survived, and 120 houses were destroyed in the air raid. The cadre
added, however: “The army was not hit all that hard, because at that
time we put our lines right up against the enemy, and most of the
bombs fell behind us. This was especially true in the case of E-52s which
hit either the people or nothing.'54
Region 13 was one of the strongholds of the CPK Center, which
it ruled through its ally Mok. Mok's son-in-law, Khe Muth, was Deputy
CPK Secretary there, and chief of Tram Kak district. The 1973 bombing
saw an intensification of CPK Center control. Now Muth was promoted
to become CPK Secretary of a newly organized military force, the 3rd
Southwest Zone Brigade. His wife Khom, daughter of Mok, then
became CPK Secretary of Tram Kak district55.
In Kompong Chhnang (Region 31), Mam Lon, who was then a
CPK subdistrict cadre, says that both T-28s and B-52s bombed his village
of Prey Thom. He claims more than one hundred people were killed
and wounded. “The people were very angry at the imperialists,' he
adds. Although he draws no connection, Lon also reports that soon
afterwards, as in Region l3,theCPK's political line hardened significantly,
and a number of cadres, including himself, were soon dismissed55.
These two examples reflect a general trend in the Southwest Zone in
1973, which we will examine in detail.

The HEREdiTARy E nemy
Early in 1973, while continuing to wage war against Lon Nol.the
CPK began an intensified campaign to drive the Vietnamese
communists from the country, in combination with a new purge of
Sihanoukists, pro-Vietnamese communists, and other dissident 'Third
Force' cadre. At public meetings in the Southwest province of Kampot,
Sihanouk was accused of supporting “the hated Vietnamese,' and
both were described as enemies like Lon Nol57. According to a
subdistrict cadre from Kompong Speu, Zone Secretary Mok rounded
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up hundreds of Khmer dissidents “from all over the Southwest' during
1973. They were taken to a worksite and forced to perform hard labour
before being executed58.
The reason usually given by CPK leaders for their increased
hostility towards the Vietnamese communists in 1973, was the attempt,
flowing from the Paris talks with the US, to get the CPK to negotiate with
Lon Nol. In Kompong Speu,the same subdistrict cadre reports, ’ Mok
told us that there had been three countries fighting the imperialists
together. 'Now Vietnam and Laos have negotiated with the US.
Kampuchea will not.' He said all cadres had to be instructed that
Kampuchea would not negotiate.'59
Mok made this speech only two weeks after the new US
bombing campaign began, and the subdistrict cadre's own village
had just been destroyed by B-52s, with the loss of three lives. He
continues: “And Mok said that the US had previously divided its
bombing between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. But now that the
other two had gone to negotiate, the US was bringing all its bombs to
drop on Kampuchea alone, twenty-four hours a day, because it did
not negotiate . '50
On the other hand, in Region 13, Zone cadres contradicted
these claims, proclaiming that negotiations would notstopthe bombing,
but “would only lead to a prolongation of the w a r'. The CPK's real
intention was to allege Vietnamese perfidy, and to assert that, that, in
the words of these cadres, refusal to negotiate “would demonstrate to
the world that our Khmer Organization was independent'.
Mok preferred not to stress that the Vietnamese were
withdrawing from Kampuchea as a result of the Paris Agreement, nor
that, as was well known in the Party, not only Vietnam but “some of our
friends like China also wanted us to negotiate'61. Thus, because it
negotiated with the US while the CPK refused to, and because it had
tried to get the CPK to change its mind, Hanoi was blamed by the CPK
for the resultant American bombardment of Kampuchea.
A more reasonable explanation, it seems to me, would limit
blame to the parties directly involved in continuing the Kampuchean
war. For its part, the CPK can hardly be blamed for the bombing itself,
even though it profited politically.
Responsibility for the aerial
devastation and massacre of course lies with its instigators, the US
Government. Yet the 1973 bombing is unlikely to have been ordered in
the event of a negotiated ceasefire like that concluded in Laos in
February 1973. The CPK leadership would have been aware of this from
the outset.
The CPK Center may have expected the bombing to indirectly
serve its aims by inflaming hatred of the Vietnamese, and as we have
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seen this did occur in a number of cases. But the hatred often had to
be conjured up by stressing more remote issues. A woman from the
Southw est's Region 33, for example, says that Vietnamese communist
troops were camped “in the forest west of my house' throughout 1973.
They behaved well and created no problems, and the villagers talked
without strain of solidarity, she says. But when they left at the end of the
year, the CPK subdistrict chief began to talk of “mutual enm ity'
between the two peoples62. He was probably following local CPK
documents which referred to Vietnamese as the “hereditary enem y'
and the “acute e ne m y'63.
A Hanoi-trained Khmer communist cadre, Yos Por, recalls a
meeting in Kampot in late 1973, which was addressed by Mok, and two
CPK Region 35 leaders.
They collected all o f us who had studied abroad, a t W at
Chhouk, and started to accuse us... o f selling the territory to
Vietnam. They were Instigating the breaking o f solidarity with
Vietnam, talking In terms o f history. Mok said that Kampuchean
territory was wherever there are sugar palms. This included
Kampuchea Krom (‘Lower Cambodia', the Mekong Deltaj.
which Vietnam had taken (In the eighteenth century). The
Kampucheans would fight to get It back, Mok said64.

Within months, a CPK district chief in Kompong Chhnang (Region 31).
told his subordinates: “Kampuchea Krom must be liberated; it was
once Khmer territory and we have lost it all. If we do not fight the
Vietnamese, we will lose the rest of our country... Vietnam is the most
acute enemy, the hereditary enemy. After victory we aim to go and
liberate Kampuchea Kro m .'65
Underlying the anti-Vietnamese position, then, was the C PK's
revival of national chauvinism. Defeat of the US and Lon Nol was only
a step towards the national and racial grandeur of which young
members of the traditional elite had long dreamed66. In rural warlords
like Mok (and Pauk in the Northern Zone), the form er members of the
upper classes who made up the CPK Center now had the means to put
their dreams into effect.

TH e CLa ss ENEiviy
On 20 May 1973, as the US bombardment approached its
height, the CPK Center launched a 'cooperativization' program,
which initially involved organizing peasants into groups o fte n, twenty,
or thirty families. This had already occurred in many CPK-held areas,
but now land was to be collectivized as well and the produce of the
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peasants' labour was to be confiscated by the authorities. In some
cases, regulations concerning the destruction of religion and family
life, and enforced communal eating in mess halls, were also
implemented. This was termed the "Democratic Revolution'67.
The increased demands of the CPK armed forces, resulting
from the bombing, partly motivated this new campaign. The CIA
Intelligence Information Cable of 2 May 1973 reported the testimony of
a CPK platoon commander, who said that “B-52 strikes in Leuk Dek
district killed many soldiers and guerrillas of the K-24 and K-25 battalions.
He said villagers left their homes and took only what they could carry.
In spite of the disruption, Khmer Insurgent (Kl) finance-economy cadre
were ordered to collect as much food and money as possible to supply
Kl and North Vietnamese army forces. This has caused resentment
among the villagers, many of whom were already short of fo o d .'68
A CPK document dated February 1974 gave one of its reasons
for the campaign, as follows: "O ur country is at war and no mercy has
been shown us. Therefore, many of our young people have gone off
to the battlefield, and only the old and women are le ft.'69 A CPK
member later explained that by ensuring a minimum subsistence for all
villagers through collection of rationing of supplies, the communists
could “release forces' for the army and its logistical needs, notably the
able-bodied who in theory were no longer needed to support their
families70.
However, both these CPK sources also gave a second reason,
an ideological one. The CPK document explained: “We must construct
a clean, honest society.' What this meant was to be outlined the next
year in the CPK's internal magazine, Tung Padevat (Revolutionary
Flags). Its author expressed a studied ambivalence about the situation
in communist-held areas up to 1973:
There was progress on the one hand, and the same old
society on the other... The state confiscated land from the
traitors... and took control of It... This was a good point...
(Secondly, however) those In possession of the land continued
to keep their private ownership. Furthermore, previously
landless peasants, and previously landless workers now
received land from the state. Therefore, land remained In
private ownership In general71.

The result was that “the traders and the enemy... were the masters... We
could not become the masters if we continued on this road... Our state
was their satellite.' The example given illustrates the extreme sensitivity
of the CPK: “Kratie township showed the same signs as in the old
society. Honda motorcycles were speeding up and down the streets

18 Vietnam Generation
like before, while our ragged guerrillas walked in the d u st.'72
So in 1973 the CPK Center decided that it must ensure that "the
state controlled everything'. Kratie's population was evacuated to
the countryside. There was to be "no more trading, mortgaging, labor
exchanging or buying on credit'. A state monopoly was decreed over
rice, salt, fuel, cloth and petrol. Without petrol, private owners of
vehicles (and Honda motorcycles) 'disappeared'; the CPK state took
over their equipment. Private ownership of land and of the means of
production was also abolished73.
The political motivation for all this is underlined by a former
Eastern Zone CPK member, who attributes the changes to heightened
revolutionary zeal resulting from the advances the Party had made
thus far: 'Th e reason was that the people supported the Khmer Reds,
so the Khmer Reds decided to move on to higher-stage cooperatives. *74
Given more than an inch by their association with Sihanouk, their aid
from the Vietnamese communists, and the popular reaction to the US
bombing, the CPK Center now decided to take a mile. Popular
approval of relatively moderate policies became an excuse for extremist
ones.
The accounts of two peasants from different parts of the
country illustrate this. They also contradict the claim that the
cooperatives provided a superior means of ensuring the subsistence of
villagers. N em ,46,from Region 31 in the Southwest Zone, says that the
mutual aid teams introduced in 1972 were popular in his village; each
person earned an adequate ration of paddy per year. But in late 1973,
cooperatives were organized, and Nem became a cook in the
com m unal eating hall.
Rations were insufficient, popular
disenchantment rose, and within a year villagers were being executed
for stealing food from the common store75.
Sang, 43, a peasant from Region 22 in the Eastern Zone, recalls
that 'th e living conditions of the people were really prosperous' after
the introduction of mutual aid teams in 1972.
'It was easy, no
problem s.' But,
Then In 1973 the cooperatives were formed, and difficulties
began. The rice was stored in collective warehouses, and
food ran short. Eventually people ate only rice gruel, with salt,
water and banana stalks. We had to get permission to raise
our own poultry, under pain of imprisonment.

Importantly, though. Sang noted that the cooperatives were not
established "all at once' in mid-1973. Rather, the local Party leaders
'selected certain good places, with good cadres' to start with, “for
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fear of popular reaction'. The process was not complete even two
years later, when communal eating was finally instituted (much later
than in the Southwest). Sang described the local CPK district and
subdistrict chiefs up to that time, in favorable terms. Three villagers
were imprisoned in 1974, but he reported no executions or starvation. It
is hard to believe that the cooperatives could have been established
at all without, firstly, some degree of public confidence in the local CPK
leaders, and secondly, the fact that "people in our village were furious
with the Americans'. For it was in Sang's village, called Chalong, that
more than twenty people were killed in a T-28 bombardment in 1973,
and seventy others immediately joined the communist army76.

TH e No r t Hern Z one : TH e em erq en c e o f D em o c ra tic
K

am puchea

Outside the Eastern Zone, the CPK response to the bombing
was far more dramatic. Even where no deaths resulted, there were
frequently subsequent arrests of villagers suspected of being “spies'
who had called in the air strikes. The most proximate potential culprit
againtookthe blame. Paranoia beganto plague the Khmer communist
movement as never before. In the Northern Zone, Kun Chhay. who
lived in Sankor village of Region 32, recalls that Ke Pauk's CPK troops
now accused the villagers of being "CIA agents' who had brought in
the US planes. The people of Sankor, now afraid of both US bombing
and Pauk's justice, offered no resistance when Lon Nol forces penetrated
the area and created a third alternative: "(They) pointed guns at us,
and told us to leave for Kompong Thom C ity.'77
According to Chhay. this new Lon Nol army patrolling was the
culmination of "countless' raids on Kompong Svay district by B-52s, T28s, F-105s, F-l 1Is , and Skyraiders, mostly from mid-1972 to March 1973.
B-52s, for instance, struck Stung Kambot village at 9 o'clock one
morning in February 1973. They killed 50 villagers and seriously wounded
30 others. No Khmer Rouge were among the casualties. A week later
another raid struck at nearby Prey Tup village. Then in March 1973, B52s and F-111 s bombarded an ox-cart caravan at O Saray in the same
district, killing ten peasants78.
The effect of all this was predictable. Chhay says: “It often
happened (that) people were made angry by the bombing and went
to join the revolution.' And if they did not, they ran the risk of being
blamed. as spies, for the damage and loss of life their communities had
suffered. Pauk's troops killed peasants on such accusations. (And
after the war ended in 1975, Chhay says, further revenge was exacted
by CPK cadres from city people and others they held responsible for
the bombing.)79
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Further south, a peasant youth named Thoun Cheng recalled
the impact of the bombing on his village of Banteay Chey. For three
months, B-52s bombed the village three to six times per day. Several of
C heng's family members were injured in the raids, and over 1,000
people were killed — nearly a third of Banteay C hey's population.
After the bombing ended, Cheng says, “there were few people left to
be seen around the village, and it was quiet“80.
Another young peasant, Tong Teng, joined the communist
army in 1970 in Santuk district of the Northern Zone. He told Frangols
Ponchaud and Bruce Palling in a 1982 interview that “bombing was a
normal thing from 1970 o n '. He added:
If you mean big bombs, Isaw them being dropped at Andaung
Prlng (village)... The bombs came tumbling down In a big
clump... right onto Andaung Prlng, and that time villagers
were killed In amazing numbers... The bombs fell In the village,
setting fire to people's houses and killing them... sometimes
they d id n't even have the time to get down out o f their
houses.
The bombing was massive and devastating, and they Just
kept bombing more and more massively, so massively you
couldn't believe It, so that it engulfed the forests, engulfed the
forests with bombs, with devastation81.

Chhit Do had come into the communist movement from a
sim ilar background, and at the time of the 1973 bombing he was an
agitprop leader in the Angkor Wat area of northern Kampuchea. He
was there at the time of Norodom Sihanouk's clandestine visit in March,
1973. (He recalls: “Sihanouk had been gone only a day when the B-52s
came after him and bombed... The bombing completely tore up that
road, as if it had never existed.') In late 1973 Chhit Do became a CPK
subdistrict chief, and after victory in April 1975, commander of a 3,000strong regional work brigade. In 1979, he fled the country, and three
years later he too looked back on the period of the US bombing: “It was
difficult in every possible way... due both to everybody's fear of the
bombing and to the fact that everybody was engaged in making war
outside of their villages. All the young people had gone off to war...
There w a sn't anything to eat. They still had to turn over rice to the
Khmer Rouge.' Bruce Palling then asked Chhit Do a series of questions:
Q. Were people being killed by the bombs ?
A. Oh yes, there were some... Some Khmer Rouge soldiers and
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some ordinary people were killed by the bombs, by the
planes.
Q. Did the Khmer Rouge make use of the bombing to do
propaganda against the US ?
A. Oh yes, they did make use o f It. They did use It to stigmatize
the US. They said that all this bombing was an attem pt to
make us an American satellite, a manifestation o f simple
American barbarism, because, after all, as they pointed out,
we had never done anything to these Americans, the people
had never done anything atall to America. TheKhm ersdldn't
even have any alrplanesand here the Americans had brought
theirs to bomb us, causing great pain to us. with their war. Their
country was way over there somewhere and here they had
come to Interfere with us... (The) propaganda was tha t this
guy Lon Nol had already sold the country to the Americans,
because Lon Nol wanted power, wanted to be President...

Q: Could you be more specific about the content o f their
propaganda?
A: They shouted and they cursed and called for opposition to
the Americans. Moreover, they took the people to see the
effects of the bombing as a kind of additional political
education. Every time after there had been bombing, they
would take the people to see the craters, to see how big and
deep the craters were, to see how the earth had been
gouged out and scorched. And the political education
cadres would pick up pieces o f shrapnel and these slabs of
metal that had been part of the bomb casings to show them
to the people and point out that the bombs were the size of
a man, the size o f 100 kilogram rice sacks. They would say that
the purpose o f the bombing was to completely destroy the
country, not simply Just to win the war while leaving the
people alive to rebuild It after the war was over, but to
annihilate the population, and that It was only because we
were taking cover, moving around to avoid the bombing,
that some of us were surviving. So they used the bombing, the
bomb craters and the bomb shrapnel to educate the people
politically, to make the people hate and be enraged a t the
Americans. They said that In Japan, the Americans had
dropped an atom bomb during World W ar II. They said that
we must point our anger a t the Americans and never forget,
that even If every last one o f us were killed, we still must not
give up. As long as anybody was left alive, we must Just keep
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on struggling and struggling.
Q: That's what the cadres said, but how did the people
themselves feel?
A: The ordinary people were terrified by the bombing and the
shelling, never having experienced war, and sometimes they
literally shit In their pants when the big bombs and shells came.
Artillery bombardments usually Involved 200-400 shells per
attack, and some people became shell-shocked. Just like
their brains were completely disoriented. Even though the
shelling had stopped, they couldn't hold down a meal. Their
minds just froze up and would wander around mute and not
talk for three or four days. Terrified and half-crazy, the people
were ready to believe what they were told. W hat (the Khmer
Rouge) said was credible because there were just so many
huge bombs dropped. That was what made it so easy for the
Khmer Rouge to win the people over... It was because o f their
dissatisfaction with the bombing that they kept on cooperating
with the Khmer Rouge, Joining up with the Khmer Rouge,
sending their children o ff to go with them, to Join the Khmer
Rouge....
Q: So the American bombing was a kind of help to the Khmer
Rouge ?
A: Yes, that's right. Itw asa kind of help. It helped to get them
to come over to the Khmer Rouge and help, because the
people saw, well, sometimes the bombs fell and hit little
children, and their fathers would be all for the Khmer Rouge.. ®2

An earlieraccount of the effectsof the bombing inthe Northern
Zone comes from a CPK infantryman who subsequently defected to
the Lon Nol government. His first battle was the early 1973 siege of
Kompong Thom, which he says progressed successfully for several
months. Towards the end of that period the town's residents began to
flee through the battle lines into the insurgent zones. "But one night...
we heard a terrifying noise which shook the ground; it was as if the earth
trembled, rose up and opened beneath ourfeet. Enormous explosions
lit up the sky like huge bolts of lightning; it was the American B-52s.'
In the morning we received the order to retreat at the double
from Kompong Thom. The countryside was upturned .cratered
with huge holes; the trees were smashed to splinters and all
our trenches had been disemboweled or burled. Hundreds of
our comrades had been killed. We were scarcely better o ff
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- we could no longer hear anything, and we could hardly walk
straight. With the other survivors we headed by truck towards
the forests of the Northwest.

Just as they did in the Southwest, CPK internecine antagonisms
in the Northern Zone became most serious in 1973. The same soldier
reports that by the year's end:
There had been conflicts between the civil and military
leaders (Koy Thuon and Ke Pauk, respectively) of the
Organization. The civil leaders claimed that the military
offensive had been launched too early, and that Its failure
had compromised the establishm ent of the new
administration. The military claimed that the civilians' mistakes
had broken the patriotic spirit of the population, who after the
B-52 raids and the retreat of our forces had fled to the other
side.
Many villagers, peasants and officers had been executed
and the disorganized Khmer Rouge militias had been fighting
one another63.

Obviously, the military debacle sparked recriminations. As Pol Pot
himself had his headquarters in the Northern Zone, these proved
crucial. Koy Thuon was later accused of “giving no thought to the
battlefield'*4. A previously influential moderate CPK leader, Thuon
was pushed aside by Ke Pauk, whose fellow warlord Mok, another Pol
Pot ally, was at that very time fuming his guns on moderates in the
Southwest Zone.
Afterthe bombing halt in August 1973, the soldier returned with
his unit to Kompong Thom to find that the population movement into
the countryside had reversed. 50,000 peasants had in fact fled into
Kompong Thom town. “The countryside was deserted, the villages
empty,' the soldier recalls. This was not just because of the US
bombardment or the aggressive Lon Nol army patrolling. It was also
because Ke Pauk (and probably Pol Pot's wife Khieu Ponnary, who in
July 1973 was reported to have become CPK Secretary of Kompong
Thom province) had fully implemented the Democratic Revolution in
the region.
In the Kompong Thom region the Organization (the CPK, was)
led by very severe men... Their discipline was terrible; there
were many executions... Buddha statues were destroyed and
pagodas secularized; youths forced to work very hard,
especially when the villages had been reorganized and
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rebuilt; the Organization had not allowed the construction of
Individual houses; there were camps for women, children,
young women and young men; meals were eaten
communally and rations consisted only of rice soup without
meat... children were forbidden to respect their parents,
monks to pray, husbands to live with their wives...85

In Kompong Kdei district of Siemreap province, during 1972,
some bombing of the area had already begun; and although the
digging of trenches kept the number of local deaths low, the
appearance of US planes inspired great fear. According to a Kompong
Kdei woman: "At that time it was not so hard working under the Khmer
Rouge; we were afraid only of dying under the bombs.' Here as
elsewhere, intensification of the US aerial campaign was accompanied
by a significant hardening of communist policy. B-52 bombing of the
area began in March 1973, and in that month, according to the
woman, Kompong Kdei was forcibly evacuated by CPK forces and the
market closed down; the town's one thousand families, now alleged
to be 'upper class' (vanna kphuos). were sent into the forest to clear
the land forfarming. Work was collective, in twelve-family groups, and
the harvests confiscated to feed the increased requirements of the
army. "They only left us with what we managed to hide away,' the
woman recalls85.
In September 1973, thirteen battalions of Pauk's forces seized
half of the city of Kompong Cham, and penetrated to within a hundred
meters of the Lon Nol province governor's residence. When they
withdrew, they took 15X00 townspeople into the countryside with
them. (Four Khmer communist troops captured by the Lon Nol forces
claimed that Vietnamese communist forces had offered fire support
for the siege of the town, but, they said, the CPK commander had
"refused this support at a critical stage of the fighting' because he
preferred to deploy his troops "to escort civilian captives' rather than
to pursue the battle for the town.)87
In February 1974, Pauk's forces were committed to a drive
towards Phnom Penh, and thousands more peasants in the Northern
Zone took the opportunity to flee into the Lon Nol-held province capital
of Kompong Thom. Their accounts, particularly of low food rations,
confirm other descriptions. "We were forced to work very hard, and
got nothing,' a former village chief told journalist Donald Kirk soon
afterwards. The death penalty was commonly applied, particularly for
evasion of the CPK draft. The refugee continued:
In April of 1973 they stopped talking about Sihanouk... They
said that he was "not the only m an,' that he was "no good
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now," and that 'w e do not need him any more'... If you still
use his name and support Sihanouk, then you will be sent
away, and you will never return... (We were told to) ‘support
Khleu Samphan and no others.'88

The 'state' of Democratic Kampuchea had emerged fully grown from
the Democratic Revolution in the Northern Zone. When that state was
officially proclaimed by the Pol Pot regime in January 1976, Norodom
Sihanouk was quickly replaced as Head of State by Khieu Samphan.

TH e NoRThEAST Z one
Because of its remoteness and sparse, mainly non-Khmer tribal
populations, little is known about political developments in the Northeast.
A defector reported in 1973 that for strategic reasons, the Zone was
‘ underthe direct administration' of Pol Pot's CPK Center89. The latter's
cooperativization program may have been inimical to the various
montagnard tribal populations there, and in combination with the US
bombing and the local influence of Vietnamese-trained communist
cadres, may have been responsible for a communist mutiny there in
197390. Vietnamese sources claim that the Zone military commander
and his Staff Assistant (both of whom had spent the 1954-1970 period
in Vietnam), and the Deputy CPK Secretary of Rattanakiri province, led
a popular rebellion in Voeunsai district in 19739’. They were unsuccessful,
and the three withdrew to the Vietnamese border; in 1974 they were
joined by another Hanoi-trained cadre,from Stung Treng92. At any rate
the Northeast in general receded in strategic significance for the
Center as CPK forces closed in on Phnom Penh.
But because of its importance as a staging point for Vietnamese
communist troops on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Northeast Zone was an
area of Kampuchea closely monitored by US forces. Moreover, after
30 June 1970, congressional limitations on the bombing of Kampuchea
restricted it to the interdiction of men and supplies en route to Vietnam.
This restriction ‘was ignored from the start' (‘ I want this purpose
interpreted very broadly,' Nixon said), and ‘thefalsification of bombing
reports was now accepted as normal'93. But the procedure was to
nominate the northeast, to be called Freedom Deal, as ‘ a virtual free
fire zone'94. Later, the area was extended to the whole of eastern
Kampuchea, as far as the Mekong River. As Shawcross reports:
It was gradually pushed southward and westward Into more
heavily populated areas, as the fighting spread. Bombing
outside Freedom Deal was reported as being Inside, and
bombing In populated areas Inside as being In wild,
uninhabited places. The mlsreportlng meant that there was
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very little folbw-up or 'bomb damage assessment*, after
mlssbns’ ®.

Nevertheless, the sparse population and jungle cover in the
Northeast Zone did favour reporting by US agents crossing the border
from Vietnam. The majority of Bomb Damage Assessments declassified
by the US Government are reports on the Northeast Zone, and nearly
half come from one district, Andaung Pich, of Rattanakiri Province,
adjacent to Vietnam’6.
The majorUStargets in this Zone were undoubtedly Vietnamese
communist troops (North Vietnamese Army or Viet Cong). This was
apparent, for instance, in the US Army reports on the destruction of the
province capital of Rattanakiri:
.... on 27 April 1973, Ba Kev City, Cambodia, was In ruins. All
(Illegible) completely destroyed (Illegible) raid. The city had
been abandoned and all civilians were believed to have
moved to safer locations. The suspected NVA battalbn-slze
base camp within the city had been completely devastated
and no evidence of NVA presence remained In the city....
Installatbns/facllitles destroyed included two bunkers of an
NVA bunker complex and an undetermined number of
dwellings within the city67.

But as the bombing reached it speak in mid-1973, the civilian
toll mounted. Villages were often bombed because they were near
alleged military camps or convoys of Vietnamese or Khmer insurgent
(Kl) troops. But civilian casualties frequently outnumbered military
ones. In two such incidents in early August 1973, the reported casualties
were as follows:
1. Seven houses destroyed, nine civilians kilted and 20
wounded. Extent o f communist military casualties unknown.
2. Eighteen houses destroyed, three civilians kilted and one
wounded. One Khmer Insurgent killed and six wounded. One
North Vietnam Army (NVA) soldier kilted9®.

Note that such statistics, according to Shawcross. are likely to
underestimate civilian casualties.
On 3 August 1973, US aircraft bombed the village of Plei Loh in
Rattanakiri province. According to an American agent who reported
on the damage nine days later, 'the village was totally destroyed, with
28 civilians and five VC guerrillas killed'” . He reported that about 30
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people had been wounded.
The next day, B-52s attacked Plei Lorn village in the same area.
According to the Army's Bomb Damage Assessment dated 16 August:
"A t Plei Lorn village there were 23 houses. Two bombs fell on two houses
killing twenty people, including children.'100 On 10 August, Plei Lom was
bombed again, “resulting in 30 montagnards and an unknown number
of guerrillas killed .',01
On the same day B-52s also struck nearby Plei Blah village: "As
a result 50 montagnards were killed, 30 houses in Plei Blah village.
Cambodia, and three houses in Plei Nhai village. South Vietnam, were
destroyed. An unknown number of communist troops and cadre were
killed.' It was later noted that Plei Nhai village was in fact located in
Cambodia, not Vietnam. The US army report continued: “Becausethe
strike took place so close to South Vietnam, the Communists intend to
use this incident for propaganda purposes.'’02 However, not enough
is known about the CPK internecine struggles in the Northeast Zone to
conclude that they bore any relationship to political effects of the US
bombardment of the Zone. The pattern is much clearer in what
became the heartland of the Pol Pot regime — the Southwest Zone.

AfTERM ATh: The S o u th w e s t Z one
The Southwest Zone saw the greatest convulsions in the
revolutionary ranks in 1973. This was the year that the Mok-Thuch Rin
tendency, closely allied with the Party Center, established its supremacy
over Chou Chet, Prasith and their more moderate colleagues, and
completely eclipsed the Hanoi-trained Khmer communists throughout
the Southwest Zone.

TAblE 2.
COMMUNIST PARTy o f KAMPUCHEA
So u rh w EST Z one P a r ty C o m m it t e e , 1972-1974’03
P o st
Chairman
Secretary
DeputySecretary
Member
Member
Member

1972
Chou Chet (demoted 1973)
Mok
Prasith (killed mid-1974)
Sangha Hoeun (killed 1973)
Thuch Rln
Phouk Chhay (demoted 1973)

1974
?
Mok
Kang Chap (from
26 August 1 9 7 4 -? )
?
Thuch Rin
?

N.B. Chou C het, Kang Chap, and Phouk Chhay were all arrested and executed In Dem ocratic
Kampushea In 1977-78. Mok and Thuch Rln remained Im portant leaden o f the exiled Party of
Dem ocratic Kampuchea In 1988.
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The first high-ranking victim was apparently Sangha Hoeun, a
communist veteran and a member of the Southwest Zone CPK
committee. A former monk from KompongSpeu, who had joined the
communists in 1970, recalls:
In 1971-72 the revolution was good; the people were not
worried atall. Sangha Hoeun was friendly with theVietnamese
and never had any trouble with them. And the people liked
Sangha Hoeun a lot because he sponsored theater
performances with traditional national music. Also, there
were plenty of Lon Nol soldiers who came to the liberated
zones from Phnom Penh and the province capitals, to Join the
revolution. Sangha Hoeun and Chou Chet re-educated and
taught these people. Isaw this; they did not kill them. ButMok
did kill such people, and he became angry with what the
other two were doing. There was a power struggle.
In 1973 the killings began. At first there were transfers of
subdlstrict and Region cadre. Then Chou Chetand his followers
fought with Mok's followers, at a combined Zone and Region
meeting In our subdistrict, which I helped organize. The fight
broke out over politics and theory. In the middle o f the
meeting. Chou Chet then left for the west to discuss the
question o f the execution of the Lon Nol soldiers. Phouk Chhay
went with him. I was told they were transferred to Koh Kong.
Two weeks later, Sangha Hoeun wasarrested by Mok's troops.
At first they took him under guard to our village for a day and
a night, and then to the Center or Zone (headquarters). Five
trucks came to take his fol towers away toKompongChhnang.

In 1976. Democratic Kampuchea security personnel reported that
Sangha Hoeun had been “sm ashed',04.
From across the Vietnamese border, the US analyst Kenneth
Quinn reported that in 1973, Chou Chet “had his authority and influence
... reduced because of his pro-NVA and pro-Sihanouk stands and, in
fact, was even ambushed and slightly wounded by the (CPK forces)
once in late November while travelling with some NVA soldiers on
Route 1 6 .',0S
After his arrival in Kompong Chhnang, Chou Chet continued to
stress solidarity with the Vietnamese at political meetings’06. A member
of the CPK youth movement there also claims that, because Chet was
an intellectual, he was in constant conflict with a "forest* revolutionary
like Mok. Further, Chet and others like Phouk Chhay (and Koy Thuon in
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the North) appreciated Prince Sihanouk's appeal, even if to them he
was only a figurehead. In fact, “the people believed in Sihanouk more
than in the revolution'; problems arose when the Party began to
criticize the Prince openly, and Mok's response was to impose his
authority by force;
Mok was cruel ever since 1971-72. Unlike Chou Chet and
Phouk Chhay, he was fierce, a killer. The killings began In 1973,
as the bombs were falling. Also, some prisoners of war were
executed, and others put In re-education centers. 1973 was
the year the US began bombing (the area) with B-52s, so they
had to fight back hard. The killings were In accordance with
regulations. This was called 'strengthening the Democratic
Revolution'. No one dared resist the changes.
I know for sure,from friends who worked directly with Mok, that
he was the one who ordered the killings. They took place In
the forest....
Mok had the power but he did not have much understanding
of politics. Phouk Chhay was educating him (but) there was
conflict between the 'forest resistance”, people like Mok,
and the 'Internal (urban) resistance", people like Phouk Chhay
who had recently arrived, since 1970. The conflict arose
because the Internal group wanted to train Ihe forest group
to Increase their capacity, and to assert their authority over
them107.

Here again they seem to have lost out. The CPK Secretary of Region 31,
Chan, was replaced in 1973 by Sarun, who was still loyal to the Party
Centereight years later. A campaign criticizing Sihanouk was launched.
and according to the local subdistrict cadre Mam Lon, there was a
“change in the political line'. Lon was expelled from the Party in
October, and soon afterwards one of his comrades in the youth
movement was executed along with three other local officials10*.
Kenneth Quinn reports that local elections were no longer held
in the areas newly seized from the Lon Nol government; from 1973, he
says, village chiefs and subdistrict officials were merely appointed by
CPK district committees. Buddhist festivals were reduced to two per
year.and Muslim ones “totallyforbidden.' InKampotin July 1973, each
Buddhist wat was ordered to supply ten monks to serve as infantrymen
in the army's depleted ranks. Soon afterwards, in both Takeo and
Kampot provinces, all but four monks in each wat were drafted, which
Quinn notes "decimated the monk population' there. At the same
time, towns in the area were evacuated, and in rural areas a “large-
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scale relocation process' was implemented — 20,000 people were
moved out of their villages In two districts of Kampot alone. Quinn
continues: “In parts of Takeo and Kampot, the Khmer Communists
brought in a large numberof newcadresto implementthis programme,
having lost faith in many older cadre whom they considered to be
either pro-North Vietnamese or not tough enough to carry it o u t.'109
July 1973 also saw the defection to the Lon Nol regime of the
Khmer communist military commander of Region 38 (Kompong Speu),
who had undergone training in Hanoi in 1971. (Two Khmer veterans
who had spent the years 1954-70 in Vietnam, also defected in 1973, the
first to do so since 1971.)’10
Popular unrest was also mounting’’’. Quinn reports that fighting
broke out between rival communist units in the Southwest in November
1973. He cites three incidents in Kampot of popular and military
reaction to attempts by CPK cadre to forcibly relocate the population
and confiscate rice harvests. In one cast, dissident communist forces
"rallied about 500 villagers to come to their aid, and, armed with
scythes, machetes and hatchets, drove the KK (Khmer Krahom , or
official CPK forces) off, killing nine and wounding twenty'. A fourth
clash in the same area in December saw a hundred people killed and
wounded, and by January 1974 "a large pro-Sihanouk force was
reported maneuvering to gain control of all of Route 16 from Tani to Tuk
Meas. as well as part of Route 205 each of Tani*. In March 1974, 742
communist dissidents surrendered to the Lon Nol regime in the Southwest.
They claimed to represent a total force of 10,000 who were ready to
follow them if Lon Nol granted them operational autonomy to continue
their fight against their CPK rivals. (They were refused.)
In Region 13, the imposition of the Democratic Revolution
sometimes provoked assassinations of cadres by enraged, recalcitrant
villagers. As one local CPK soldier tells it:
At first the Khmer Reds were popular, from 1970 to 1974. Their
line was good,with no oppression. The people were prepared
to follow them Into the socialist revolution. In July 1973 I
enlisted because 1believed what they said about liberating
Kampuchea from oppressorsand Imperialists. But persecution
began In 1973-74, when everything was collectivized.
Communal eating was Introduced In May 1973, In groups of
12 families. (Soon) people were eating banana leaves, sugar
palm roots, coconuts, and finally weeds. Then there was
nothing left at all. In the end the people rebelled, killing
cadres In all villages. Here (Prey Pley village) one cadre was
taken o ff and disappeared. So the Khmer Reds had to give
In, and In 1974 private eating was once again allowed.
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But this district. Tram Kak, run by Mok's daughter Khom, was to be
officially lauded by the Party as the first inTakeo to introduce communal
eating, which of course resumed after victory in 1975. Meanwhile, in
nearby Kong Pisei district (Region 33), two Region-level cadre were
assassinated by their own couriers in 1974, after they had attempted to
send out orders to implement the new measures. Although it is possible
that Quinn underestimated the solid base of support that the CPK had
developed among a minority of poor peasants in the Southwest, the
thrust of his conclusion is undeniable: "In early 1973 when the KK
entered the new harsh phase of their campaign In which all rules were
strictly enforced and unpopular programs carried out, with stiff penalties
for non-compliance, almost all popular feeling turned against them .'
Finally, and perhaps most important of all in the political sense,
came the destruction of Prasith, the Southwest Zone Deputy Party
Secretary who actually outranked Mok on the CPK Central Committee.
He ran coastal Koh Kong province. An ethnic Chinese woman who
was living there at the time recounts what happened to Prasith and his
lieutenant Prachha. whom she calls the ’free Khmer Rouge':
In late 1973, the Vietnamese....were told to go back to their
country and we saw no more of them.
In 1974, hard limes began. Zone and Regional armed forces
from Kompong Sella arrived In Koh Kong;.... Prachha was
arrested and taken away. They said he was going to study,
but actually they killed him. Everybody In Koh Kong was
afraid, because their leader had been taken away. Prasith
disappeared about the same time....
It got harder and
harder. The Khmer Rouge began killing people; people who
did anything wrong were taken away and shot. In 1974 they
recruited every youth 16 years old or more Into the Army....
Some who didn't go were killed.

According to Lon Nol intelligence, which confirms this account of
Prasith's execution. CPK Center member Vom Vet assumed control of
In m id-1974.
There was one exception. About 200 of Prasith's followers
escaped arrest and fled into the Cardamom mountains along the Thai
border, where they initially set up five small bases, each of platoon
strength. Led by Sae Phuthang, these people held out for the next six
years. Abandoned by the Vietnamese communists, they constituted
no real threat to the CPK regime, but were occasionally aided by
ethnic Khmers and local Thai officials across the border. With the
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overthrow of Democratic Kampuchea in 1979. a hundred of them
emerged to participate in the form ation of the People's Republic of
Kampuchea. Sae Phuthang became Deputy Secretary of the ruling
People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, and two of his lieutenants
became Party Secretaries of Koh Kong and Kampot provinces.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that B-52 bombardment was at tim es a
devastating weapon against massed forces, and that CPK and NVA
units suffered enormous casualties from it. Table 3 sum marizes
declassified assessm ents by the US Army of m ajor damage done to
com m unist units in eastern Kampuchea during air strikes in 1973. These
assessm ents are striking for the high killed-to-wounded ratios claim ed,
recalling Shaw cross's point about the fabrication of reports. But they
are not inconsistent with the claim of General John Vogt, Commander
of the US Seventh A ir Force. that 16,000 Khmer insurgents were killed by
US bombing in 1 9 7 3"2. If this is the case, the 1973 bombing postponed
the revolutionary victory for a crucial two years.
On the other hand, it is apparent that on many occasions CPK
and other “Khmer insurg ent' forces did avoid casualties by digging airdefence shelters. One report to the US Army in July 1973 stated: “In
headquarters areas, many of the shelters are of solid construction and
able to withstand bombs. In frontline areas, shelters are often built
under bamboo groves and are relatively safe, barring a direct h it.' But
fo r civilians the effect was much more devastating. The same report
continued:
Civilian reaction to US air strikes: Most houses In the combat
zone have been totally destroyed, either by US bombs or by
the communists themselves.
Civilian reaction to the
devastation Is mixed; but an objective appraisal seems to be
that the US. Cambodian government and the communists
are equally responsible (sic). It Is a fact, however, that the
civilian population fears US air attacks far more than they do
Communist rocket attacks or scorched-earth tactics'13.

According to the historical division of the US Department of
Defense, more than 11,000 Khmers were killed by US b om bing "4. This
seems a serious underestim ation, perhaps because of the difficulty
and fabrication involved in the monitoring of casualties in areas distant
from the Vietnamese border. The evidence of survivors from many
parts of Kampuchea suggests at least tens of thousands, probably in
the range of 50,000 to 150£00 deaths, resulted from the US bombing
campaigns in Kampuchea from 1969 to 1973.
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TAblE J.
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What was achieved? The Khmer Republic, the intended
benefactor of the bombing, may perhaps be given the last word on
the matter. On 28 July 1973. the J-2 intelligence section of the Khmer
National Armed Forces reported on the 'Enem y Outlook after 15
August 1973*.ltnoted: 'Th e American bombing halt can only favorably
influence the morale and the behavior of the enem y.' But it went on
to make a devastating criticism of the bom bing's effect on the armed
forces of Lon N o l's Khm er Republic:
On the other hand. It will have a sad effect on the state of
mind and the attitude of our own forces who have been
accustomed for the last six months to benefit from the unlimited
support o f the air force and will have great difficulty In doing
without It. In effect, too often air Intervention had been called
In when ground action would have been sufficient. They
depended on this support so much that certain units, already
little Inclined to go beyond the limits of their quarters, no
longer adventured on the terrain If alrsup port was not assured.
This tendency at all levels, and particularly at the basic units
level, of considering the bombing 'a s an end In Itse lf.' has
seriously compromised the fighting capability of many units.
Because of this, our troops were not able to take advantage
of the air Intervention which, logically, should have enabled
them to pull themselves together and retake the Initiative
starting at the end of January',s.

For his part. Henry Kissinger has staunchly defended the US role,
claiming in 1979 that 'W e destabilized Cambodia the way Britain
destabilized Poland in 1939."" 6 He states in his memoirs: 'Itw a sH a n o i
— animated by an insatiable drive to dominate Indochina — that
organized the Khmer Rouge long before any American bombs fe ll on
Cambodian s o il.'” 7
Five years earlier, however, Kissinger had had a more perceptive
view. In an April 1974 cable to the US Embassy In Phnom Penh, he had
written:
In the areas such as southeast and southwest Cambodia
where there has been a Khmer Rouge organization since the
1940s, we could assume that at least the political organization
If not the military Is dominated by Khmer Rouge who not only
had little training abroad but probably resent and compete
with the better-trained men from North Vietnam. It Is not
happenstance that there Is significant conflict between the
VC/NVA and the Khmer communists In these areasof southern
Cambodia so close to South Vietnam.
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’ Nevertheless/ Kissinger added,
a Titolst Cambodia which Is Independent and doctrinaire
would be dangerous to Its neighbors as a sanctuary for
communist rebels. The Khmer communists, such as Saloth Sar
(Pol Pot), Koy Thuon and Khleu Samphan are probably
xenophobic both when It comes to Vietnamese and the local
Chinese Inhabitants. One objective of a Cambodian
communist regime would be to expel or severely control
these groups.

By 1974,then, Kissinger was aware — largely through the reports
of Kenneth Quinn — of the existence of the chauvinist Pol Pot tendency.
But he was as yet unsure that the CPK Center played the dominant role
in the Khmer Rouge movement. He noted that ’ our lack of precise
knowledge of the insurgency makes it difficult to describe the decision
making process and identify the decision-m akers':
Convincing arguments can be made that the Insurgency Is
less a centrally controlled communist rebellion and more an
Insurgency with several regional bases. It Is difficult to say
whether one can go so far as to describe It as warlordlsm, but
It does square with Cambodian tradition, and the nature of
this particular war. A factlonallzed Insurgency with a veneer
of central control does explain certain past anomalies In
Insurgent operations and apparent conflicts. The insurgents
no doubt have a central committee and If the Communist
Party Is as advanced as It should be after 25 years of existence
there probably Is a presidium made up of little known leftists
such as Saloth Sar. Nuon Chea, Koy Thuon, Non Suon, and
more prominent French-trained Individuals such as Khleu
Samphan, leng Sary, Son Sen, Hou Yuon and to a lesser extent
TtvO land Phouk Chhay. These men In our view wield the real
power” *.

How true this last sentence was to prove. Saloth Sar, Nuon Chea, Khieu
Samphan, leng Sary and Son Sen still make up the Khmer Rouge
leadership in 1988 (having purged and executed the other five secondlevel figures on Kissinger's lists, between 1975 and 1978)” ’.
The tragedy of Kisslnger'slndeclsionastow hetherthe insurgency
was regional. and factlonallzed with only ’ a veneer of central control,'
or whether ’the real power* was wielded by the central presidium
headed by Pol Pot, is that the form er was largely true In 1972; the latter
was largely true In 1974; and Klsslngerand Nixon were largely responsible
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for what had happened in between.
The year 1973 was a watershed in Kampuchean history. The
massive bombardment of that year had several major effects. First, it
decimated and even destroyed a number of CPK regular units. (The
casualties were particularly heavy among Southwest Zone units during
the siege of Phnom Penh in July 1973’20, and this may have helped tip
the balance of power there in the CPK C enter's favour.) Second, the
bombing caused enormous losses of Khmer civilian life and property.
Third, these drove a large number of new recruits into the revolutionary
ranks, recruits who were often motivated as much by a desire fo r
revenge as by positive political or social goals. Such people were an
asset to the Pol Pot group.
In one case, CPK cadrestold young survivors of US bombardment
that "the killing b ird s' had come “from Phnom Penh' (not Thailand or
Guam), and that Phnom Penh must be made to pay for its assault on
rural Kampuchea121. On the day the bombing ended, 15 August 1973,
CPK propaganda leaf lets found in bomb craters in Rattanakiri attacked
the “Phnom Penh w a rrio rs' who were, they claim ed, soon to be
defeated122.
The popular reaction to the bombing was cleverly manipulated
by the CPK Center. This was probablyfatal fo r relatively moderate CPK
leaders like Prasith, who was overwhelmed by fanatics and killed ju st as
Chou Chet and Phouk Chhay also lost out to Mok and Thuch Rin in the
crucial struggle fo r control of the Southwest Zone at this time. It Is clear
to o , that Koy Thuon's position in the North, in relation to the Zone m ilitary
commander Ke Pauk, was severely undermined by the Impact of the
bombing there. Had all these people been able to hold their ground,
the history of Kampuchea in the rem ainderof the 1970s might well have
been different.
The Pol Pot leadership of the Khmer Rouge can in no way be
exonerated from responsibility fo r committing genocide against their
own people. But neither can Nixon or Kissinger escape judgem ent for
their role in the slaughter that was a prelude to the genocide. Worse,
but for that extreme example of US m ilitarism , the Pol Pot group may
have been denied their opportunity. It remains to be hoped that they
w ill not get another one.
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T h E iN flA TiO N A R y IM P A C T o f

War*
Tom RiddEll

t

H e V iE TN A M

It is more than fifteen years since the US w ithdraw al from the
Vietnam W ar. Enough tim e has passed to sort out the historical record
concerning the w a r and its econom ic im pacts. Like a ll w a rs, though,
there w ill continue to be controversy over interpretations of it and its
effects. There is w idespread recognition o f the econom ic costs of the
w a r and its resp onsib ility fo r stim ulating inflation in the 1960s. The
increased spending fo r the w ar during the econom ic prosperity of the
m id-1960s produced pressure on prices.
Because econom ic
policym akersfailed to institute corrective policies, inflation accelerated
by the late 1960sand laid the basis fo rth e inflationary sp ira l of the 1970s.
The econom ic consequences of the Vietnam W ar w ere among the
m ajor fa c tors in creating the econom ic d iffic ulties faced by the United
Sta tes during the 1970s.
In the 1980s. how ever. President Ronald Reagan sought to
reinterpret the history o f the war. He labeled it a "nob le c a u se ' and
tried to je ttiso n the "V ietna m syn d ro m e '.th e critical reevaluation of US
foreign policy that suggested caution tow ard m ilita ry intervention.
Som e econom ists, also echoing positions from the w a r yea rs, have
recently suggested theirow n revisionist version of the econom ic im pact
of the war. They argue that the econom ic burden of the w a r w as trivia l,
tha t it produced only m inor inflation in the 1960s, and that it cannot be
held responsible fo r the inflationa ry spira l of the 1970s1.
In th is a rticle, I w ill confront th is challenge and reexam ine the
econom ic consequences of the Vietnam W ar and w hether it caused
an acceleration of inflation in the late 1960s. Such a nalysis should
contribute to our understanding of recent econom ic history and o f the
possible econom ic effects of m ilita ry expansions — w hich could
presum ably inform current and future econom ic policy.

*A previous version of this paper was presented at a Presidential Conference on
"Lyndon Baines Johnson: A Texan In Washington' at Hofstra University In April 1986, and
appears In Firestone, Bernard J.; Robert Vogt, eds. Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Uses
of Power (Greenwood Press) forthcoming.
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INflATiON iN TtlE 196 0s
Table 1 presents data on various measurements of annual rates
of inflation from 1960 to 1971. This data demonstrates the source of the
conclusion by most professional economists and the public that the
acceleration of inflation was linked with the Vietnam War.
For the period 1960-1964. the Consumer Price Index, the
Producer Price Index and the GNP deflator all show relatively low and
stable rates of inflation In a range of less than 1 percent to less than 2
percent. The average annual changes in these three different measures
of price increases were barely above 1 percent. This trend continued
the low rates of inflation experienced in the late 1950s. But with the
escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965, there was an acceleration in the
rates of increase in all of these measures of price levels.
From December 1964 to December 1965, the unadjusted CPI
increased by 1.9 percent, up from 1.2 percent the previous year. This
was followed by an increase of 3.4 percent in 1966,3 percent in 1967,
4.7 percent in 1968, and 6.1 percent in 1969. A sim ilar pattern of
accelerating inflation emerges in the year-to-year, adjusted CPI
changes. The annual percentage increases in the GNP price deflator

TA blE 1
INflATiON D u r Inq t He VIETNAM W ar PERiod, 196 0 TO 1971
Year

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

Change In
Consum er
Price Index,
Decem ber to
December.
Unadjusted

1.5
0.7
1.2
1.6
1.2
1.9
3.4
3.0
4.7
6.1
5.5
3.4

Change In
C PI.Yearto-Year,
Adjusted

1.6
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.7
2.9
2.9
4.2
5.4
5.9
4.3

C ha ng e In
Producer
Price Index,
December to
D e c e m b e r,
Unadjusted

1.8
-0.5
0.1
-0.2
0.5
3.3
2.2
1.6
3.1
4.8
2.2
3.2

Change In
PPI. Yearto-Year,
Adjusted

Annual
Change In GNP
Im plicit Price
D eflator

0.8
0.0
0.3
-0.3
0.4
1.7
3.2
1.2
2.8
3.7
3.5
3.1

1.6
0.9
1.8
1.5
1.5
2.2
3.2
3.0
4.4
5.1
5.4
5.0

Source: Economic Report o f the President. 1962: 237.295.302.

44 Vietnam Generation
also accelerated from 1965 to 1969 — 2.2 to 5.1 percent. In the two
series for producer prices, there were marked jum ps in the annual rates
of change in 1965 and 1966, a slowdown in their rate of increase in 1967
(due to “growth recession'), and renewed acceleration in 1968 and
1969.
W alker and Vatter contend that the data on inflation don't
demonstrate an acceleration in inflation until 1968. They base this
conclusion on an analysis of quarterly changes in annual rates for the
CPI and the PPI and on the assertion that changes in the price indices
of less than 3 percent are not significant2.
First of all, the quarterly data on the rate of inflation during the
period of the Vietnam escalation can be used to measure short-run
movements in prices and don't necessarily show inflation. But I would
argue that quarterly data do not provide adequate information on the
trend in the rate of inflation in the period prior to the escalation, during
it, and after it. The relevant period is not simply the escalation but rather
the period surrounding increased spending for the Vietnam War. For
this more extended time fram e, the changes In the annual rates of
inflation are superior. When economists measure inflation over five to
ten year intervals, they rely on the annual changes in price indices.
Secondly, W alker and Vatter refer to a statement in an introductory
economics textbook about a 2 to 3 percent margin of error in the CPI
and conclude that any change in it of less than 3 percent amounts to
“no in fla tio n '3. They transpose this range of uncertainty to 3 percent as
the standard and use it as an absolute test of the existence of inflation.
The fact that the CPI is based on a survey and has a margin of errordoes
not mean that it cannot be used to identify patterns of change in
consumer prices. It is a consistently measured series over tim e, and
economists rely on statistical technique to ensure its ability to reflect
trends in the prices of goods and services. If economists were not
allowed a 3 percent margin of error, there is not much that we could
say about the economy with any degree of confidence.

T I ie TirviiNQ ANd I m p a c t o f t Lie V ietn a m W a r E sca La t Ion
Both economic theory and history suggest that wars usually
have an inflationary impact. During all of its m ajor wars, the United
States has experienced increased rates of inflation4. The connection
between war spending and inflation is based on both conventional
micro-and macro-economictheory. Increased war spending stimulates
the demand for labor and raw materials used in war production.
Increased price pressures develop fo r these factors of production in
proportion to the tightness of their markets. These price increases can
then spread from market to market. The macro-economic effect
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T aM e 2
The EsTiMATEd I nc rem en ta l ANd F u ll C o s t s o f D I r e c t
A m erican M illTARy I nvoI v e m e n t In iNdo-ChiNA, F I sca I Y ea r s
1 9 6 5 -1 9 7 5
(Billions of Current Dollars)
Fiscal Year’

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Totals:

Incremental Costs0

, lb
5.8
18.4
20.0
21.5
17.4
11.5
7.3
6.2C
4. l d
2 .0d
$114.3

Full Costs0

. lb
5.8
20.1
26.5
28.8
23.1
14.7
9.3
7.9°
5.0*
2.5d
$143.8

'Th e US Governm ent Fiscal Year fo r all these years was from July 1 through June 30, e .g.. Fiscal Year
1965 was from July 1,1964 to June 30,1965.
°Full costs cover all forces, baseline and additional, and equipm ent and m aterials used In the war.
Increm ental costs cover the added costs o f fighting the w ar over and above the norm al costs o f
operating the baseline force In peacetim e. These are the tw o m ethods o f cost accounting fo r the
w ar supplied by the Pentagon.
“The figures fo r Fiscal Year 1965 are m ost Ikely too low to cover the buildup o f troops In 1964-1965 and
the stepped-up a ir activity In response to the G ulf o f Tonkin Incident (August 1964) and the Plelku
attacks (February 1965). Some o f this may have been financed w ith the funding fo r m ilitary assistance
fo r South Vietnam . O r It may have Involved the use o f already existing baseline forces. However, this
activity stfl had a cost and should, a t the very least, be Indicated In the fu ll cost o f the war. Some
baseline forces were diverted to Vietnam fo r the 1964-1965 buildup — the ships th a t were In the G ulf
o f Tonkin, the aircra ft th a t was a t Plelku, and the planes th a t retaliated against the North as a result
o f both o f these Incidents— and probably accounted fo r costs In excess o f $ 100 m illion. Consequently,
the cost figures largely derived from Departm ent o f Defense accounting which are presented In this
table must be regarded as conservative estim ates o f the actual costs o f the war.
•These are estim ates based on the original and revised budget submissions o f the Departm ent of
Defense. They reflect the combined effects o f the US response to the Spring 1972 O ffensive o f the
North Vietnam ese, the US bombing o f North Vietnam In December 1972, and the ceasefire obtained
a t the end o f January 1973.
•Estimates based on the costs o f US military assistance to Indo-Chlna and the continued presence o f
US air and naval forces In Southeast Asia.

Sources: Riddell, Tom. A Political Economcy o f the American War In Indo-Chlna: Its
Costs and Consequences, unpublished dissertation (Washington, DC: The American
University) 1975: 98-99; and, US Department of Defense (Comptroller), The Economlcss
o f Defense Spending (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Oflce) 1972: 149.
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results from the stim ulation of aggregate demand in the economy as
a whole. Government spending to prosecute the w ar effort is added
onto total spending in the economy. The new spending creates
demand fo r war goods, as well as higher incomes throughout the
economy that w ill be spent on non-m ilitary goods and services. The
increased demand for both m ilitary and consumer products contributes
to inflationary pressures in the economy. The inflationary impact of the
war w ill depend on the state of the economy, the manner by which It
is financed, and wartime economic policy. If the economy is close to
full employment, ceteris paribus, increased war spending w ill have a
larger inflationary impact. If the war is financed by printing money or
by the Federal Reserve lending directly to the Treasury, there w ill be
higher inflation. If the government does not increase taxes (or decrease
non-m ilitary spending) to pay for the war. its inflationary impact w ill not
be checked.
The issue here is whether the Vietnam W ar caused increased
inflation in the 1960s. The analysis w ill rest on an Investigation of the
impact of the war (taking into account the magnitude and tim ing of
the buildup for the war), the state of the economy at the tim e, how it
was financed, and wartime economic policy.
To examine the impact of the war, we must identify the period
of tim e when the war made extra demands on the resources of the
society. W alker and Vatter have determined that the escalation
period was 1966-1967 when national defense purchases of goods and
services as a percent of GNP increased5. There are two problems with
this definition — one of substance and one of measurement.
The US involvement In the war was an unusual event in the
history of the country; it was an extraordinary occurrence. In this light,
the effect of war spending lasted fo r the entire period of tim e during
which It was making an extra claim on the society's resources. Table
2 presents inform ation on the annual costs of the war from Fiscal Year
1965 to FY1975. The full costs of all forces, equipment and materials
used in the war amounted to over $140 billion; and the incremental
costs of fighting the w ar over and above the normal costs of using
baseline forces in peacetime were over $110 billion6. While It is true that
the war placed accelerating demands on resources during the 1966
1967 period, it is also true that the w ar made an extra claim on
resourcesthroughout itstenure (subject to countervailing fiscal policies).
W alker and Vatter focus only on the period of escalation. Whether
inflation Is engendered by an escalation is certainly a relevant question;
but It Is not the only question in determining the Inflationary Impact of
a war.
Furtherm ore.from an examination of the data that they present.
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as w ell as Table 2. it is possible to identify a different and longer period
of escalation. Table 2 shows w ar spending increasing in every Fiscal
Year from 1966 through 1969. W alker and Vatter note that defense
purchases as a percent of GNP began to increase in the 3rd quarter of
1965 (at 7.1 percent), continue to increase in every quarter to the 2nd
in 1967 (9.0 percent), and then decrease in the 3rd quarter of 1967 (8.6
percent). This brought the “escalation* to a close. However, there are
two Important qualifications to this dating of the escalation. From the
4th quarter of 1967 to the 2nd quarter of 1968, defense purchases go
back up to 9.0 percent of GNP. The dating by W alker and Vatter of the
end of the escalation seems to be at least questionable and certainly
arbitrary. Based on these figures, it could be argued that the escalation
lasted Into 1968; only after the second quarter of 1968 were there
consistent decreases in defense purchases as a percent of GNP7. In
fact, one could argue thatthe escalation lasted until defense purchases
as a percent of GNP went back to their pre-war level. By this criterion,
the escalation would last until the 3rd quarter of 1970 based on
quarterly data and 1971 on annual data (itw a s 7.2 percent in 1965.9.0
percent in 1967,7.5 percent in 1970, and 6.6 percent in 1971).
The history of the w ar itself also substantiates the conclusion
that W alker and Vatter have incorrectly specified the tim ing of the
escalation. Spending on the war reached Its peaks in FY1968 and
FY1969. Recalling the Initial escalation of direct American m ilitary
involvem ent In the w ar, the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place in August
1964 and was followed by an intensification of US bombing of North
Vietnam and by a massive increase in the number of US m ilitary
personnel in Vietnam. From August 1964 to May 1965 (during FY 1965).
an additional 50,000 troops were sent to Vietnam.
At the end of July 1965. President Johnson announced that the
adm inistration needed additional funds to wage conflict and that a
furthersupplem ental appropriation would be required in January 1966.
By the end of 1965, 100,000 people were added to US forces in
Vietnam , bringing the total to more than 180XXX). By the end of 1966,
there were 385XXX) US m ilitary personnel in Vietnam. The number
continued Increasing until the end of 1968 when the total reached
538XXX)8. The tim ing of the escalation has much longer boundaries
than 1966-1967.

The Ec o n o m ic I m p a c t of t He W ar
To adequately measure the economic Impact of the w ar and
the effectthat It had on Increasing Inflation, It Is necessary to supplement
national defense purchases of goods and services w ith other indicators
of defense activity.
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Table 3 presents some data that w ill help to measure the
economic im pact of the Vietnam War. National defense purchases
record payments made by the federal government to individuals and
businesses; It is a final indicator of defense activity in the economy.
Progress payments outstanding represent early payments by the
Department of Defense to contractors fo r w ork in progress; it is an
Intermediate indicator of defense activity. The other m easurements in
Table 3 are all advance indicators. They measure the volum e of
com m itm ents and contracts that DOD makes w ith the private sector
fo r m ilitary goods and services. M ilitary prime contracts, gross obligations
incurred, and m anufacturers' new orders all register activity undertaken
in the private sector at the behest of the federal governm ent and in

TAblE 5
iNdicATORS o f D e Fen se A c Tiv iTy , A nnuaI A m o u n ts
B illioN S o f C u r r e n t D o U a rs , 1964 t o 1970
Year

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

N a tio n a l D e fe n se
Purchases o f Goods
and Services

49.0
49.4
60.3
71.5
76.9
76.3
73.5
D e fe n se
D e p a rtm e n t
Gross O bligation Incurred.
Procurem ent

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

15.6
16.6
23.6
26.5
28.3
20.9
20.1

Defense Departm ent
M ilitary Prim e C ontract
Awards

Defense Departm ent
G ro ss
O b lig a tio n s
Incurred, Tota l

26.6
29.9
40.2
42.4
42.3
35.2
33.5

55.0
58.3
73.2
81.8
87.0
81.3
80.0

M anufacturers’ New
O rd e rs,
D e fn e se
Products Industries

27.4
32.2
39.1
44.9
46.7
43.1
42.9

Defense Departm ent
P ro g re ss Pa ym e nts
O utstanding

3.2
3.9
5.5
7.5
8.5
9.8
9.4

Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Defense Indicators
(November 1972): 36; (October 1976): 31; (October 1977): 31,33; and. (Novemberr
1977): 31,33.
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advance of actual payment for the work completed. Consequently,
during periods of m ilitary buildups, the advance Indicators are the first
to signal the impact of the increased demand for m ilitary goods and
services in the economy9.
An examination of the relative changes in these measurements
of defense activity compared to changes in GNP during the period
1965-1969 provides information about the tim ing of the impact of
Increased m ilitary spending on the economy. Table 4 presents the
annual rates of change for these defense indicators. All of the
indicators, with the exception of gross obligations incurred, total,
decreased in 1964. In 1965, along with the escalation of the war. all of
the indicators increased. The advance indicators all increased by
much more than national defense purchases, which increased by only
.8 percent. M ilitary prime contracts (12.5 percent), m anufacturers'
new orders in the defense products industries (17.5) percent, and
progress payments outstanding (21.9 percent) all increased at a rate

TAblE 4
A nnuaI R a t e s o f CHanqe In D e Fense iNdicATORS, 196? t o 1969
Year

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

GNP
C urrent
Dollars

8.4%
9.4%
5.8%
9.2%
8.1%

National
Defense
Purchases o f
Goods and
Services

M ilitary Prime M anufacturers'
C ontract
New Orders.
Awards
Defense
Products
Industries

.8%
22.1%
18.6%
7.6%
-.8%

12.5%
34.0%
5.5%
- .3%
-4.8%

Departm ent o f
Defense. Gross
Obligations
Incurred

17.5%
21.4%
14.8%
4.0%
-7.7%

D e p a rtm e n t
of
D e fe n se ,
G ross
O bligations Incurred,
Procurem ent

Defense Departm ent
Pro g re ss Pa ym ents
O utstanding

6.4%
41.8%
12.5%
6.6%
-25.9%

21.9%
41.0%
36.4%
13.3%
15.3%

6.0%
25.5%
11.8%
6.3%
-6.6%

Source: Economic Report of the President. 1983: 233 for GNP growth rate. All others
from Table 3. Percentage changes all calculated.
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significantly in excess of the growth rate of current GNP (8.4 percent).
The other advance indicators registered increases only slightly below
the increase in GNP. In 1966,thepaceofthebuildupaccelerated. The
annual rates of increase in all of the indicators were larger than the rate
of increase in GNP — with the increases in most of the advance
indicators being the largest of all. The buildup slows down somewhat
in 1967, but the rate of increase of defense purchases, m anufacturers'
new orders, gross obligations incurred, and progress payments
outstanding are all larger than the growth rate of the GNP. In 1968, the
indicators (with the exception of progress payments) showthe beginning
of the end of the escalation period. M ilitary prime contracts actually
decrease; and defense purchases, m anufacturers' new orders, and
gross obligations incurred (total and procurement) continue their
increase but at a rate below that of GNP. The indicators fo r 1969
(except progress payments) all decrease.
The leading indicators point to the acceleration of defense
activity in 1965. This activity took place prim arily in the private sector as
m ilitary contractors expanded their inventories and their demands for
raw m aterials and personnel. The impact of the escalation was
intensified in 1966 and 1967; in fact, increased m ilitary purchases
accounted fo r 16.8 percent and 25.9 percent respectively of the
increases in GNP for these two years. The end of the escalating
economic effect of the war is somewhat more problematic. The
leading indicators indicate a deceleration in 1968; but the data on war
spending (Table 2) show a continued increase through FY1969. Although
it is not an inarguabie proposition, I would date the period of escalation
from 1965 through the 2nd quarter of 1969. This was the period during
which m ilitary activity in the private sector and actual spending fo r the
w ar was increasing.

Th E I n fla tio n a ry I m p a c t o f t He V ietn a m W a r
The general effects of wartime escalations— Increased demand
fo r resources, a stim ulus to aggregate demand, and the tim ing of the
impact — all lend support to the hypothesis that the w ar stim ulated
inflation in 1965.1966, and 1967.
The w ar increased demand for raw m aterials, m etals, and
Industrial products. The impact on prices is indicated in a comparison
of the wholesale price indices for all com m odities, metal and metal
products, and machinery and equipment. Forthe period 1960-1964.all
ofthese indices declined or increased minimally. In 1965 and 1966.wlth
the beginning of the w ar. all showed substantial increases. From 1965
through 1968, the wholesale price index for all com m odities increased
by 8.2 percent. The index fo r metals and metal products increased by
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9.2 percent, and the index fo r machinery and equipment increased by
11.2 percent. Tightened labor markets due to economic expansion
and the drain of the m ilitary draft led to accelerated wage increases
after 1965. The annual increase in average hourly compensation
averaged just under 4.0 percent for the 1960-1965 period. But in 1966
average compensation increased by 6.1 percent; and the average
annual increase through 1971 was about 7 percent. The bargaining
position of labor unions reflected tight labor markets. From 1961 to
1964, negotiated settlem ents produced average annual increases in
hourly wages of about 3 percent. But, beginning in 1965, the annual
Increases in negotiated wages began to accelerate. The increase in
1965 was 3.7 percent and accelerated to an average annual increase
of 6.6 percent from 1966 through 1970. In addition to these price and
wage pressures from the extra demands of the war, the context of the
economy, the financing of the war, and wartime economic policy
contribute toa n interpretation of the culpability of the w arin stim ulating
Inflation throughout the economy.

H ie S t a t e o f t Iie E conomy
The closer the economy is to full employment, the more
Inflationary the impact of a war is likely to be. Table 5 contains data on
the general state of the economy fo r 1964-1970. In 1965, the ratio of
actual to potential GNP was 100.1 and remained above 100 through
1969. Actual GNP is the current value of output in the economy and
potential GNP Is the value of output if all the resources of the society
were fully employed. If actual output exceeds potential output, the
economy is operating above its capacity to produce goods and
services. Sim ilarly, the unemployment rate was relatively low, given
post-W orldW ar2 experience, and had been decreasing since 1961. In
1965, the capacity utilization rate fo r manufacturing was at its highest
level since World War 2 (In excess of rates during the Korean War).
These data Indicate an economyoperating near or above its capacity
and In which unanticipated increases In aggregate demand could be
expected to stim ulate Inflationary pressures. The war, moreover,
coincided with both the 1964tax cutto stim ulate the economy and the
launching of the war against poverty. From 1965 to 1969, actual GNP
exceeded potential GNP, the capacity utilization rate for manufacturing
remained In the high 80s, and the unemployment rate continued to
decrease to 3.5 percent (the lowest it had been since World W ar 2
except fo r the Korean War years). The w ar escalation took place in an
expanding economy. It was in this context that the extraordinary
stim ulus of the war contributed to Inflationary pressures in the mid1960s.
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TAblE 9
M ea su r es of ThE G enera L S tate of t Me
Year

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

GNP
Actual/
Potential

98.2
100.1
102.1
101.2
101.9
101.0
97.2

econom y,

Rate of
Unemployment

5.2
4.5
3.8
3.8
3.6
3.5
4.9

1964-1970

Capacity Utilization
Rate.
Manufacturing

85.6
89.6
91.1
86.9
87.1
86.2
79.3

Sources: Actual/Potentlal GNP from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Survey of Current Business (April 1982): 25. Unemployment rate and capacity
utilization rate from Economic Report of the President (1982): 266, 283.

FiNANciNq t Me W a r
But to dem onstrate that the w arw as a source of inflation, it must
also be show nthatthe mannerin which itwasfinanced accommodated
increased w ar spending and that wartime economic policy did not
take purchasing power away from other sectors of the economy.
Revisionists have argued that during the w ar “tax increa ses' did
reduce inflationary pressures,that otherfederal spending was reduced,
and that m onetary policy was not excessively expansionary'0. They
identifytw o sources o fta x increases during the period 1965 to 1968. The
first was the com bination of increasing tax collections in a progressive
tax system during a period of rising incomes and scheduled increases
in social insurance taxes. The second was the 1968 surtax passed by
Congress to help finance the war and relieve inflationary pressures in
the economy. However, the surtax w a sn't passed until July. 1968 and
after that federal ta xes' share of GNP actually decreased. Until the
passage of the surtax, tax rates did not change during the first three
years of the war; and there was no significant decrease in personal
consumption expenditures and disposable personal income as a
percent of GNP, which would signal the contractionary effect of
increased ta xe s". Also, the impact of increased social insurance taxes
is not so clear.
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W alker and Vatter argue that the increases in social insurance
taxes were in excess of increased social insurance benefits and
consequently that this “is unequivocally a nti-infla tiona ry'12. They are
correct in arguing that social insurance tax collections were increasing;
they increased their share of total federal receipts from 19.1 percent in
1965 to 23.0 percent in 197013. Social insurance contributions account
for about 80 percent of federal trust funds receipts, and throughout the
duration of the war these trust funds experienced surpluses. These
surpluses are anti-inflationary only if they are not made available to
other agents of demand in the economy. However, they were made
available to the Treasury through the only thing that the Social Security
Adm inistration,for example, is allowed to do with its surpluses: purchase
US Treasury securities. The amount of federal debt held by other
government accounts actually increased more than the amount of
debt held by the Federal Reserve during the 1965-1969 period. From
December 1965 to December 1969, total federal debt increased by
$47,3 billion. The Fed's holdings increased by $16.4 billion, the private
sector increased its holdings by $1.5 billion, and other government
agencies increased their holdings by $29.3 billion14. This fact dim inishes
the potentially anti-inflationary impact of increased social insurance
taxes.
In fact, the contribution of the federal trust funds surpluses
helped to finance increased war spending. When the Fed lends to the
Treasury, it creates money. When other federal agencies lend funds to
the Treasury, it does not directly create money because it merely
transfers purchasing power from the public to the Treasury. However,
if the receipts were withheld from circulation, it could have a
contractionary effect on the money supply. W alker and Vatter present
data to show that the possible monetary impacts of the war were
minimal and that there was no excessive money creation in the
escalation period15. In addition to their neglect of the increase in
federal debt held by government agencies other than the Fed, the
data on the growth of the money supply could be interpreted in a
different way. From 1960 to 1964, the money supply had been
increasing at an annual rate of less than 3 percent. However, w ith an
increasing federal debt, the rate of increase of M 1 accelerated to 4.7
percent in 1965. In 1966, as a result of a Fed decision to tighten up on
monetary policy in response to the inflationary effects of the war, M 1
grew at a rate of only 2.5 percent. When the Fed's attem pt at
contraction was abandoned, money supply growth took off to rates of
6.6 percent in 1967 and 7.7 percent in 196816.
W alker and Vatter also argue that federal non-defense
purchases helped to reduce the inflationary impact of the war because
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they decreased as a percent of GNP during the escalation. Regardless
of the period of escalation, they are correct. But the contribution to
reduced aggregate demand was m inim al, the GNP share of federal
non-defense purchases decreased from 2.6 percent to 2.4 percent —
a 7.7 percent fa ll in its share, whereas the share of defense purchases
increased during the w ar buildup by 28.2 percent.
There is one additional factorthat must be analyzed in assessing
the inflationary impact of the war: the role of wartim e economic
policy, or, rather, the failure of economic policym akers to institute any
effective constraints on aggregate demand. As Keith M. Carlson,
writing in the Federal Reserve BankofSt. Louis Reviewin February 1967,
pointed out:
At times o f high employment and near-capacity levels of
output, a resource transfer from civilian to military use is
normally effected by either tax Increases or a system of
Government controls. Neither route was followed with respect
to the Vietnam buildup in late 1965 and 1966. Instead a price
mechanism was utilized to effect the resource transfer, l.e.,
the Federal Government bid away goods and services from
civilian use for the war effort.
Overall price Increases thus operated as a silent tax
In the absence of more restrictive fiscal or monetary actions'7.

The question thus becomes: what was the economic policy response
to the w ar and why did it fail?

The Economic Policy Failure During the War
There are two questions relevant to an assessm ent of economic
policy during the war. One concerns the awareness of policymakers
to the inflationary effects of the war. The other concerns the lack of an
effective policy to counter those impacts. Both economic theory and
history suggest that wars induce inflation. In all its previous w ars, the
United States adopted a variety of measures to dampen inflation.
These have included increased individual and corporate income
taxes, excise taxes, wage and price controls, and rationing18.
In the case of the Vietnam W ar, there was a failure to adopt
appropriate and sufficient wartim e policies to reduce inflationary
pressures. Th isfa ilu re w a sp rim a rilya re su lto fth e p o litic so fth e w a r. The
war escalated slowly and was initially referred to as the Vietnam
“conflict*. Initial cost estim ates fo r the w ar were outrageously low.
President Johnson was reluctant to engage in a public debate about
economic restraint due to the war and, concurrently, about the war
itself. Furtherm ore, Johnson wanted to preserve his commitment to the

I nflationary I mpact

55

Great Society from any budget restraint associated with increased
spending fo r the war19.
The w ar began without a form al declaration. The adm inistration
introduced increased numbers of troops into Vietnam gradually. And
it consistently underestimated w ar costs in its budget subm issions to
Congress. Johnson decided on a path of slow escalation, but one
which included flexibility20. During Fiscal Years 1965,1966,and 1967,the
original budget requests for the war were eventually exceeded by
more than 100 percent in supplem ental requests for funds21. Since
there was no 'w a r' and since the original requests fo r funds did not
foresee a massive increase in spending fo r the w ar, the Johnson
adm inistration did not need to introduce any com prehensive wartime
economic policy measures.
Nevertheless.there were a number of responses to the increased
inflationary pressures brought about by prosperity and the effect of the
Vietnam escalation. Table 6 contains a summary of policy m easures or
proposals to restrain demand in the economy from 1965 through 1968.
One of the first instances of an adm inistration concern with the
inflationary effects of the w ar was a Decem ber 1965 CEA
recommendation to Johnson that he consider a tax increase to help
pay fo r the war22. But Johnson refused because he d id n't want to
adopt wartim e economic measures for fear of touching off a debate
on the war of losing some of his Great Society programs23. Throughout
the rem ainder of 1966 and 1967, mild policies of restraint were utilized.
Johnson relied on the C EA 's wage-price guideposts and patriotic
appeals to dampen inflationary wage and price movements.
Scheduled reductions in federal excise taxes on telephone service and
autom obiles were rescinded and collections of some federal taxes
were accelerated. In his Economic Report of the President fo r 1967,
Johnson suggested that he might call fo r an income tax surtax to
restrain the economy. Finally, in August 1967 he form ally proposed a 10
percent surcharge on income taxes. Congressional hearings were
held on this proposal in August, September, and November 1967 and
in January 1968. In these hearings, virtually all of the adm inistration
officials and others who testified acknowledged the responsibility of
the war in making the surtax necessary. But the proposal stalled over
congressional desires to cut non-defense federal spending and
Johnson's unwillingness to compromise over his Great Society programs.
In early 1968,the economic environment deteriorated with accelerating
inflation, a massive increase in the budget deficit, and an international
m onetary crisis. At this point, congressional leaders and adm inistration
officials worked out a compromise that called for the income tax
surcharge in return for a commitment to cut non-defense federal
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TA blE 6
E conomic Po lic y R espo n ses t o t Iie I m p a c t of ThE V ietn a m W ar ,

1969

to

1968

Date

Policy Action

December 1965

Federal Reserve raises discount rate from 4% to 4 1/2%.
Council of Economic Advisers sends tax Increase request
to Johnson, which he rejects.
President Johnson proposes accelerated corporate and
individual Income tax collections and a revision of the
scheduled eliminations of the federal automobile and
telephone excise taxes.
Johnson holds meetings with Congressional and business
leaders In which they back his reluctance to raise taxes to
finance the war.
Federal Reserve sends letter to commercial banks urging
restraint In business loans.
Johnson announces restraint on federal non-defense
spending and requests a 16 month suspension of the 7%
investmenttax credit and of accelerated depreciation on
business construction.
Administration falls to release a Midyear Review of the
Budget.
Johnson proposes a 6%Income tax surcharge on corporate
and Individual Income.
Johnson requests the relnstltution of the 7% Investmenttax
credit.
Johnson firms up his tax surcharge request and asks for a
10% surcharge on Income taxes.
Johnson proposes broad series of measures to directly
control Increasingly difficult balance of payments
problems.
Johnson holds another series of meetings with business
leaders In which the economic Impact of the war is more
forthrightly discussed than previously.
Johnson with draws from the approaching 1968 Presidential
election and announces steps to negotiate an end to the
war.
Congress finally enacts the 10% income tax surcharge to
help finance the Increasing costs of the war.

January 1966

March 1966
September 1966

Fall 1966
January 1967
March 1967
August 1967
January 1968

March 1968

June 1968

Sources: Econom ic Re p o rt o f the Presid ent. 1965 to 1970; and, Riddell, A P o litlc d
Econom y o f the Am erican W ar In Indo-C hlna : 333-334.
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spending by $6 billion in the FY1969 budget. The surtax fin a lly becam e
law on June 28,1968.
Som e m easures of econom ic restraint w ere used during the
escalation period, but they w ere inadequate. W hy? The w a r w as
escalated slow ly and by stealth. W ithin the a dm inistration, there w ere
predictions and plans fo r a much longer and co stlie r war. Ye t, in public,
the posture w as confidence in a contained, successful and "cheap*
conflict. As Johnson him self quotes one of his m ajor advisers, M cGeorge
Bundy, in his m em oirs: "A t its very best the struggle in Vietnam w ill be
long. Itse e m sim p o rta n tto u sth a tth isfu n d a m e n ta lfa c t be made clear
and our understanding of it made clear to our own people.... fTjhe re
is no shortcut to success in Vietnam . *M This evaluation of the rea lity of
US involvem ent in Vietnam and where it w as like ly to lead w as not
shared w ith the public (at least not until the publication of the Pentagon
Papers). C onsequently, there was no public reason to ask fo r typical
w artim e econom ic m easures. The lack of adequate econom ic policy
m easures and a w ar stim ulus that was larger and would last longerthan
w as adm itted in public w ent hand in hand. As W alter H eller (C hair of
the C ouncil of Econom ic Advisers during the Kennedy adm inistration)
has put it, there was “an unw illingness to loose the flood of debate on
Vietnam fo r which a tax proposal would provide the tem pting
o c c a sio n '25. And Lyndon Johnson wanted very m uch to protect his
Great Society:
W e are a rich nation and can afford to make progress at
home while meeting our obligations abroad — In fact, we
can afford no other course if we are to remain strong. For this
reason, I have not halted progress In new and vital G reat
Society programs In order to finance the costs o f our efforts In
Southeast Asia26.

Throughout 1965,1966, and 1967, it would be guns and butter
both. Not until late 1967 and 1968 did the debate about the w a r and
w artim e econom ic policy get the public airing it deserved given the
econom ic im pacts of the war. In fa c t. Johnson him self reaped the
harvest of secrecy when he renounced the Presidency in M arch 1968
as a result of the political and econom ic ram ifications of his conduct
of the war.
C harles Schultze, D irector of the Bureau of the Budget during
the Johnson a d m inistra tion, sum m arized th is policy fa ilu re in
congressional testim ony in 1970 on the econom ic effects of the war:
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... our earlier inflation Is in part due to the fact that we wouldn't
cover the financial costs of the war In taxes and finally In turn,
one of the reasons we wouldn't cover the financial cost of the
war in taxes was because It was basically an unpopular war....
CDhe Inflation that we are trying to stop originated from a
combination of the Vietnam war on the one hand and our
political inability to finance it on the other27.

The Vietnam W arstim ulated inflation in the mid- and la te-1960s.
This result was a combination of the economic Impact of the war, the
state of the economy at the tim e, the manner in which the war was
financed, and the conduct of economic policy. Given the structure of
the economy and the institutional power of large corporations and
labor unions .this inflation produced further cost-push sources of inflation.
This inflationary experience laid the foundation for the increased
difficulties w ith inflation in the 1970s — the price-wage spiral, the
productivity crisis, energy price increases, excessive monetary growth
and easy credit, and so on.

C oncI u s Ion

W alker and Vatter concluded in their analysis that the Vietnam
War was an “economically trivial event' and posed the question of
what the effect would be if the nation really engaged in a massive
m ilitary escalation. “The profession needs to tell the nation that the
economic barrier to war, its appalling economic costs, has been
destroyed by the tremendous size of our economy. Consequently,
w e'd better erect stronger political and social barriers or we w ill have
more w a r.'28
I
have shown that the Vietnam War was by no means a trivial
economic event. It increased the percentage of the nation's resources
going to defense purposes by only 2 percent of GNP, but it also lasted
for almost a decade and cost the Treasury almost $150 billion. It
induced accelerated inflation. The nation continues to bear the
economic costs of that war in interest payments on the debt incurred
during the war, programs for Vietnam veterans, and lost output from
disabled and disoriented veterans. There were and are economic
burdens of the Vietnam War — to go along with the political, social,
and cultural upheavals it unleashed in the United States in the 1960s
and 1970s. It is a lesson that economists bear a responsibility for
sharinglt is also a lesson that has relevance to the current massive
peacetime m ilitary buildup of the Reagan administration Through
FY 1990, this escalation calls for m ilitary spending of almost $2.7 trillion29.
The defense share of GNP w ill increase from 5.6 percent to 7.1 percent
ofGNP. Butthat 1.5 percentshare of G NPinvolvesa significant amount
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of spending and the opportunity cost is always the other things that
those resources could have been used fo r — education, tax cuts,
public works projects, job training programs, etc. There is still a choice
between guns and butter. To a rg uetha tthisb uild up istrivia lm inim a lizes
the burden that it places on the country's resources. The revisionist
position on the economic effects of the Vietnam War also feeds into
recent attempts to undermine the "Vietnam syndrom e' and to pursue
more aggressive interventionist foreign and m ilitary policies like those
of the Reagan administration in Central America and the Middle East.
W alker and Vatter are correct to urge strong political and social
barriers to the pursuit of war. But US citizens also need to be aware of
the substantial economic burdens associated with m ilitary buildups in
tim es of war and peace.
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I n Cold Blood: V ietnam iN TEXTbooks
D A vid IM. B e r m a n

iNTROduCTlON
In May 1967, in the central highlands southwest of Pleiku, 7200
Jarai tribesm en were moved from eighteen villa gesacrossthe la Drang
Valley into the Edap Enang resettlem ent center. Their form er home
became part of an enormous free fire zone. By the end of the w ar in
1975 approxim ately one-third of the one m illion M ontagnards, com
prising at least thirty different tribal groups including the Jarai, and
inhabiting almost one-half the land area of South Vietnam , were
casualties of that war. 85 percent of their villages were destroyed,
abandoned, or forcibly evacuated'. No textbook examined in the
following study even mentions the existence of indigenous tribal popu
lations in Vietnam.
In March 1968, in the village of Son My, located in Quang Ngai
province, American soldiers slaughtered between 400 and 570 civilians
in what has erroneously become known as the My Lai m assacre2. This
atrocity was apparently not unique: "B y the tim e the Am ericans
departed more than one million South Vietnamese civilians had been
w ar casualties, with approxim ately 200000 killed and 500,000 seriously
wounded by either allied or communist a c tio n '3. O f the sixteen texts
examined in this study which were published after the assault on Son
M y, only fw oreferto the “My Lai m assacre' while only s/xof the 22 make
any reference at all to civilian casualties.
In January 1971, Kerry Ryan was bom to Maureen and Michael
Ryan. She had 22 birth defects, including two vaginas, two cervixes,
two uteruses, four ovaries, and no rectum. In March 1979, alm ost
twelve years after Michael returned from Vietnam , and some eight
years after the birth of their daughter, the Ryans, along w ith nineteen
other couples, filed a class action suit on behalf of “all 2.8 m illion
veterans who served in Vietnam ' against six American m anufacturers
of defoliants and herbicides sprayed in South Vietnam. The suit was
eventually settled out of court for $ 180 million dollars4. W hile “attorneys
estim ated that as many as 400X1 veterans may eventually become ill
or die from e ffe c ts' of toxic herbicides, more than 200,000 claim s for
injuries were filed under the settlem ent including “60,000 claim s of birth
defects among veterans' children and 24,000 m iscarriages by veter
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ans' w iv e s'5. No textbook examined in this study published after 1972
mentioned Kerry Ryan, and no textbook published after 1979 men
tioned the class action suit. Of the 22 textbooks reviewed, only one
mentioned veterans poisoned by dioxin, American and Vietnamese
children born with birth defects, or aerial spraying of toxic chemicals
during the war.
Textbooks do not mention the Iron Triangle, orthe Ho Bo Woods,
orthe Street W ithout Joy. They do not discuss the strategies of generals,
the tactics of field commanders, the “pacification' programs devised
by Diem and his American supporters. They studiously avoid the topic
of the CIA, o rthe role that organization played in fighting and funding
the war. They neglect to explain the secret bombing and land
operations in neutral Laos and Cambodia. They fail to discuss the legal
questions of American intervention, orthe decisions of the World Court.
They decline to concern themselves with Vietnamese prewar and
wartime culture, or to explain the wet rice farming techniques of
lowland villages and the slash and burn cycle of highland tribes. They
do not consider the 1.2 million ethnic Chinese, the Khmers, and the
Chams of Vietnam to be worth notice. They do, however, occasionally
report casualty statistics — American casualties, both dead and
wounded, and sometimes even the casualties of our South Vietnam
ese allies (though the casualties of the international forces, the Kore
ans, the Australians, the New Zealanders, and the Thais, go unnoted).
More rarely still, there appear casualty figures fo r Vietnamese civilians,
NLF and NVA fighters.
Many of the most important aspects of the w ar are ignored or,
at best, treated in a blatantly superficial manner. Textbooks present
the events of the Vietnam War without connecting casualty statistics
to their human costs, and thus ultim ately obscure their impact and
effect. “We fought the Vietnam War “in cold blood,' Colonel Harry G.
Sum m ers, Jr. has written.
This cold-blooded approach to war was not unintentional. It
was an outgrowth of the limited war theories that reduced
war to an academic model. As we go back and read the
writings of the political scientists and systems analysts on
limited war, they are noteworthy for their lack of passion. The
horror, the bloodshed and the destruction of the battlefield
are remarkably absent.... The academics could be excused
for this omission, but we in the military knew better. It was the
Job of those of us who had seen war firsthand to add this
missing dimension to their academic theories6.

Can academics really be excused fo r “this om ission'? When we
reduce warfare to a theoretical model we conceal its violence from
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our students, some of whom will go on to fight the next war, ignorant of
its costs. Academics treat Vietnam as a limited war, for which limited
coverage is appropriate. Remarkable for its 'la c k of passion,' our
educational writings on the war are consistent with the political tone of
textbooks 'su ita b le ' for distribution to high school students whose
minds are in the process of being shaped to inherit the ideology of the
patriotic American community.
The narratives of the Vietnam War which appear in textbooks
are the results of a process of remaking history in the image of the myths
upon which a culture depends. The image of this war was frequently
more important than the reality. Inthewordsof John Heilman: 'American
leadership would most consistently define the war in Vietnam as a test
of Am erican' w ill', in effect a symbolic war in which the true terrain was
the American character and the ultimate stakes world history.' 7 South
east Asia, like other earlier 'fro n tie rs'
became symbolic landscapes, separate yet connected,
possessing a moral geography in which Americans perceived
themselves achieving their identity and working out their
special destiny... When they thought about Indochina,
Americans generally saw themselves entering yet another
frontier, once again 'western pilgrims' on a mission of
protection and progress*.

Ourethnocentrism blinded us so that we could not discern the political
landscape of Vietnam, its long history of nationalistic revolt, its aversion
to China. Instead, we asked the wrong questions: 'H o w was it possible
for the Vietnamese to fail to realize that the ideas of Democracy and
God are more important than life ? '9
National mythology justifies the war in Vietnam as a war for a
noble cause; but this mythology is unable to encompass the savage
and painful conflict in which American sons died inglorious deaths for
obscure reasons. Texts which prefer to deal in comfortable myths, and
thus fail to confront the political and cultural realities of Vietnam must
also fail to question the fundamental premises upon which the war was
fought. Questioning premises, of course, is not what texts are for:
general texts support the mythology which is accepted by our local
communities as an ideal for enculturating our children in local public
schools. History of a Free People10, America: The Glorious Republic1
or The American Dream12 — the titles themselves couched in the
romance of the American myth — can hardly be expected to deal
honestly with the pain and torment of the Vietnam War.
The intent of this essay is to explore these texts in terms of their
failure to confront 'th e horror, the bloodshed and the destruction of
the battlefield'. I w ill examine the methods by which they conceal the
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“missing dimension' of the Vietnam War from the adolescents for
whom these texts are written. I hope to accomplish this at the expense
of the national mythology which serves as the foundation for social
studies education at the secondary level in the American public
schools.

P rev io u s STu d iEs
In an article on textbooks and Vietnam, Dan B. Fleming and
Ronald J. Nurse suggest that “the changing perspective of a nation
and its people over time is mirrored in the writing of history', and they
proceed to examine ten US history texts published in the late 1970s vis
a-vis early 1970s texts to support this view13. Fleming and Nurse admit
that these texts “offer a too sketchy account of the Vietnam W ar' but
suggest that their deficiencies are not the result of “distortion, dishon
esty, inaccuracy, or bias'. Rather, they assert, “the neglect of certain
key topics' is part of a normal selection process which can be “ex
plained, in part, by the limitations of space available to the authors,
which is an inherent problem for all survey textbooks'14. In a similar
article published six years later, the authors review another twelve texts
published between 1982 and 1986 and note an “improved treatment
of the war in Vietnam.... Just as the American public appears to be
taking a new look at the war in Vietnam, so history textbooks seem
gradually to be presenting a new ’t ru th ". They remark once again that
“because of space limitations, survey texts seldom satisfy anyone in the
depth of the coverage of a specific top ic ', suggesting that teachers
need supplementary materials to teach Vietnam15.
An earlier analysis of 28 high school textbooks and their treat
ment of the Vietnam War by William L. Griffen and John Marciano
proposes, however, that the “neglect of certain key topics' is a
product of other than natural selection, and that such choices prede
termine the perspective a student will take on the Vietnam War. Griffen
and Marciano direct their work “to all Americans who at some time in
their schooling become miseducated by dishonest textbooks and do
not want more of the same visited on their children'15 They take as their
subject the process by which “the Vietnam War was explained to
American students'17, and they suggest that “through their pretensions
of neutrality and objectivity and through their suppression of data and
alternative views, textbooks further the hegemonic process by estab
lishing the ’parameters which define what is legitimate, reasonable,
practical, good, true and b e a u tifu l"18. Griffen and Marciano assert
that the
twenty-eight textbooks examined the most bitter conflict in
recent American history without calling Into question a single
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fundamental premise surrounding the conflict.... American
hlgh-school students, teachers, and parents could read these
textbooks without considering the possibility that they lived In
a nation that had committed the most blatant act of
aggression since the Nazi Invasions of World War 2” .

Though Fleming and Nurse are correct in asserting that space
limitations prevent the author from addressing all important aspects of
the Vietnam War in a text, they seriously underestimate the importance
of paying attention to exactly which key topics the author chooses to
"neglect'. This essay will explore the question of the "tru th s' presented
in textbooks, and attempt to explain the nature of the "distortion,
dishonesty, inaccuracy' which Nurse and Fleming dismiss. The truths in
these texts are presented within a cultural context; they are so deeply
rooted in the American ideal that the fundamental questions which
can be raised to test the validity of this ideal go unasked. These texts
are often misleading in regard to political events and historical devel
opments, as Griffen and Marciano have noted. The textual narratives
which will form the basis of the students' knowledge about the Vietnam
War universally fail to acknowledge the human cost of warfare. When
the horror, bloodshed, and destruction of the battlefield are absent,
the premises which involved us in that controversial war go unchal
lenged. "In short, integrity in the search for truth is not the aim of the
textbook business. Profit is the aim, and profit, when you are serving a
quasi-monopoly, is made by satisfying bureaucrats and politicians and
by offending as few vocal and organized interests as possible.'20
There are good books about Vietnam that "make the imper
sonal economic and political convolutions of Vietnamese history
understandable, they always draw the reader back to the man on the
ground who has to live with the consequences of those fo rces'2'. It is
the failure of textbooks to make this very connection — between the
analysis of political and historical events and the consequences of
these events for the American and Vietnamese "man on the ground'
— which deprives textbooks of life and realism, a choice made by
publishers in a premeditated fashion. "(Bernard) Fall's books (about
Vietnam) remain popular with American soldiers today because they
ring true,' writes Kirkpatrick22. This essay presents the conclusions of an
analysis of 22 US history textbooks and theirfailure to “ring tru e '; a failure
which suggests that the reality of warfare in general, and in Vietnam in
particular, is diluted for consumption by high school students because
academicians are more interested in creating a political and historical
approach consistent with a curricular pattern organized in the effi
ciency model than they are with presenting stimulating narratives of
the Vietnam War. The efficiency model promotes organizational
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stability, efficiency, and propriety of the community, the school, and
the classroom at the expense of controversy and creativity. Teaching
the Vietnam War in any critical manner could lead students to chal
lenge community ideals, and thus disrupt the orderly dispensation of
knowledge from teacher to student. Textbooks, seen within this con
text, represent the imposition of a particular political and historical
framework upon the reality of warfare as seen in human terms. “In most
texts,' wrote Frances FitzGerald, “the reporting on the (Vietnam) war is
no more accurate than their predictions about it were... the texts are
neither hawkish or dovish on the war — they are simply evasive.'23

T ext books, H me, an<J V ietnam
The organizational framework of both course and text is the
curricular block of the unit or chapter heading: “The American
Revolution', “The Civil W a r', “World War T , “World War 2 '. Wars are
often the chronological benchmarks by which time is measured and
topics are organized. Vietnam — a “limited w a r' — seldom achieves
the status of unit or chapter heading, and is relegated to sub-units or
sub-paragraphs. In the text America is{ 1984), mention of Vietnam can
be found in the large unit called "C hange', under the chapter
heading of “Years of Hope and Tension', under the section heading
“The Strain of Intervention'24. Our Land. Our Time (1985) places
Vietnam in a unit called "New American Frontiers', in a chapter titled
“The Vigorous Sixties', under a section heading entitled “Vietnam
Involvement'25.
A People and a Nation (1981), features a section entitled "The
Disaster in Vietnam'. This section is part of a chapter entitled ‘An Age
of C risis' which in turn is a part of a unit entitled “C risis'. "C risis' spans
the post-World War 2 era through the Carter administration. The
“Disaster' section is five pages long, and includes over two pages on
the antiwar movement and the 1968 Presidential election, complete
with pictures and maps26. The Paris Peace Talks and the fall of South
Vietnam are treated in the following section on foreign policy27. A
People and a Nation avoids discussion of the nature of the war, and
offers the student only the statement that “people disliked a war so
prolonged, so costly, so unsuccessful, so ruthless and dirty, whose
dreadful consequences they could see projected nightly on televi
sio n '28. If the reader is curious about the nature of those “dreadful
consequences', he or she will find little food for the imagination. The
text is deliberately vague and general, perhas so that the student
cannot read, see, or feel just how “ruthless and dirty' the war was.
In a text called Our American Heritage ( 1983), the unit contain
ing mention of the Vietnam War is entitled ‘ Change and Continuity in
Am erica'. Chapter headings in this unit include ‘The Cold War and
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Beyond'. “Domestic Affairs 1945-1960', and “Only Yesterday: The
1960s to Today'. A sub-section entitled “From the Vietnam War to the
Present' is part of the “Cold W ar' chapter and occupies slightly over
three pages29. 'From the Vietnam War to the Present' is similar in
content to the “Disaster' section in A People and a Nation. The text
explains that “one principle of American strategy during the cold war
was to avoid a land war on the vast Asian continent (but) as cold war
tensions eased in the 1960s, the United States departed from this
principle — with disastrous results'30. The disaster is defined strictly in
political terms: “Vietnam was finally united and independent, but
under Communist control'31.
Designed for middle and junior high school students, America
Is discusses Vietnam in a four page sub-section called the “Buildup in
Vietnam'. The text contains an undated map of the “War in Vietnam'
with a main United States supply route extending from Quinhon (sic)
along the central Vietnamese coast. Another sub-section entitled
“The Search for Peace,' describes the consequences of the war:
the last American troops left Vietnam. But the war there still
went on. While many Americans were saddened by this, they
were glad the United States was out of the war. During Its
Involvement, some 46,000 Americans had been killed, and
more than 300X100 others had been wounded32.

The student who sought to understand the reasons for the loss of
American lives in Vietnam would find only this passage to justify our
involvement:
In August 1964, after an attack on American warships by
North Vietnamese gunboats... the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution...
allowed the President, as commander In chief, to use any
measures necessary to halt an attack on American forces,
stop North Vietnamese aggression, and aid any SEATO
member who asked for help In defending Its freedom33.

While America Is does note the existence of a difference of
opinion between hawks and doves, and describes some protests
against the war, it still presents the American role in the Vietnam War as
unquestionably defensive, waged against “a group of Vietnamese
communists called the Vietcong (sic) who were well established in
South Vietnam '34. Students are provided with no opposing viewpoints;
they are intended to accept the premise that the United States was
legitimately defending the cause of freedom by putting a stop to
Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. When the antiwar move
ment is described, the context of the discussion is framed by the
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premise that the war is just, and that the ideology upon which the
intervention was based is justified as well.
The texts of the 1960s foreshdow the arguments of the texts of
the 1980s. American texts take a consistent approach to Vietnam,
failing to address significant issues of foreign policy, ideology, and
social convention. They are united by the chauvenism which gener
ates rationalizations in order to justify US involvement in Vietnam. “To
have been an editor of one of the mass-market texts in the mid-sixties
must have been a nightmare... because of the Vietnam W ar,' writes
FitzGerald. “The problem for editors then was to find a compromise
formula that would not offend anyone, when there was no compro
mise position and no way to avoid the whole subject. ' 3S The editors of
such texts deliberately sought the lowest common denominator, and,
in the process, managed to avoid portraying the war in a manner
which cast doubt on American myths. Though these 1960s texts
included brief narratives of our involvement in Vietnam, they failed to
question anyfundamental premises. Even when cataloging the voices
of dissent, these texts fail to examine the legitimacy of the arguments
of antiwar protestors, or to explore some of the more unsavory conse
quences of American involvement in Vietnam.
In 1966, when the number of American troops had reached
200,000, Land of the Free failed even to mention Vietnam36, while The
Making of Modem America devoted only four paragraphs on three
separate pages to the subject37. The Making of Modern America
provides the following narrative of the Vietnam War: “North Vietnam
ese Communists aided guerrilla forces in South Vietnam in an effort to
overthrow the pro-Western government.... The United States in turn'
sent 10,000 support personnel because, “in the opinion of President
Kennedy, the preservation of the independence of South Vietnam was
one of the 'vital interests' of the United States.'38 Eventually, “American
ground forces took a more active part in fighting the Communist
guerrillas,' while “President Johnson repeatedly expressed a willing
ness to enter into 'unconditional discussions'. But the North Vietnam
ese government insisted on complete withdrawal of American forces
before any discussions could take place.'39
Rise of the American Nation (1966) devotes a portion of two
pages to Vietnam and offers a somewhat more detailed, as well as
more balanced, discussion of the war. Nevertheless, this text also falls
easily into the rhetoric of the era when it notes that “over and over
again the President urged North Vietnam's leaders to cease their
aggressive actions and to meet around a conference table. 'We
remain ready... for unconditional discussion"60. History of a Free
Peopled 1967) notes that “President Johnson... repeatedly made public
offers of negotiation.... But Ho Chi Minh, president of North Vietnam,
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made the impossible condition that the United States withdraw all
troops before negotiations could begin'41. The American Nation
(1966), spending less than a paragraph on the escalating war in
Vietnam, asserts that "some diplomatic accommodation was desir
able,' perhaps because “the mere mass of the Chinese — 700 million
persons — seemed to compel their recognition, in the formal diplo
matic sense and in the larger sense of coming to grips with their
significance'42. In other words, Vietnam was to be understood within
the context of cold war politics: “the implacable hostility of the evermore-powerful Chinese communists (now masters of the atom) loomed
like a thunderhead in the heavens, a constant threat to the free
world...' and to Vietnam43.
By the end of 1966 the number of American troops in Vietnam
had reached 400,000, with a casualty toll of about 5,000 Americans
killed and 16,000 Americans wounded. The impact of the war was, by
then, felt in at least one textbook. History: USA( 1967) devoted two full
pages to Vietnam under a section entitled “Shadows from Abroad
Cloud the Visions of a Great Society'44. In hindsight, the most remark
able inclusion in this text are the casualty figures: 1,484 KIAs with 7,337
wounded by January 1 1966. These figures are absent in most other
texts, even by the 1980s. And the text makes a gesture in the direction
of exposing the complexity of the American war in Vietnam by includ
ing a statement made by one general, who said that “'a soldier has to
be much more than a man with a rifle.... He has to be part diplomat,
part technician, part politician — and 100% a human b e in g "45. If this
assertion had been companioned by an explication of the difficulties
of fighting a war in an alien environment, and of working with a
population whose language and ways are not comprehensible, some
good questions might have been raised. But the next sentence denies
complexity and appropriates the general's meaning: “... put another
way, the object of American policy in Vietnam was to help the South
Vietnamese people hold off the communist invader from the north,
while enabling them to work toward the establishment of a sound and
effective political system....
Meanwhile, the very presence of a huge US military buildup In
the poverty-stricken nation was providing a dramatic boost
to the local economy and significant progress toward
eradication of the ancient lllsof hunger, disease,and Illiteracy.
Should America succeed In this venture, the people of South
Vietnam could well be launched toward their own form of a
great society46.

Underneath the quoted passage, on the very last page of the
text, is a section entitled “An American Soldier in Vietnam', which
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includes a picture and a citation for Pfc. Milton Lee Olive III, who threw
himself on a grenade and was posthumously awarded the Congres
sional Medal of Honor. A section on the previous page, entitled ’ GIs
Around the W o rld ', explained that ’the American Gl was indeed a
world traveler, and his presence either at home or abroad was clear
evidence of America's intention to use the full force of its resources in
the cause of freedom and national security'47. Olive is connected, by
the text, to an American warrior tradition; he was in Vietnam because
the communists simply would not listen to reason: ’ President Johnson
offered to meet Communist leaders ’anywhere in the world' to arrange
a cease fire in Vietnam, but his appeals fell on deaf ears. He also
offered to launch a one billion dollar ’Marshall Plan for Southeast Asia,'
but the Communists gave him no encouragement.'48
What is striking about the texts of 1966 and 1967 is not their
inability to accurately report on facts and events in the public domain,
but their remarkable facility for obscuring the significance of the
escalation, as well as their failure to question the purpose of that
escalation. The information necessary to construct a critical inquiry into
the war was certainly available — the casualty figures in the Allen and
Betts' text attest to that. The insistence of these texts that increasing
American involvement in Vietnam would have as its chief effect the
provision of "a dramatic boost to the local economy' resulting in a
Vietnamese “great society' reflects a refusal to deal with difficult
issues. American insistence on imposing its own image upon ’ a world
qualitatively different from its o w n'49 is indicative of the ethnocentrism
with which we often approach the Vietnam War — as it was fought,
and as it is taught.
The 1960s texts reviewed in this paper rationalize .without ex
ception, American involvement in Vietnam as a legitimate enterprise;
they view it within the context of the Cold War era, and accept that
intervention was necessary to contain communist expansion. These
texts were read by young American men who were soon on their way
to fight in Vietnam; young men who should have been exposed to
argument over the complex issues that the war revolved around, so
that they could make intelligent and informed decisions about their
involvement in that war. But crucial information was withheld from
them because it did not reflect the mythology of equality and justice
which pervaded these textbooks at the expense of the scholarship or
real argument.
Men from lower to middle income families, who were high
school dropouts, or high school graduates without college educations
were much more likely to serve in the military, to serve in Vietnam, and
to see combat action than their better educated, wealthier peers50.
The likelihood of military service in Vietnam decreased as income and
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education increased. In his detailed study of Pittsburgh area Vietnam
War casualties, for example, Thomas Richard McIntyre documents
that, during the escalation phase of the war,
casualty status was largely confined to areas marked by
lower to middle Income levels, normal educational
achievem ent levels and predominantly blue collar
employment. In short, such data would apparently confirm
the distinctive 'working class' character of the casualty
profile associated with America's Ill-fated Vietnam War effort61.

In the deescalation phase, marked by a declining attrition rate, ’the
social demography of the casualty distribution remained virtually
unchanged despite pronounced changes in strategy*. Vietnamization "did not reallocate the diminished combat burden more equita
bly.... It was still lower and working class American troops, albeit fewer
of them, who suffered the more severe risks of com bat....'52.
Among this generation, fighting for one’s country was not a
source of pride; it was misfortune. Going to Vietnam was the
penalty for those who lacked the wherewithal to avoid It....
Poorly educated, low-income whites and poorly educated
low-income blacks together bore a vastly disproportionate
share of the burdens of Vietnam53.

Texts address (or fail to address) these issues in various ways. The
Free and the Brave (1977) explains that "most of those who did serve
were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one,* describing a
system which allows men of eighteen to go to war, but does not
consider them "old enough to vote*. The text admits that "antiwar
protesters pointed out that this was unfair,* but is quick to detract from
their credibility by stating that these same protesters enjoyed the luxury
of dissent while others served in their places in Vietnam54. As the men
from Vietnam "started coming home, the American people tried to
heal the wounds caused by the conflict,* insists The Free and the
Brave55. Under a heading entitled "Aggression in Vietnam ,' America:
ItsPeople and Values^ 1975) states that "theVietCong received weap
ons and supplies from Communist North Vietnam, from Communist
China, and from the Soviet Union,* noting that President Kennedy
faced a tough decision because "the United States had promised to
help South Vietnam defend itself against Communist attack*56. This
text neglects to discuss, in the following section entitled "American
Troops in Vietnam*, the fundamental inequity in the composition of
troop units; nor is there any mention of the casualties taken by these
units in defense of "American national security*. The Pageant of
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American History (1975) declares that as the situation worsened in
1967, "more draftees were sent to Vietnam '57. But there is no discussion
of the racial or class composition of these troops, and never a mention
of draft programs such as Project 100X00, though the text later ac
knowledges this omission in a two-line follow-up tacked on three pages
after the larger discussion of the war. The Pageant rather sheepishly
admits that "the draft itself was upsetting the lives and careers of the
nation's youth,' and that "the poor, and especially the blacks, were
too often drafted. The more fortunate college students were deferred
until they finished their studies'58. The text neglects to mention that
most college students missed out on Vietnam altogether. (This text also
devotes a sentence to "the bombing and the burning — often of
innocent women and children' during the course of the war, and
includes a paragraph which cites the "disclosures of American atroci
ties committed against North Vietnamese at My L a i'59. This last tidbit
moved FitzGerald to remark that the author or his editors had " in effect
moved the village and credited Lieutenant Calley with a single
handed invasion of North Vietnam '.)60
By the 1980s, as the war passed from contemporary event into
history, one might have thought that texts would begin to offer serious
reflections on Vietnam, putting forward assessments of the w ar's
impact on American and Vietnamese society. But although these new
texts offer a slightly more detailed description of the political machina
tions of the Vietnam War era, the majority of the 1980s texts are worse
than their predecessors in their failure to consider the human dimen
sions and social consequences of the war in Vietnam.
These texts dutifully note American (and, occasionally Viet
namese) casualties of war, but fail to pursue the implications of these
casualties. The seventh edition of The American Pageant (1983)
remarks that President Kennedy “had ordered more than 15,000
American men into the far-off Asian slaughter pen' by the time of his
death in 1963, and later mentions the death of 50X)00 Americans and
the wounding 300,000 more61. But the term “slaughter pen' seems to
have meaning only in the numbers of Americans who were injured,
although "many Americans also felt pangs of conscience at the
spectacle of their countrymen burning peasant huts and blistering
civilians with ghostly (sic) napalm '62. Rather than being exposed to a
serious treatment of the suffering of war, and an exploration of the
context in which this suffering took place, the reader is treated to
"c u te ' section headings such as ‘ Vietnam Vexations', “Vietnamizing
the Vietnam W a r', and “Cambodianizing the Vietnam W a r'. This text
includes the famous photograph of General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, the
National Police Chief (who is referred to merely as a ‘South Vietnamese
police chief') executing a Viet Cong soldier. The caption for this photo
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is "Justice on a Saigon Street, 1968', and the authors never bother to
contextualize the image63.
The American Dream makes reference to "an additional 15 XXXD
Americans (who) died in the war that was being 'V ietna m ized ",
followed by a sentence in parentheses: "(By 1971 about 51,OCX)
Americans had died in the w a r.)'66 It is curious that the author of a 1980
text failed to update the casualty figure. The mention of casualties
other than American KIAs would also have been appropriate. Ameri
can Adventures (1983) mentions that "more than 20,000 US troops had
been killed' by the time of the February 1968 Tet Offensive, and then
makes no references to Tet or post-Tet casualties of any kind65. America's
Heritage (1986) explains that "more than 46,000 American soldiers
were killed in combat' in a war which began when "the North
Vietnamese began to move down into South Vietnam. They wanted
to take control of the new republic'66.
A question might be raised about the meaning of the casualty
figures represented in the above texts. Certainly the emphasis on
American deaths and injuries encourages the reader to assume that
the greatest impact of the war fell upon American participants. This
perspective also encourages students to draw the conclusion that
American policy issues (such as the suppression of communism) have
a natural precedence over Vietnamese internal issues (such as civil
war and self-determination). These casualty figures work to conserva
tive political ends.
Even in the area of political analysis, these 1980s texts have
failed to grow much past their 1960s predecessors. The 1982 edition of
American History is no more sophisticated than the 1966 edition.
American involvement in Vietnam began, according to this text,
during "the summer of 1964' when "the former French colony of
Vietnam was tom by w a r'67. American History fails to mention that
Vietnam existed as a nation prior to the French occupation. The text
continues:
Communist North Vietnam was supplying aid to pro-communist
South Vietnamese guerrillas, who were known as the Viet
Cong (sic). The Viet Cong had been seeking to overthrow the
pro-American government of South Vietnam ever since
Vietnam had been divided Into two countries In 195448.

An ideological framework is established which can support a narrative
where Americans come to the defense of freedom-loving South
Vietnamese who are desperately fighting off the Communist aggres
sors: "Recent events such as the war in Korea and the Cuban missile
crisis seemed to show that the way to check communist expansion was
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by firmness and fo rc e .'69 American History's belligerent tone is rein
forced by the repetition of President Johnson's belief that “the fighting
in South Vietnam was between local Vietnamese patriots and 'out
side' com m unists'70. Chinese and Soviet communists, asserts the text,
were “supplying the Viet Cong with weapons and advice, just as the
United States was helping the anticommunist government of South
V ietna m '71. Thus, the stage is set for a political struggle of global pro
portions; leaving no room for discussion of the civil war taking place in
Vietnam. According to this text, the consequences of the Vietnam War
were the “cost of more than $ 100 billion and the lives of nearly 50,000
Americans and a much larger number of Vietnam ese'72.
“Communists Threaten South Vietnam* trumpets one section
heading in the 1985 edition of America: The Glorious Republic. The
sections which follow are filled with references to “highly disciplined
C om m unists', and “Communist gains'. The reader learns that the
“Communists launched surprise atta cks', and that "the Communists
paid dearly for the Tet O ffensive'. The chapter review is marked by a
section entitled “Communist Repression' in which the reader is told
that “the repressive nature of communism was revealed by events in
Europe and A sia ' (Czechoslovakia and China). The Vietnam War is
framed in terms of the struggle between the Communist Menace and
Free World73. The 1977 edition of the same text had a very similar tone.
That edition devoted three pages to Vietnam, and featured a section
entitled “The War in Southeast A sia ' which started with the claim that
the People's Republic of China began to challenge the
Soviet Union for the leadership of the Communist world, the
two countries competed for the favor of Communists In other
nations. An area of the world In which they showed great
Interest was Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos)...
(which) all had strong Communist parties74.

Rife with inaccurate historical claims (“The Communists (presumably
the North Vietnamese) ... urged South Vietnamese Communists to
revolt. These rebels called themselves the Vietcong. ') 75, the narrative
in this text forms the basis of the history presented in the 1985 version; the
same explanations are rehashed. In both versions the impact of the
war on South and North Vietnamese life and culture is ignored.
There are a few texts which deal with the Vietnam W ar on a
slightly more sophisticated level:
The introduction of the section on Vietnam in Rise of the
American Nation (1982) contains the following passage: “The most
serious problem that the United States faced between 1960 and 1980
was a war in South Vietnam. This war had a great impact on the image
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of America around the world. It also influenced the way Americans
perceived their own country and its role in the w o rld .'76 This section,
peppered with incorrect phonetic pronunciations of Vietnamese names
(Ngo Dinh Diem as “NOH DIN DYEM ' and Nguyen Van Thieu as “nuh
WIN van TYO O '), does present the information that “the war had a
shattering impact on all participants', citing both American and
Vietnamese casualties. Civilians, it states, “bore the heaviest burden of
suffering,' and it continues with the assertion that “by the end of
1967 .civilian casualties were totaling between 100,000 and 150,000 a
y e a r . S e v e r a l pages later it cites the figure of 45,729 Americans killed
in action and more than 300XXXDwounded and also includes figures on
Vietnamese deaths: “estimates put South Vietnamese deaths at
160,903 and those of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese at 922,295,'
also noting that 6 million refugees were created by the war78. Rise of
the American Nation is remarkable because it attempts to describe
the suffering which resulted from the war, and includes statistics on
both American and Vietnamese victims.
The Americans: The History of a People and a Nation (1982)a Iso
stands out from the rest of the general texts. The Americans refers to the
Vietnam War as “the longest war in US history' and explains that “the
direct cost to the nation was 46,000 battle deaths, 300,000 wounded,
and a price tag of about $137 m illion'79. There is mention of ‘42,000
Vietcong casualties' during the Tet Offensive, and a significant section
entitled ‘The Ground W ar' which refers to civilian casualties during
search and destroy operations, the production of refugees, and the
spraying of defoliants which ‘ devastated about 20 percent of the
landscape' and ‘ led to birth defects in Vietnamese children and in the
children of American servicemen, as well as to liver damage, muscular
disorders, and other health problems for the adults who were exposed
to the chem icals'80. In the 22 textbooks reviewed, this was the only
significant passage which referred to the use of toxic chemicals or
dioxin poisoning.
Our Land, Our Time: A History of the United States (1985)
devotes several pages to Vietnam, briefly citing “atrocities — some
unintentional (such as the bombing of civilian targets), and some the
result of soldiers cracking under the pressure of a vicious w a r' although
it makes no mention of specific instances of atrocity, such as the Son
My (My Lai) massacre81. In a sub-section entitled ‘Vietnam's Legacy,'
this text discusses the tragedy of the war, although the American
casualty figure is off by approximately 150,(XX). It is noted that ‘ proba
bly 800,000 South Vietnamese and a comparable number of North
Vietnamese died.' Placing these numbers in a graph, the caption
notes that “each day during 1968, the most savage year of the war, 40
Americanswere killed and 128wounded. And yet not one of the goals
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for which all the blood was spilled and all the money was spent was
achieved'82. This is a unique observation in texts of this kind, and raises
significant questions about the nature and value of patriotism, obedi
ence , and authority. The text then points out that “veterans of the war
were neglected and shunned, as if they were responsible for it, instead
of being its victim s'83. Despite the problematic strategy of turning
soldiers Into “victim s' (and thus according them the same status as
Vietnamese civilian casualties or victims of atrocities), this text does
acknowledge the existence of the phenomenon of Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder, and the difficulties of readjustment for veterans after
the war.
C O N C LUSIO N

Some may argue that there is little room in US history texts for
mention of Edap Enang, Son My, or Kerry Ryan. Most people believe
that the purpose of these general texts is to survey the history of the
nation — the political entity — which, given its scope, excludes de
tailed treatment of human stories. But the exclusion of particular
human stories and the inclusion of others (such as the heroic death of
Pfc. Milton Lee Olive) creates a political framework which supports a
particular (and not necessarily accurate) narrative of the Vietnam
War. Vietnam is discussed in light of “the Communist Threat to South
Vietnam '; the need for “The Tonkin Gulf Resolution'; and the wisdom
of “Johnson's Vietnam Policies'84. The mythology which underlies
these narratives is fundamentally incapable of encompassing a war in
which American and soldiers fought, suffered, and died (and still
continue to suffer) for less than noble reasons. And this mythology is
incapable of dealing at all with the questions of Vietnamese history
and political culture. An approach which could embrace these topics
would lead to fundamental questions of authority and obedience to
country, to school; in fact, to all figures of authority.
In an interview several years ago David Marr was asked a
question about how to write about Vietnam in high school textbooks.
He answered that “for the Vietnam war you will try to find out what are
the most common public attitudes about the war, and you will repeat
those in one form or another'85. A textbook written for the public
schools cannot be expected to confront the fact that fathers, hus
bands, and sons of the community have become casualties for no
good reason. Textbooks, reflecting traditional cultural values, must
present a history that can conform to “the most common public
attitudes' even if they must rewrite events to achieve that end. They
are noteworthy primarily because of how they choose not to deal with
Vietnam, by their evasion, their lack of passion — their presentation of
Vietnam in cold blood.
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Can educators be excused for this failure to face the facts?
Next to parents, we are the primary agents by which our society
encutturates its children. How can we justify our failure to confront the
consequences of warfare? There is no question that texts ignore the
"missing dimension' of the Vietnam War, and there is no legitimate
excuse we can make for this ignorance. Frequently the evasion is
disguised by a claim of academic objectivity, but this "objectivity'
almost always turns out to work in support of a particular political view.
The attempt to avoid the controversy which would enterthe classroom
if we encouraged enlightened discussions aboutthe Vietnam War is an
outgrowth of the political constraints placed on the comprehensive
public school and of the cultural conditions which shape the schools in
the community image.
The treatment of the Vietnam War In American textbooks
serves as one of the means by which schools perform their
larger social functions. Their most basic function Is to obtain
an uncritical acceptanceot the presentsoclety. thus hindering
rational analyses of conflicts such as Vietnam... the textbook
examination of the Vietnam War Is eminently reasonable
once we understand the role It plays in the larger social
functions of schooling86.

It is the failure of educators to confront the community, and to
question the role which we play in the whole of the educational system
which results in the miseducation of our students. If we fought the
Vietnam War in cold blood, we have taught the the Vietnam War in
cold blood as well.
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Tw o Q uiET A m eric a ns : T urn Inq B R iTish
L it e r a t u r e iNTO A merican P ropaqancJa
Mariam D arce F r en ier

On February 18, 1982, history, film, and literature met and
merged in Ronald Reagan's description of the American decision to
enter the Vietnam War. Echoing the platitudes of the fictional Alden
Pyle, he stated:
If I recall correctly, when France gave up Indochina as a
colony, the leading nations of the world met In Geneva with
regard to helping those colonies become Independent na
tions. ...North and South Vietnam had been, previous to
colonization, two separate countries.... And openly, our
country sent military advisors there to help.... And they were
doing this. If I recall correctly, also In civilian clothes, no
weapons, until they began being blown up where they lived
and walking down the streets by people riding by on bicycles
and throwing pipe bombs at them1-

As Garry Wills, Lou Cannon, and many others have pointed out, Ronald
Reagan cannot always distinguish between movies and reality. In this
case, Reagan's analysis seems to be shaped by too many late-night
viewings of The Quiet American. Reagan's (probably unconscious)
revision of history is a product of the same American tendency to
reinterpret unpleasant realities as Joseph Mankiewicz's movie
(sub)version of Greene's novel. In this article 1will demonstrate the way
in which Mankiewicz's reinterpretation of Greene mirrors American
Cold War misinterpretations of the Vietnam conflict and of the French
experience in Indochina.
Greene went to Vietnam during the early 1950s. The Quiet
American was constructed from his experiences there as a newspaper
correspondent. A converted Catholic2, his sympathies were with the
political Left; he admired Fidel Castro and was once heard to say that,
if forced to choose, he would prefer to live in the USSR than the US3 His
novel examines American naivete in Vietnam in the early 1950s.
Thomas Fowler, the novel's narrator, is a British journalist familiar with
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Saigon and the Vietnamese — obviously a proxy for the author.
Originally published in 1956 and still in print, many critics now consider
this the best novel about Vietnam in English.
As the novel begins, Fowlerand Phuong (Phoenix) have
lived together for two years when the quiet American, Alden Pyle,
stumbles into their lives4 The novel's Pyle is a well-intentioned promoter
of a "Third Force' — Vietnamese who are neither communist nor
collaborators. Fresh from the US, Pyle "know s' what the Vietnamese
want and how to help them to accomplish their goals. Fowler tries to
explain the realities of Vietnamese politics to Pyle, but Pyle cannot
listen.
Nor can he listen when Fowler tries to explain the basis of
Phuong's attraction to Pyle. Phuong has no understanding or interest
in the romantic love which Pyle professes; instead, she is won over by
Pyle's promises to take her to the United States and marry her.
In the course of his work, Pyle causes a massacre. Hopelessly
immersed in American mythology, Pyle can only do harm, and Fowler
decides to cooperate with the Viet Minh who wish to assassinate him.
The French Inspector, Vigot, who investigates Pyle's murder decidedly
concurs in Fowler's judgement of the political situation in Vietnam and
of the quiet American. Pyle dead, Phuong gravitates back to Fowler.
The movie tells a different story. As in the novel, Fowler narrates.
However, the movie's quiet American wins the romantic love of
Phuong, is innocent of the murder of women and children, and repre
sents wisdom while Fowler is the true innocent. In his naivete, the
movie's Fowler is duped by the Chinese Communists into cooperating
in their assassination of Pyle. Vigot seconds Pyle's analysis of Fowler.
Phuong, in disgust at Fowler, and grieving for Pyle, returns to her life as
a dance hall girl — rejecting Fowler's offer of marriage.
Joseph Mankiewicz wrote and directed the movie version of
The Quiet American, which first appeared in American movie theaters
in 1959s A Cold War liberal, Mankiewicz was accused of being a
"fellow-traveller' by powerful director Cecil B. DeMille during the
turbulent McCarthy Era. Though he retained his position as President of
the Screen Director's Guild, he may have felt his reputation was stained
by DeMille's accusations. His version of The Quiet American may have
been created, in part, to drown out any whispers that he was soft on
Communism.
Though Robert Lantz claimed that Mankiewicz "boasted of his
projected transformation' of the novel, Mankiewicz denied this in
19786 He describes the film, instead, as ‘the very bad film I made during
a very unhappy time in my life...'7 But neither does Mankiewicz have
praise for the novel, calling it "a terribly distorted kind of cheap
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melodrama in which the American was the most idiotic kind of villa in'8
A critical and commercial failure, the movie failed to make the
list of Annual Top Moneymaking Films for 1958 or 1959, falling far short
of The Bridge on the River Kwai (estimated box office receipts $18
million) and Auntie Mame ($8.8 million). The Quiet American did not
even gross as much as $1 million9
When the movie was reviewed in 1958. many critics thought
Mankiewicz changed the ending to avoid the anger of American ex
hibitors and the movie's financing distributor. United Artists. But it is
disturbing that Geist and other critics did not note changes more
insidious than Mankiewicz's gross manipulation of the ending. Greene
himsetf wrote to protest those changes in a letter to the Times of
London, published on January 29.1957:
(S)uch changes ... will make only the more obvous the dis
crepancy between what the (US) State Deparment would
like the world to believe and what In fact happened In Viet
Nam.

Speculations on the reasons for the differences between novel and
movie include the strong possiblity that Joseph L. Mankiewicz and his
company — along with too many other Americans in the 1950s — held
so tightly to American mythology that they couldn't tolerate Greene's
presentation. American mythology dictated that Americans cleaned
up after decadant Europeans, and had a mission to bring God/
Democracy/American values to other parts of the world. Though
Mankiewicz was critical of the “white hat/black hat' polarization in the
Hollywood Western and gangster movie10- he was seemingly oblivious
to his own decision to use that same device. Thus, in Mankiewicz's
Quiet American, the American became a hero, the British journalist
became a sleazy patsy for the Commies, and the wishes of the Viet
namese became invisible and inrelevent.
To illustrate specific ways in which the movie inverts the novel,
I will examine several key passages and scenes, and discuss their
presentation in both contexts. As in most artistic works, the opening has
a special significance, setting the tone of what is to come, and
creating audience/reader expectations.
The novel begins at midnight In Fowler's room; it is the night of
Alden Pyle's assassination. Six months have passed since he met Fowler
and Phuong, and “weeks ago (it was) the Chinese New Yea r'. Vigot
Is present, and the novel's first conversation between the French In
spector and Fowler not only establishes that both were aware of Pyle's
covert military activities, but that both disapproved of them. “To speak
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p la inly,” Vigot states about Pyle's murder, "I am not altogether sorry.
He was doing a lot of harm '. Pyle's misapprehension of Vietnamese
politics is early established by these two experts, who acknowledge the
importance and existence of the Viet Minh.
The United Artist movie opens with an orientalized title. Audie
Murphy (Pyle) receives top billing, followed by Michael Redgrave
(Fowler), Claude Dauphin (Vigot), and Georgia Moll (Phuong). Orien
talized music plays as the titles are superimposed on a series of Asian
faces, and then the movie breaks directly into a Chinese New Year
celebration which features a paper dragon. Subtitles follow:
Frame 1:
SAIGON
At the time of
CHINESE NEW YEAR
1959
Frame 2:
There was an Emperor who
ruled by permission of France
to whom it belonged
Frame 3:
and 300 miles to the north of
Saigon, both the Emperor and the
French were fighting a war against
a Communist army
Frame 4:
But, at war or in peace. CHINESE
NEW YEAR was a time to forgive
one's enemies, square accounts
with one's God and creditors —
Frame 5:
and to rejoice in a world that
for two days, might be considered
a happy one.
At the end of the credits the movie cuts to an Asian man who
finds Pyle's body. He is joined at the scene by a group of Asian women.
In this way, although th e “it' in Frame 2 is Vietnam, Vietnam itself
goes unspecified. Furthermore, the date is given as 1952: Greene
closes his novel with the notation “March 1952 — June 1955.' These
changes distance the movie's Pyle from Colonel Edward G. Landsdale
and the events of 1954, and make Vietnam a stand-in for any “it' that
is “fighting a war against a Communist a rm y '. Then, the subtitles estab
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lish the importance of the Chinese in Saigon and begin to connect
them with Chinese Communism. These political shifts transform Greene's
novel.
In the novel, the most politically significant scene is set in a South
Vietnamese watch-tower well outside Saigon. Pyle and Fowler end up
there because their cars have been sabotaged — perhaps by the Cao
Dai, a cult which once backed Pyle's for the leader of the Third Force,
General Th6. They share the tower with two Vietnamese sentries.
Fowler: You and your like are trying to make a war with the
help of people who Just aren't Interested.
Pyle: They don't want Communism.
Fowler: They want rice... They d on't want to be shot at. They
want one day to be much the same as another. They don't
want our white skins around telling them what they want.
Pyle: If Indochina goes...
Fowler: I know that record. Slam goes.
Pyle: They'll be forced to believe what they are told, they
w on't be allowed to think for themselves.
Fowler: Thought's a luxury. Do you think the peasant sits and
thinks of God and Democracy when he gets Inside his mud
hut at night?

Pyle grounds his arguments in the theories of York Harding, an Ameri
can scholar. But Fowler calls Harding merely "a superior sort of
journalist... He gets hold of an idea and then alters every situation to fit
the idea. Pyle came out here full of York Harding's idea'. Inthewatchtower, Pyle again refers to Harding.
Pyle: You shouldn't be against York, you should be against the
French. Their colonialism.
Fowler: Isms and ocracles. Give me facts.

Fowler tries to explain the Vietnamese peasants to Pyle:
The only man to treat him as a man Is the (Communist) political
commissar. He'll sit In his hut and ask his name and listen to his
complaints; he'll give up an hour a day to teaching him — It
doesn't matter what, he's being treated like a man, like
someone of value. Don't go on In the East with that parrot cry
about a threat to the Individual soul. Here you'd find yourself
on the wrong side — it's they who stand for the individual and
we just stand for Private 23987, unit In the global strategy.

Finally, Greene points up the nature of the Viet Minh and Pyle's distrust
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of his South Vietnamese allies. Fowler leaves the watch-tower to fetch
blankets from his car, and finds the atmosphere different in the hut
when he returns:
Pyle: I don't trust (the sentry guards) with the gun If (the
enemies) are coming....
Fowler: They are supposed to be on our side.
Pyle: I thought you didn't have a side.
Fowler: Touch6,1 wish the Viets knew It.

In the movie's watch-tower scene the conversation is very different.
Pyle says of the two guards, “They're just kids.' He wonders how to pass
the time.
Fowler: Why not give them lectures on ‘ national democ
racy.'
Pyle: You don't believe in It at all do you? There are two
different beliefs here, both confined to this hut at this minute.

Fyie offers a cigarette to Fowler, who suggests he give some to the
guards in order to stay friendly with them.
Pyle: I wouldn't have thought you'd suggest economic aid to
buy friends.
Fowler: They're scared.... Theyjustwant enough rice.... They
don't want our white skins around telling them what they
want.
Pyle: You're telling them what they don't want.... (T)he skins
In Russia are still white too.
Fowler: I don't take sides.... This sudden Importance of the
Individual and his freedom, why have we Just discovered It?
Fifty years ago nobody would have spoken of It.
Pyle: I'm from a country that's been In existence less than 200
years In a very old world.... (S)uddenly the world waits angrily
for us to find the answers It hasn't been able to find In 50
centuries.

Ma nkiewicz uses the watch-tower scene to establish Pyle's concern for
his allies, America's special mission, and to confirm the audience's
belief in monolithic communism. He ties the Vietnamese Communist
struggle to the Soviet Union (never mentioned in the novel), and makes
no reference to Vietnamese peasants or Viet Minh commissars.
Pyle's theories are put into practice, in both the novel and the
movie, in the bicycle-bomb incident and in the bombing of a civilian
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crowd in Saigon. In the movie, the bicycle-bomb incident occurs after
a Chinese, Mr. Heng, shows plastic (“Diolactin') and a mysterious mold
to Fowler. Heng then suggests that perhaps Fowler will be “near the
flower stalls on the Boulevard Chamet at precisely half-past one this
afternoon'. Near the flower stalls at the appointed time, Fowler sees
vehicles racing to a fountain, sirens screeching; officials jump from their
cars, pick up nearby bicycles, and hurl them into the fountain. Heng
appears and begins to talk to Fowler. The bicycles explode. With
Heng's help, Fowler makes the connection between the bicyclebombs, Diolactin, the mold, and Alden Pyle. While the novel is subtler
— for example, Heng does not set Fowler up so explicitly — the bicyclebomb incident has similar consequences.
But novel and movie lead the audience in different directions.
This is brought out most clearly in the scene where explosions kill
Vietnamese women and children congregating in a busy Saigon
square. In the novel, after the explosions, Fower and Pyle meet in the
square.
Pyle said, “It's aw ful.' He looked at the wet on his shoes and
said In a sick voice, ‘W hat's that?'
’ Blood," I said....
He was seeing a real war for the first time....
He said weakly, ‘ There was to have been a pa
rade.'...
‘ But the parade was cancelled yesterday. Pyle.'
‘ I didn't know.... They should have called It o ff.'
He looked white and beaten and ready to faint.

Greene's Pyle blanches at the realities of war, or dirty tricks, and
acknowledges his faulty intelligence gathering.
The movie scene is full of burning cars, a woman screaming,
and a woman being carried off on a stretcher. Pyle arrives standing on
the dashboard of a vehicle; men are inside and he seems to be
directing them to bring him to the massacre scene. Subsequently, he
points out to Fowler that a French Military parade had been scheduled,
then cancelled, and that there had been rumors about a demonstra
tion and bicycle bombs. Fowler exclaims, 'Yo u r bicycle-bombs!' and
suggests that Pyle's Third Force hope. General Th§ has done the
bombing. Pyle denies any part in the demostration and snaps: “Why
don't you just shut up and help somebody.'
The movie's Pyle becomes the helper rather than the menace.
Furthermore, a take-charge Pyle is established as being in full control of
intelligence gathering and as being innocent of any part in the
massacre. These shifts are part of a greater revision — Pyle's naivety
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replaced by Fowler's.
Early in the novel, the innocence of Pyle is established as a
cause of concern to Fowler. After Pyle's death, the American Eco
nomic Attach^ first tells Fowler that Pyle had “special duties' and then
wonders why he was killed. Fowler responds:
They killed him because he was too Innocent to live.... He had
no more of a notion than any of you what the whole affair's
about, and you gave him money and York Harding’s books
on the East and said, "Go ahead. Win the East for Democ
racy.' He never saw anything he hadn't heard In a lecturehall and his writers and his lecturers made a fool o f him. When
he saw a dead body he couldn't even see the wounds.

In the novel, Pyle's second-hand ideas are re-emphasized, and his
foolish innocence is under-scored.
In contrast, the movie portrays Fowler as the true innocent and
infers that Pyle's idea of “national democracy' is the solution for South
Vietnam. York Harding is never mentioned in the movie. The movie's
last scene between Fowler and Pyle demonstrates this subversion
clearly.
Fowler: W hat do you hear from General The?
Pyle: I haven't seen him lately.
Fowler: Isupposed he would have come to Saigon to see how
his bomb worked.
Pyle: W hat makes you so sure It was his bomb? I don't think
so....
Fowler: Believe me, national democracy Is something that
comes out of a book.... Thd's not the leader for your Third
Force.
Pyle: It's not my Third Force.
Fowler: Your country m ustn't trust men like Thd....
F>y1e: You're talking cloak and dagger nonsense.... It'squlte
true that I've been In touch with General Thd.... After I was
graduated from college, I took some post-graduate work at
Princeton.... While I was there I met a very prominent Viet
namese living In exile In New Jersey.
Fowler: Who was he?
F>yle: Youknow.orshouldknow.aswellasl. Because If all goes
well. If Vietnam becomes an Independent republic, this man'll
be Its leader.
Fowler: And this future leader sent you to General Thd?
Pyle: W hat makes you believe any sane government or sane
man would send me on a mission like that?
Fowler: Then, who did send you to General Thd?
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Pyle: I did.

The movie conversation ends with Pyle denouncing Fowler: “I think you
believe whatever you need to believe emotionally.... My government
has nothing to do with this ... it was my own idea.' Pyle continues:
You've got a great talent for words... you depend on them as
If saying a thing Is an effective way to make It true.... What are
you afraid of anyway? Like an adolescent boy who keeps on
using dirty words all the time because he doesn't want
anyone to think he doesn't know what it's all about. You're
going to hate this, but I think you're one of the most truly
Innocent men I'll ever know.

Three important subversions exist in the scene described above.
The most important is the reversal of Pyle's and Fowler's roles. In the
novel, it is Pyle's words that are dangerous — innocent, idealistic, and
deadly — but it is Fowler's words that are condemned in the movie. The
second subversion is a removal of Pyle from the intellectual environ
ment of Harvard (and York Harding) to the Princeton, New Jersey area,
so that his connection with Diem (an "authentic' and validating
connection) can be established. The third subversion is that Mankiewicz absolves the US government of even the remotest complicity in
the massacre of innocent civilians.
Mankiewicz uses several devices to accomplish the demolition
of Fowler's credibility and character. He reverses the positions of
innocence and wisdom which Greene had established between
Fowler and Pyle, he realigns the sympathies of the French Inspector,
Vigot, and he manipulates the relationship between Pyle and Phuong.
Where the novel's Vigot is sympathetic to Fowler, the movie's
Vigot is contemptuous of him. In a scene set in the French inspector's
office, Mankiewicz's Vigot and Fowler discuss Pyle's murder.
Fowler: He was killed by an Idea as much as anything else....
All his life they saturated him with this Idea; from books and
slogans, church pulpits, lecture platforms.
Vigot: An idea so repugnant that he was killed for It?

The movie has already established that words, especially when uttered
by Fowler, can be bad, but now it is clear that ideas are good and
worth dying for. In this scene, idealism joins with anti-intellectualism,
tapping into an old American disjunction between knowledge and
ideals. The conversation continues, and it becomes clear that Fowler
has been fooled into thinking that Pyle was dealing in explosives by the
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Communists. Vigot's contempt knows no bounds.
Vlgot: Do you ask ...about guilt (for the massacre)? Do you
ask how about the guilt you decided upon before the crime
was committed? And for which the sentence has already
been carried out? ... It was the Idea that had to be
murdered.... You know. It Is a mistake to say that Communism
Is appealllng to the mentally advanced. I think it Is only true
when the mentally advanced are also emotionally retarded.
Fowler: I'm not a Communist, Vlgot.
Vlgot: But someone was required to help assassinate the
Idea, someone gifted In the war of w ords... to plead the right
eousness.... But yet someone so emotionally Involved that he
would not permit even his training as a professional reporter
... to reject such an obviously Idiotic story.
Fowler: All right, mea culpa.
Vlgot: You were terrified of losing your girl to a younger man....
You've simply been used that you could be so childishly ma
nipulated.... They have made a bloody fool of you.

In the novel, Fowler is driven to take sides when he realizes that Pyle's
blind innocence has already brought about the death of civilians and
will likely bring about more such deaths. Greene's depiction of the last
exchange between Pyle and Fowler points out the correctness of
Fowler's interpretation.
F>yle: I saw Thd this afternoon.... I dealt with him very se
verely.... In the long run he Is the only hope we have.... The
massacre was a terrible shock today, Thomas, but In a week,
you'll see, we'll have forgotten It. We are looking after the
relatives too.
Fowler: We?
FVIe: W e've wired to Washington.

At this point, Fowler goes to the window to give a pre-arranged signal
to Heng's associates. Still staring out the window, Fowler reads out of
a book to Pyle:
I drive through the streets and I care not a damn.
The people they stare, and they ask who I am;
And if I should chance to run over a cad,
I can pay for the damage If ever so bad.
So pleasant It Is to have money, heigh hoi
So pleasant It Is to have money.

By having Fowler quote from Arthur Hugh Clough's “Dipsychus' (the
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“twin-souled") Greene comments on America's moneyed insensitivity,
and acknowledges that Pyle may indeed represent the flip-side of
Fowler.
The scene in the movie goes in a very different direction.
Directly after Pyle's statement that "M y government has nothing to do
with t h is ... it was my own idea," he says, “I'm being sent home next
week. Phuong's going with me. We're going to be married at home.
Immediately Fowler, in voice-over narration, notes: “Forthefirst
time he spoke of Phuong, of taking her away with him, of leaving me
behind alone.' That is the moment that Fowler chooses to go to the
window to betray Pyle, and then to quote Shakespeare's Othello.
rather than the more political Clough:
Though 1purchance am vicious In my guess. —
As, I confess. It is my nature's plague
To spy Into abuses, and o ft my Jealousy
Shapes faults that are not, —

Mankiewicz's Fowler thus betrays Pyle out of sexual jealousy. And it is
this jealousy which disgusts Vigot and highlights the movie's focus on
romantic love.
Greene's Phuong is incapable of romantic love: “It isn't in the
Vietnamese nature," Fowler explains to Pyle. But the movie up-ends
Phuong's response to the Pyle of the novel, and implies that romantic
love is indeed universal. The movie's last scene between Fowler and
Phuong takes place in the dance hall where they first met. Fowler reads
her a telegram from his British wife: she is granting him a divorce so that
he can marry Phuong. Phuong walks away from Fowler, but pleading,
he follows after her. She turns to him and echoes his last statement.
Phuong: What “we" have always wanted Is In your hands?
What Is that?
Fowler: To be together as we were, to have again what we
had.
Phuong: What were *we" and what did we have?.... There
was a man who gave to me something ... o f himself. I've
known a man who loved me, he said.... Have you ever loved
me? Have you ever even lied to me that you loved me?
Fowler: What will become of you here In a place like this w ith...
with people like these?
Phuong: Since when does the future concern you?...
Fowler: Now, It concerns me now.
Phuong: Now Is too late for you.
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This argument takes place in the middle of the same Chinese
New Year celebration which marked the beginning of the movie. The
emphasis on Chinese culture is significant because it underlines the
way in which Mankiewicz simplifies and reduces Vietnamese culture.
To Mankiewicz, all Asian cultures are one — there is no need to
distinguish among them. Thus, Greene's considered observations on
Phuong's Vietnamese conception of love and marriage are easily
replaced by standard 1950s American concepts (the "rig ht' con
cepts), in the same way that "good' Vietnamese, like General Th6 and
Diem, can accept American concepts of national democracy. ’ Bad'
Vietnamese (like the Viet Minh) are equated with the Chinese Commu
nists. The inference here is that traditional American values are good,
and that traditional Asian values are corrupt.
Fowler's last words in both novel and movie are the same:
"(H)ow I wished there existed someone to whom I could say that I was
sorry'. But they imply something completely different in the film and in
the novel.
In a 1969 interview, Greene said of his novels: "Even the early
thrillers were political: The Confidential Agent deals with the Spanish
Civil War. The Quiet American and The Comediens are political
novels'11 Nevertheless, The Quiet American was written by a devout
Catholic, who framed those last words carefully to represent an
atheist's longing for God.
One gets so tired of people saying that my novels are about
the opposition of Good and Evil. They are not about Good
and Evil, but about human beings. After Hitler and Vietnam,
one would have thought good and evil In people was more
understandable12-

1950s America was incapable of getting the point, and it seems that
this incomprehension has carried over into the 1980s. Reagan's
February 1982 speech is only an extension of the logic which governed
Manciewicz's revision of Greene's The Quiet American.
Life imitates art in amazing ways. Thomas Morgan tells the story
of a conversation which took place between him and Audie Murphy,
the real-life World War 2 hero who starred in Mankiewicz's Quiet
American years before. Morgan and Murphy got into a discussion
about the antiwar protesters who demonstrated against American
involvement in the war in Vietnam.
'G e e ,' (Murphy) said, 'I'd hate their guts If they had
any.'
'I think we should get out of Vietnam,' I said.

Two

Q uiet A mericans 93

*No, you can't leave Vietnam unless you win the
war.'
*1 don't think the Vietnamese want us over there.'
‘ Listen, when you feel you are morally right, you just
have to act and let people catch up later. That's the way It
Is in w a r.... It'll take one million troopsl But I say — we go In, we
do the Job. Then we get out! There's no other w a y'13

1Gettleman, Marvin E., Jane Franklin, Marilyn Young, H. Bruce Franklin, eds.
Vietnam and Am erica: A Documented History (New York: Grove Press) 1985:
xili.
2 During his college years ‘out of Impishness,' Greene had Joined the Commu
nist Party. He remained a member for six weeks. In 1926, at the age of 22. he
converted from Anglicanism to Catholicism.
3 Current Biography (1969): 180-182.
4 The character of Alden Pyle was obviously modeled on the American CIA
officer. Colonel Edward G. Lansdale. In 1954 Lansdale worked with the CIA to
establish Ngo Dlnh Diem's power base; he used various methods to accom
plish his ends. Including ‘ dirty tricks'. He Is also known to have bribed several
of the leaders of the Cao Dal and Hoa Hao to rally to Diem, paying them with
CIA funds. (Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking) 1983: 222.)
6 The movie was a box-office flop, but is still frequently shown on American
television.
6 Gels: 267-269.
7 Ibid..-. 268.
8 Ibid.: .269.
9 Steinberg, Cobbett. Reel Facts: Movie Book o f Records (New York: Vintage)
1982: 22.
10 Geist: 196.
11 Phillips, Gene D. ‘ Graham Greene: On the Screen,' Catholic W orld 209
(August 1969): 218-221.
12 Ibid.
13 Morgan, Thomas B. ‘The War Hero,' Esquire 100 (December 1983): 597-604.

F ir s t Blood R ecI rawn
D on K unz

Nearly everyone speaking or writing about Am erica's Vietnam
soldier eventually feels compelled to mention Rambo. As David Morrell
notes with pride, the name of the character he created in his novel. First
Blood, has entered our nation's household vocabulary1. It resembles
in this case the title of Joseph Heller's World W ar 2 novel. Catch 22. and
the macho m ovie-star name of Marion Robert Morrison — John Wayne.
There is more at stake in the popular adoption of those term s than a
simple enlargem ent of the dictionary. The evolution of Rambo from
character to icon illustrates the fictionalizing process by which history
is accom m odated to myth.
Rambo is an ambiguous and contradictory epithet, its meaning
shifting as a result of an elaborate revision process still underway.
M orrell's protagonist has been appropriated variously as a symbol of
American patriotism , mindless savagery, the frontier hero, and
Frankenstein's monster. President Reagan has invoked Rambo as the
deus exm achina to his adm inistration's hostage crisis and tax reform
problem s2. Rambo has subsequently trickled down into parental
discussions of overly zealous Little League coaches, and to newspaper
headlines about Los Angeles freeway killers. In the sem antically
confusing aftermath of the Rambo films — Ted Kotcheff's First Blood.
Part I (1982), George P. C osm atos' Rambo: First Blood. Part 2(1985),
and Peter M acDonald's Rambo 3(1988) — David M orrell's 1972 novel
has almost been forgotten.
Critics have written about the Rambo films in relation to one
another and in relation to other films about Vietnam, ignoring the
original literary work. I intend to reestablish the importance of the novel
by a com parison of its setting, characterization, and theme to the
revisionary film adaptation. I will then demonstrate the ways in which
the two cinem atic sequels to First Blood, Part 1 continue the
transform ation of a provocative, engaging fiction into a fam iliar and
comforting myth.
The film adaptation and its sequels repackage and resell the
Vietnam experience as an entertainment com m odity for safe mass
consumption — a sanitized rerun of Am erica's first television war. In the
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films, David Morrell's complex and disturbing protagonist is simplified
and softened in order to transform the public's concept of America's
Vietnam veteran from psychotic loser to incorruptible and invincible
superpatriot;Sylvester Stallone's muscular incarnation of John Rambo
glosses over Morrell's profoundly troubling conclusions about America's
treatment of Vietnam veterans.
In Morrell's original story, protagonist and antagonist alike are
realistic extensions of the national character, reflecting the historic era.
Their suffering is psychological as well as physical; the conflict is more
tragic than melodramatic. Reading the novel, we are invited to
acknowledge the humanity of those who provoke the returned
veteran's violence. Asa consequence, we are unable to deny that to
some extent the antagonists represent us, ordinary Americans of no
great power or influence who nevertheless share responsibility for what
happened to the Vietnam veteran.
Morrell's Rambo returns to an America which is hostile territory
for anyone who looks different. The setting of the novel — Madison,
Kentucky — is apparently unremarkable except for being near the
heartland of America, for which it stands. Rambo, with his heavy
beard, long hair, and ragged, dusty, patched clothing, is nearly run
over by a car as he is hitchhiking in Madison, and a gas station
attendant quickly calls the police because he looks like a vagrant. The
Chief of Police, Wilfred Teasle, drives Rambo to the edge of town and
leaves him In the ditch, like a throwaway bottle. When Rambo returns,
Teasle tells him he looks like a drifter, a moocher, a drug pusher; he
stands out "like some black m an'3. Escorting Rambo to the city limits
for the second time, Teasle remarks angrily that his town is changing:
kids are hanging out on the street, littering, making noises that he
doesn't want to hear. Rambo should get a haircut, a bath, and a job.
Morrell makes it clear, when Rambo thinks to himself that Madison is the
fifteenth town he has been pushed out of, that this old Kentucky home
Is just like the rest of America in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
In Morrell's America, blacks have been excluded from full
social participation, ghettoized out of sight; there is a generation gap,
an internal war between Establishment and counterculture. The local
police have obviously taken President Nixon's speeches about law
and order to heart. In fact. Chief of Police Teasle has made his home
in the police station; an old schoolhouse newly repainted red, white,
and blue. Rambo eventually dynamites the station along with the
courthouse, and Teasle thinks, "Christ, he's gone out of his mind.... He
wants to blow up the whole tow n'4. Synecdochically, the town is
America.
In contrast, Kotcheff'sfilm adaptation of Morrell's novel makes

96 Vietnam Generation
the town which casts Rambo out seem atypical and fantastic. (The film
was shot in Nelson, British Columbia; the same otherworldly location
Fred Schepisi and Steve Martin used for Roxanne.) The neon sign at the
city limits proclaims, “Welcome to Holidayland'. A remote resort
surrounded by snow-capped peaks, this place seems special, not the
average American small town. In First Blood. Part /, a black family lives
beside a sparkling lake where children play happily together. The
Police Chief contentedly belches and pats his full belly as he emerges
from the station to banter good naturedly with the locals. The streets
are bathed in sunlight reflected from the majestic, snow-covered
mountains. This tow n's allegorical name is consistent with Kotcheff's
revision: Hope.
Kotcheff's Rambo returns to America with a set of expectations
which are soon dashed. Unlike Morrell's character, this Rambo is not
just passing through one more American town along an endless road.
Instead, he has come to Hope expecting to be welcomed; he has
come to look up Delmore, a black comrade, the only other survivor of
his Green Beret unit. In the opening scene, Delmore's mother bitterly
informs Rambo that her son died of cancer brought on by his exposure
to Agent Orange. Rambo is crushed to learn that there is no hope of
escaping the damaging effects of the war, even after being discharged,
and the sky actually darkens as he heads into town, looking for
someone to blame. Hope is a false promise. The town seems beautiful,
friendly, but it is actually a closed community harboring its own cancer;
a utopia maintained by violently repressive and sadistic forces, denying
access or understanding to outsiders. Kotcheff grants his film audience
license to regard this town, and especially its inept and villainous police
force as isolated from, rather than typical of, the nation at large.
In contrast, Morrell's Madison is just like the fifteen other town
Rambo has been pushed out of on his aimless journey through America.
The novel does not permit the readerto escape the unsettling conclusion
that rejecting the Vietnam veteran and denying him a place in the
society he fought for can only result in his decision to turn against
America, to bring the full horror of the Vietnam War home.
Neitherthe novel northefilm give much insight into the townsfolk;
it is the character of the police force which precipitates Rambo's
decision to reenact the guerrilla war. In the novel the police are
plausible civilian surrogates, representing America at home as the
soldier does in Vietnam. The policemen of Madison are ordinary
people who follow procedures, live routinely, think conventionally.
Rambo can anticipate and openly mock their cliched remarks: what
sex is he? and let's take up a collection to buy him a haircut. Chief
Teasle automatically assumes that Rambo is a fugitive because he
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does not carry any identification. The wounds which are revealed to
Teasle during his strip search of Rambo are assumed to be related to
civilian life rather than military service. Teasle and his men are wholly
unprepared to deal with an alienated, intelligent, skillful Green Beret
who once escaped a North Vietnamese prison camp and was awarded
the Congressional Medal of Honor. When an inexperienced policeman
named Gait shakily draws his gun (against Teasle's orders) Rambo
instinctively lashes out with the razor being used to shave him. The war
at home begins with the police force unaware that Rambo is a
veteran. In fact, they have been so conditioned to expect trouble from
the opposite end of the political spectrum — counterculture war
protesters — that they mistake Rambo for one.
Isolated and silent, ratherthan tribal and vocal, Rambo has not
returned from the war to join the ranks of the protesters against it. He
has, however, become a kind of dropout, scavenging, surviving off the
land, and rejecting the option of settling down with a regular job. The
badges of his status are his long hair, beard, and ragged clothing. The
way Rambo chooses to live after the war is implicitly a critique of the
establishment which sent him abroad to perpetuate its values. In
suggesting at least a superficial (countercultural resemblance between
the veteran and the antiwar protester, Morrell's novel invites our
conclusion that the Vietnam War pointed an entire generation in
roughly the same direction. Like us. the police officers of this typical
American town do not, at first glance, understand the situation. They
are average Americans of an older generation hostile toward a
younger one, ignorant about Vietnam and unable to imagine how the
war will have an effect on them.
The film adaptation depicts Hope's police as melodramatic
villains who are aware of Rambo's war service almost immediately;
they have read his dog tags. When a young policeman (Mitch) calls
attention to Rambo's scars, the older officer (Gault) says curtly, “Who
gives a shit?" Although Mitch can see Rambo is growing agitated and
tries to calm him down, Galt, as senior officer, mocks and tortures the
“soldier boy*. Without provocation or warning he strikes Rambo in the
kidneys with his nightstick, washes him down with a firehose while
laughing sadistically, and puts a choke hold on him when Rambo starts
to object. Galt's brutality triggers Rambo's flashback to torture in the
POW camp, and precipitates his violent escape. The cinematic
flashback clearly equates Hope's police force with the North
Vietnamese. AsElizabethTraube notes, “Domestic violence is modeled
on the represented foreign violence, and the film makes a manifest
attemptto identify the oppressive domestic forces with the Vietnamese
enem y'5.
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Kotcheff's film adaptation transforms Galt from the least
experienced to the oldest veteran on the police force. In the novel,
Galt acts from ignorance and fear, as any of us might. In the film his
blatant disregard for the veteran's pain and his eagerness to abuse
Rambo make him hateful beyond the point of audience identification.
This reckless brutality is more characteristic of Hope's police
force than not. Teasle's chase after Rambo is a crazy, headstrong
charge off the highway, on to backroads, across fields and streams,
through closed pastoral gates, until the officer overturns his car on the
mountainside and crawls from the wreckage to fire a parting shot. The
police cruiser is not the only thing upside down here.
It is no wonder that Teasle describes the evil Gault as his oldest
and best friend: they are both corrupt authority figures who disguise
their sadistic tendencies by maintaining the pretense of a rule of law;
ironically, they provoke the disturbance which they are pledged to
guard against. This conspiracy envelopes other citizens of Hope, such
as the civilian whom Teasle employs to track Rambo with dogs.
Dobermans, he asserts, are better than Bloodhounds because the
fiercer dogs “can eat on the ru n '. Although Hope's police force wears
white cowboy hats, the officers are clearly not the good guys of this
cinematic melodrama. Theircrudedisregardforandsadistictreatment
of the Vietnam veteran justify the magnitude of the destruction which
he visits upon them and, more importantly, forestall any audience
sympathy.
The police officers' willfully callous abuse of John Rambo, their
disastrously ill-conceived search and destroy tactics, and obsession
with avoiding at any cost a publicly humiliating defeat by a presumably
inferior force might help the audience to the conclusion that these
men are small-town surrogates for civilian and military leadership
during the Vietnam War. But Rambo's prison flashback qualifies that
interpretation, inviting the audience to regard Hope's police force as
a quasi-foreign corruption of American civil and moral authority — the
metaphorical equivalents of his brutal North Vietnamese captors. As
such .they are justly punished by the Vietnam veteran who has returned
to protect us from them.
Morrell's Police Chief Teasle is a more complex invention than
his film counterpart. Though he orders the stranger out of town by
sundown (exhibiting the typical macho of the frontier sheriff), he also
offers him a ride to the city limits and, later, when Rambo returns, asks
him if he needs a job. Teasle's tough talk is softened by some paternal
gestures and an occasional smile which permits a glimpse of humanity
beneath the gruff professional exterior. His police cruiser accident is
not melodramatic but comic: Teasle is so astonished at seeing Rambo
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back in town that he stops short in traffic and get rear-ended by one
of the local citizens. Fending off public embarrassment, he gives the
man a ticket because “the law says the car in back is always wrong.
You were following too close for an emergency'6. The episode depicts
Madison's Police Chief more humanely, and serves as ironic
commentary on his pursuit of Rambo — Teasle follows him too closely,
unable to anticipate the accident he is about to cause. Morrell's
Teasle is complex because we have access to his consciousness. We
see him worrying about the wife who has left him, remembering his
father's death in a hunting accident, and considering how to renew
relations with his surrogate father, Orval. Although Teasle denies it,
even Orval (and. hence, the audience) recognizes that it is displaced
anger that compels Teasle to pursue Rambo. Teasle is unable to
separate his personal and professional life, creating a dangerous and
volatile situation.
In Morrell's novel. Teasle and his police force are not evil men;
they are simply unfamiliar with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),
dulled by small town life and official procedures, and overly protective
of their authority. They are not prepared to cope with the emergency
which the Chief's routine rousting of Rambo provokes. Most importantly,
they show no initial malice toward Rambo, and have no suspicion of his
veteran status. The police of Madison are simply implemented of
America's domestic law-and-order agenda. Morrell makes it difficult
to hate these policemen and easy to believe they are only average
men making natural mistakes which must inevitably trigger Rambo's
violent backlash. Madison's policemen are family men.
The guerrilla war which Rambo brings home to America in
Morrell's novel is, finally, a family affair. Rambo is the son Teasle wanted
but could never have. Morrell has carefully constructed Rambo's
entrance to coincide with the departure of Teasle's wife: Teasle
wanted a child; his wife didn't want the “trouble*7. Teasle is old enough
to be Rambo's father and, even after he learns Rambo's name,
continues to refer to him only as “the kid' — an epithet which the rest
of his men adopt. Teasle and Rambo are very much alike; they have
matching temperaments. Both are proud, independent, macho
personalities, men without the softening influence of women. Neither
likes to receive advice or take orders or negotiate.
The novel's protagonist and antagonist have been shaped by
similar experiences. They are heroic veterans: Rambo is a Congressional
Medal of Honor winner .Teasle is a recipient of the Distinguished Service
Cross for his conduct in Korea. Both men have macho foster fathers
(Orval and Trautman) who they have grown to resemble and whose
authority they have challenged in rites of passage to adulthood. Both
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men are alienated: Teasle returning from Korea to be Chief of Police
in his hometown, "except it was no more home, just the place where
he had grown u p '8, and Rambo returning from Vietnam to wander,
homeless, from town to town. The personal war between Teasle and
Rambo continues the cycle of rebellion against a harsh fatherfigure in
whose Image a boy has been raised. Morrell uses family violence as a
trope to explain the blind ferocity and self-destructive nature of a
tragic action replicated on a national scale. The war between father
and son is prologue to , and rehearsal for, foreign war. And now the war
has come home again, the family enlarged, the epilogue written.
As Teasle's battle with Rambo unfolds in Morrell's novel, it
becomes more personal, more intimate. He enlists Orval's help in
tracking Rambo, and then loses all professional perspective when
Orval is shot: "... Teasle was vowing to track the kid forever, grab him,
mutilate him... No more because of Galt.... Personal now. For himself.
Father, fosterfather. Both shot. The insane anger of when his real father
had been killed, wanting to strangle the kid until his throat was crushed,
his eyes popping'9. The Vietnam War has come home for Teasle,
threatening first his professional reputation and his pride in keeping
order in his hometown, and then threatening his personal relationships
and his ability to control and order his family life.
Although the State Police and the National Guard become
involved in hunting Rambo, Morrell focuses primarily upon the
developing intimacy between Teasle and his prey. Each crawls
painfully through a thicket of brambles to escape the other (Teasle in
the mountains and Rambo in town); each experiences chest pains
(Rambo because of broken ribs,Teasle because of heart trouble); both
want to end their war but cannot, caught in the escalating struggle
which moves the war from the mountainous wilderness into the town
itself.
The plot moves to resolution as they fire reflexively and
simultaneously, wounding one another with pistols. And, significantly,
each experiences mysteriously transcendent moments which precede
the catastrophe. Rambo's transcendence occurs at a level which
"the native allies in the war had called ... the way of Zen. the journey
to arrive at the pure and frozen moment achieved only after long
arduous training and concentration and determination to be perfect.
... the moment could not be explained. The emotion was timeless,
could not be described in time, could be compared to orgasm but not
so defined because it had no physical center, was bodily everywhere'10.
Teasle's moment occurs first as a dream in which he foresees exactly
how Rambo will escape the trap set for him by detouring through a
"graveyard' of junk cars and stealing a police cruiser, and, then, after
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Rambo shoots him. in a moment when “it was all reversed, him outside
of himseif, but everything out there within him.... He had never seen
anything with such distinct clarity'1'. Teasle has become Rambo's
secret sharer.
What the two veterans have suffered together has made them
reluctant antagonists. After he has wounded Rambo, Teasle admits. 'I
shot him and all at once I didn't hate him anymore. I was just so n y '12.
Similarly, Rambo “squinted to clear his vision, looking down the mound
where Teasle lay flat in the brush. Christ, he had hit him. God, he had
not wanted th a t'13.
Theirdeveloping intimacy in the novel is publicly acknowledged
just before death. As Teasle lies wounded, “the one policeman shook
his head queerly. 'Hethinkshe'sthekid.'.... 'He'sgone crazy,' the other
sa id '14. Teasle is perceived by observers not justas having lost his mind
like Rambo, but having, in a sense, become Rambo. Killing Rambo is
like killing himself. When Teasle continued to stalk Rambo despite his
own mortal wound, he argued with Trautman about who had the right
toendit: “He's m ine,'says Teasle. “Notyours. He wants it to be m e '15.
As he was tracking Rambo, Teasle thought, “There was blood here on
the fence. The kid's. Good. He would be going over where the kid had.
His blood dripping on the kid 's....'16
But it is Captain Trautman, who finally kills Rambo, taking off the
top of “the kid 's' head with a shotgun blast as the dying Teasle
watches: “He thought about (his wife) again, and she still did not
interest him. He thought about his house he had fixed up in the hills, the
cats there, and none of that interested him either. He thought about
the kid, and flooded with love for him, and just a second before the
empty shell would have completed its arc to the ground, he relaxed,
accepted peacefully. And was dead'17. The tragic conclusion of the
personal war between Rambo and Teasle is couched in the intimate
terms of a belated reconciliation between estranged father and son
whose life experiences mirror one another.
In Morrell's novel, the body count from Rambo's guerrilla war at
home is a staggering 200 kills18, indicating the extent to which the
Vietnam veteran succeeds in making his fellow Americans experience
the pain and suffering of the conflict which they had exported to
Southeast Asia. Like America's policy makers, the Madison police
force pay an enormous price for steadily escalating the conflict. But in
this tragic novel's catastrophe, Rambo manages to make civilian and
military authorities recognize the pain of the Vietnam veteran who was
the instrument of America's destructive policy abroad and a casualty
upon his return. Teasle and Trautman, who serve as Rambo's civilian
and military foster fathers, discuss the murder of their “son': “'What's
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it like for you?' 'Better than when I knew he was in pain.' 'Y e s " '’
Ted Kotcheff's film adaptation spares its audience the pain of
any such discussion of strife between fathers and sons. For one thing,
neither Teasle nor Rambo die on celluloid. Instead, Trautman talks
Rambo out of killing the sadistic and obsessive Police Chief of Hope,
and then leads him off to prison. Trautman and Rambo march side by
side through an assembled crowd, through flashing lights that seem
more awed tribute to a returned Vietnam veteran's victory over evil
forces than an arrest — a belated parade in which he has compelled
them to march. This Teasle is not like Rambo: he is not a war hero, or
even a veteran. This private war is not structured sothat the experiences
of the combatants reflect one another. There is no mutual respect in
their final orgy of destruction.
Kotcheff's Teasle is a ghoul in a horror movie, the bad guy in a
western — a sadist who wants “to kill that kid so bad he can taste it'.
The scene where Teasle and his police force pursue Rambo in the
wooded mountains is a cinematic hybrid. Rambo. garbed like an
American Indian, ambushesand cripples each white-hatted deputy in
turn. The techniques he uses seem to come from the latest manual of
guerrilla warfare. Resurrected from his tragic end in the novel to
become a muscular romantic film hero, Rambo rises mysteriously from
the forest floor, leaps from trees; he stabs one deputy in the leg, lashes
another to a tree with a garrote, impales another on punji sticks.
Lighting flashes, thunder booms, and each wounded deputy screams
for help. Rambo finally pins Teasle against a tree and holds a knife to
his throat: the savage delivers a civilized warning: “In town you're the
law; out here its me. I could have killed them all. Let it go or I'll give you
a waryou w on't believe. Just let it g o .' And Rambo disappears silently
back into the forest darkness.
The film First Blood. Part 1 is a revisionist Western like Ralph
Nelson's Soldier Blue (1970) or Arthur Penn's Little Big Man (1971),
inverting our sense of who is savage and who is civilized. Teasle and
Rambo are intimate, but opposite. Rambo is a modem version of the
prototypical American hero: the Green Beret, like the Indian Fighter,
adopts the alien other's costume and tactics in the service of fighting
for progress along a frontier poised between savagery and civilization.
In Vietnam, the Green Beret used the small-band guerrilla tactics of the
Viet Cong, and now he has returned home to use those same skills on
the war-making savages who masquerade as righteous representatives
of law and order. Like the mythic American frontier hero, the Green
Beret is distinguished from the savage antagonist whom he resembles
not only by the progressive mission which his savagery serves but also
by the civilized restraint which exercises.
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But Kotcheff is also making a horror film. Harvey Greenburg
notes that First Blood, Part 1 can be considered a 'b rid g e ' film which
connects earlier works depicting the Vietnam veteran as an urban
vigilante (a kind of post-modern Western) to the spectral lunatic
haunting 'slic e and dice' thrillers20. This first Rambo film is an updated
Frankensteinv/tth Rambo as the rejected m onsterandTrautm anasthe
scientist-creator 'com e to reestablish control over the dangerous
power that he has unleashed'21. In the novel Jeasle sends forTrautman;
in the film Trautman mysteriously appears immediately after Teasle
exclaims, 'W hat ever possessed God in Heaven to make a man like
Rambo?' 'G od didn't make Rambo. Id id /sa ysTra utm an. Trautman
speaks of Rambo as if he were not quite human, but rather a sort of
bomb that needs to be ’ defused'. Through its mixed homage to two
of cinema's melodramatic forms, the Western and horror genres, the
film First Blood, Part 1distances its audience from the conflict between
the returning Vietnam War veteran and his countryman; by its
conventional fictionality.the adaptation forestalls consideration of the
troubling conclusions to which the more inventive novel leads its
readers.
In Kotcheff's film, Rambo brings the guerrilla war home simply
because he Is brutalized by police so sadistic they seem foreign. In the
novel his motives are complex and disturbing. When Morrell's Rambo
breaks out of jail he is not being tortured but being made to look like a
solid citizen: bathed, clean-shaven, and short-haired. Morrell's Rambo
has gotten himself into jail in the first place as a matter of principle. He
maintains that he has the right to dress, eat, sleep, and go where he
chooses. This Rambo sees himself first as an American civilian entitled
to basic liberties that have been systematically denied to him in the last
fifteen towns he has passed through. He feels strongly that his wartime
service also entitles him to respect. Finally, Morrell's Rambo admits that
he misses the war and is hungry for some action. This matrix of motives
inevitably conspires against peace when the Vietnam veteran returns
to an America divided between respect for authority and preservation
of liberty. As a result, everyone is drawn plausibly into an insanely
escalating conflict which resuits in the winner of a Congressional Medal
of Honor getting killed for demanding his basic civil rights and a minimal
veterans' benefit — respect. Morrell's story poses a challenge to
America's sense of innocence, righteousness, and invincibility.
Kotcheff'sfilm does not dramatize the Vietnam veteran's painful
homecoming in terms which would lead the audience to seif-scrutiny.
The film focuses on special effects excitement — exploding helicopters
and massive firepower. It is almost as If the filmmakers set out to
eradicate traumatic memories of the Vietnam era in the same way
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that policy makers tried to win the war itseif; with a technological fix.
Only in the m ovie's final scene is the veteran allowed much more than
a sullen expression to articulate his feelings about the war and its
aftermath. In a rambling monologue, Rambo responds to Troutman's
assertion that "this mission is over'. Rambo answers that the war cannot
simply be turned off by those who turned it on. Although repelled by
the horror which he experienced in war, the civilian life to which Rambo
has returned is nothing without the code of honor by which he lived in
Vietnam. He wants to "go h o m e ', but where is that? The war is officially
over, but Rambo cannot hold a job, or even talk to anybody "back in
the W orld'. The film adaptation urges us to conclude that the Vietnam
veteran's real home is not with us but in the military. Infact.Trautm an
tells Rambo he has called a helicopter to fly him back to Fort Bragg.
With the wildman/monster back on his military reservation, and the
quasi-foreign, police-state authorities killed-in-action or hospitalized in
intensive care,thetheateraudiencecan escape any lingering concern
about everyday issues like non-violent abridgement of civil liberties or
PTSD.
Cinematic revision of Morrell's novel facilitates assimilation of
the Vietnam "experience' into the popular consciousness in a non
threatening (or even self-congratulatory) way. Richard Crenna recently
referredtothe Rambo film phenomenon as "an audience participation
cartoon'22. Through such mass-audience entertainments we escape
the spectres of the Vietnam War and the turbulent 1960s. Personal
betrayal, military failure, and moral bankruptcy can be attributed to
corrupt authority figures. In First Blood, Part 7the audience can identify
with the Vietnam veteran as a victim who exacts violent poetic justice
upon a police force so brutal that they represent corruptions of
American civil and moral authority. We do not recognize them as part
of our national family, but as quasi-foreign infiltrators who are destroying
the country from within.
The second Rambo film, George Cosmatos' Rambo: First
Blood. Part 2. presents the comfortable spectacle of the Vietnam
veteran's return to Southeast Asia for a rematch against the North
Vietnamese. Rambo wins a belated victory by destroying a prison
camp and liberating a small band of American POWs. Because the
North Vietnamese are assisted by Russians, there is the additional
satisfaction of seeing American fighting mettle tested successfully
against the Evil Empire... almost as a preview of coming attractions.
More importantly, the enemy soldiers are depicted as both foreign and
familiar: the North Vietnamese wear distinctive “A sian' uniforms, but
the beret-clad Soviets look western; both use technologically
sophisticated weaponry and employ massively superior numbers in
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either conventional front line assaults or search-and-destroy missions.
The screenwriters have constructed a fiction in which the historic
image of the Vietnam-era American soldier is linked (through uniforms
and berets) to one so foreign and sinister that we are pleased to see it
eliminated. Similarly, the fictional American and South Vietnamese
forces (Rambo and his native intelligence contact, Co) are costumed
and deployed as guerrillas: without uniforms; vastly outnumbered;
relying upon primitive weaponry or what they can steal; and practicing
deception, harassment, and hit-and-run tactics on fixed defensive
positions. The image of the Viet Cong has been projected onto the
fictional allied forces in a way which makes the fantasized American
victory more plausible. This first sequel revises history by a fictitious role
reversal. The implication is that Americans could have won the
Vietnam War if we had relied less on technology, superior numbers,
and conventional tactics.
Ultimately, this conclusion is an indictment of American
leadership, a shifting of blame away from the many individual veterans
with whom we share the movie theater, and onto a few more distant
political and military decision makers. This Rambo. then, rehabilitates
the reputation of the Vietnam veteran by demonstrating that he could
have won the war, and by identifying a scapegoatwho prevented
him from winning.
Cosmatos' sequel starts by clearing Ram bo's former
commanding officer, now “Colonel'Trautman,of anytaint of betrayal.
In the opening scene, we see that Rambo has not been flown back to
Fort Bragg, as Trautman had promised, but has been condemned to
hard labor on a prison rock-pile. Trautman comes to the imprisoned
Rambo and asks him to believe that he tried to prevent this punishment,
but was over-ruled by higher authorities. Moreover, Trautman has
been instructed to offer Rambo immediate release from prison, a
temporary reinstatement in the Green Berets, and a possible Presidential
pardon in exchange for his services on a covert reconnaissance
mission. Rambo asks only one question: "Sir, do we get to win this
tim e?' Trautman replies, “This time it's up to you.'
But it isn't. The sequel asks us to believe that the same “higher
authorities' who kept us from victory in Vietnam are also preventing the
recovery of American POWs. This time “they* have conspired to use
Rambo and Trautman in a scheme to cover up the existence of
American prisoners in Southeast Asia. Rambo isto be sent to reconnoiter
a POW camp that American authorities know will be empty, so that
when this notorious war hero and defender of veterans' rights reports
that he found nothing, a potentially embarrassing and costly political
issue will be convincingly closed. The Vietnam veteran has been
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seduced back into his country's service under the illusion that he will be
freed from debilitating restraints imposed by devious or cowardly
leaders and so be given an opportunity to conclude the w ar's unfinished
business honorably. In Cosmatos' film, the betrayal of the Vietnam
soldier is compounded, the stakes doubled, the potential for cathartic
revenge increased.
The covert mission is directed by Marshall Murdock, a man who
identifies himself as Head of Special Operations in Washington, and
who alludes to his committee's interest in resolving the POW-MIA issue.
While Murdock tells Rambo that he himself served in Vietnam and
cares passionately about finding and rescuing POWs, he later explains
to Trautman that it is doubtful any POWs will be found and that the
whole mission is a public relations strategy to pacify special interests.
Before being deployed, Rambo tells Trautman he knows Murdock lied
about serving in Vietnam, and that Murdock is not to be trusted.
Because of mis-timing, Rambo does discover a handful of American
soldiers being held prisoner by the South Vietnamese and, instead of
simply taking pictures, he actually brings a prisoner back to the pickup
point. Murdock then aborts the mission — abandoning American
soldiers as a sacrifice to political and economic expediency. Returning
from witnessing the aborted pickup, Trautman confronts Murdock
about the mission, shouting, ”It was a lie I Just like the whole damn war!'
Murdock's reply is that Vietnam w asn't his war; he is just there to clean
up them ess.b ringittoa conclusion, and indulge in some “bureaucratic
ass covering*. Once this conspiracy is revealed fully, Trautman has to
be restrained and arrested to prevent him from assisting Rambo, and
Rambo, even while being tortured by Russians, vows to return to “get*
Murdock.
In Murdock the screenwriters have created a comfortable
scapegoat. He is a politician accustomed to acting out of expediency,
not principle; he is a bureaucrat quickto absolve himself of responsibility
by pleading that he only follows the orders of those higher up; he is a
technocrat who augments his own feeble powers with the most recent
sophisticated computers, communications devices, and weaponry.
Obviously, he is a foil for Rambo who lives by a personal code of honor,
gladly assumes responsibility for winning “a war someone else lost*,
and relies on his own mind and muscle. While Rambo gets tangible
results by taking aggressive action in the jungle, Murdock manufactures
false, image-saving political solutions in the comfort of his artificial
environment. It is worth noting that Rambo is so burdened by the
technological weaponry which Murdock provides that it nearly kills him
at the beginning of the mission. Literally cutting himself free of this
technological baggage in order to depend upon more primitive
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devices and his philosophy that "the mind is the best weapon', Rambo
authentically completes the mission that Murdock's dependency on
artifice would have doomed to failure.
In First Blood. Part 2, protagonist and antagonist conform
closely to the familiar conventions of American myth. Rambo is the
archetypal American hero: his German/American Indian ancestry is a
literal mingling of immigrant and native characteristics. His hometown
in Arizona, his costume (bare chest, headband, necklace), his weaponry
(bow with flaming arrows, Bowie-like survival knife), and his penchant
for physical violence controlled only by a personal code of honor are
clear reminders of the frontier experience which shaped the American
character. And Murdock is a familiar antagonist for the frontier hero.
He is from the city (Washington, D.C.), costumed in a white shirt and tie
(a man of ideas, not action), dependent upon the artificial brains of his
computers for decisions (and thus has no personal honor), and relies on
the weapons of his functionaries for protection (shrinks from participating
in physical violence).
Susan Jeffords argues that this sharp contrast between
protagonist's and antagonist's style, behavior, and values in effect
constitutes gender stereotyping: “Surrounded by comforts, computers,
and loyal personnel, Murdock marks a clear feminine to Rambo's
expanded masculine'23. In fact, the film's shot composition repeatedly
supports this assertion. The Rambo character is photographed with
angles, distances, and lighting which enhance Sylvester Stallone's
well-developed musculature and place particular emphasis on his
biceps and pectorals so that the physical aspect of his masculinity is
exaggerated to the level of a cartoon figure like that of Arnold
Schwarzeneggar in the Conan films. Moreover, when he returns to
"g e t' Murdock he enacts a symbolic rape. First Rambo destroys
Murdock's computers with gunfire while Murdock cowers in an adjoining
room. Then Rambo bursts through the door, throws Murdock down
across a desk, draws his knife, and lying on top of Murdock plunges the
knife down next to his ear. Jeffords concludes that "this overtly sexual
display confirms the defeat of the weak feminine by the phallic
strength that is celebrated in all these recent Vietnam film s'24.
Feminizing the scapegoat is yet another facet of re-enacting
American myth, specifically the flight of the male hero from civilization
associated with the female and the restraints she entails. In this sense.
First Blood. Part 2 is about reestablishing the masculinity of the Vietnam
veteran, cast in doubt by the loss of the war. In this fictional resolution
of the trauma of emasculation, the veteran reclaims the manhood
deviously stripped from him by those "fem inine' influences which
constrained him from winning the war and recovering his captured
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comrades.
What, then, are we to make of Co, the female intelligence
contact who guides Rambo to the POW camp and rescues him from
his Russian torturers? Her first words to Rambo are, “You did not expect
a woman, no ?' And, indeed, women are excluded from the masculine
universe of Ted Kotcheff's First Blood. Part 1and do not appear in Peter
MacDonald's Rambo 3. Co is an anomaly. She fulfills the conventional
role of the woman in the Hollywood epic of male adventure, nursing
Rambo when he is injured, cheering for him when he escapes death,
providing an audience to whom he can explain his values and by
whom he can hearthem confirmed, and, as a love object, she acts as
something immediate and tangible for him to value and protect. But
in her tenacious loyalty, her readiness to fight physically, and her
courageous rescue of American POWs, Co assumes those desired
masculine characteristics which Murdock's feminized character lack.
Because Cosmatos locates evil in the feminine, Co can be a sympathetic
character only if she is masculinized. Through the alchemy of fiction.
First Blood. Part 2 projects masculine characteristics upon the female,
andfeminine characteristics upon the male just as it projected American
costume and tactics upon Soviet and Vietnamese soldiers, and the
guerrilla behavior of the Viet Cong upon the American hero and South
Vietnamese heroine. Cosmatos offers us a fiction which seems to
reflect history's reverse image: the historical negative is projected as a
fictional positive.
The result of the process by which fiction revises history into myth
is the creation of closure. As a South Vietnamese still loyal to the cause
for which her father died (preservation of a non-Communist state), Co
reaffirms for Rambo the validity of his earlier trials in Vietnam. In her
desire to leave Vietnam (which she defines as a place of death) and
go with Rambo to America, she reconfirms that the values which the
United States tried to export to Southeast Asia may not have taken root
there but are still prized and worth fighting for. When Co is killed by the
North Vietnamese, Rambo dons her good luck charm, vows not to
forget her, and sets out with renewed determination to free the
American POWs not only for the sake of US honor, but also in memory
of those South Vietnamese who relied upon American promises and
support. Rambo: First Blood, Part 2 provides a victorious surrogate
closure to all of the unfinished items of business entailed in the Vietnam
War: loyal South Vietnamese are brutally murdered and then properly
avenged; POWs are rescued; the Vietnam veteran's manhood is
restored; and, the effeminate politicians responsible for the w ar's loss
are identified and brutally threatened.
The third Rambo film, Peter MacDonald's Rambo 3. moves the
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Vietnam War into the present by recreating it in Afghanistan. Stallone,
who co-wrote the screenplay with Sheldon Lettich, rejected David
Morrell's initial suggestion to set the story in Nicaragua, presumably
because Americans were so divided on US covert involvement there25.
Once again Morrell was interested in facing up to the complex and
disturbing legacy of Vietnam, but the filmmaker preferred a less
troubling scenario.
As Rambo 3 opens, the twice-betrayed veteran has retreated
to find peace in a Buddhist monastery. When Colonel Trautman arrives
to request his assistance in a covert mission in Afghanistan, Rambo
declines. He tellsTrautman that “it'snot my w ar,' and refusesto believe
that his involvement would make a difference. Only when Trautman
is captured in Afghanistan does Rambo reluctantly join the war effort.
The theme of the veteran'sabandonment by cowardly, lying American
bureaucrats runs as strongly through this film as it does through its
predecessor. An American embassy official, Griggs, helps Rambo
infiltrate Afghanistan, but telsl him, “We can't do anything about it. Not
officially. If you are captured, we will deny your existence.' Rambo
replies, “I'm used to it.' Similarly, when his native guide, Mousa, tells
Rambo, “If you fail, I will accept no responsibility,' Rambo remarks
laconically, “Sounds familiar.' This time Rambo has taken on the POW
rescue mission for reasons more personal than patriotic: Rambo 3 is a
buddy film.
Despite its continued scapegoating of American politicians
and bureaucrats, this film offers an even fuller opportunity for the
audience to revise the negative image of America which is the
historical legacy of involvement in Vietnam — this time by projecting it
more completely and explicitly onto the Soviet Union. As Colonel
Trautman tells his Soviet counterpart. Colonel Zaysen: “We already
had our Vietnam. Now you're going to have yours.' The Green Berets,
Rambo and Trautman, advise and assist the oppressed natives, who
are victims of Soviet atrocities. These mujahadeen guerrillas ride
horses, lurk in mountain caves, and fire primitive weapons against a
massive Soviet army of occupation, which conducts genocidal search
and destroy missions with helicopters, rockets, napalm, and automatic
weapons. But once Trautman and Rambo have killed an enormous
number of Soviets and have escaped the rest with the help of the
mujahadeen, they decline any further participation in the war and ride
off together in a jeep, sharing a joke about getting soft. The war is
recognized as the proper responsibility of not only indigenous but also
younger males like Little Hamid, who self-consciously imitates Rambo's
super-masculine heroics. (It is possible that we are only one sequel
away from Son ofRam boj. In Rambo .3the screenwriters have recast
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Am erica's role in a foreign war to illustrate that we have transcended
the mistake that was Vietnam. American are shown acting in
accordance with their mythic sense of self: peace-loving people who
make war reluctantly and only for a righteous cause which ensures
their triumph.
John Hellmann argues, in American Myth and the Legacy of
V/efnam,thatourmore “realistic* national literature aboutthe Vietnam
War illustrates profound disillusionment with the fundamental myth of
our culture. Specifically, the lesson that the American Adam learned
in Vietnam is “that his parentage ties him to a fallen past, that he is not
an exception to history and the fallen world of time, but is rather a
limited, fallible person whose destiny is in profound d oubt'26. The myth
of the American hero, who defines himself by fleeing from feminine
civilization into a masculine wilderness where he is regenerated by
violence exacted according to a code of personal honor, is challenged
by many Vietnam novelists. David Morrell, in First Blood, contributes
significantly to the restructuring of this myth. Morrell's Vietnam veteran
returns home to demonstrate what he has learned abroad in a limited
war presumably fought for reasons of national security. The code of
machismo locks us into a sadomasochistic cycle of unregenerative
violence — an unreasonably escalating use of physical force visited
back upon the father by the son to whom he taught it — an American
family engaged in mutually assured destruction.
Ted Kotcheff'sfilm adaptation of First Blood is a step backward,
reaffirming the failed American myth by denying the history of the
Vietnam War. In the film, a more restrained violence is justifiably visited
upon a scapegoat by a heroic veteran who uses the guerrilla tactics
he learned in Vietnam to restore America's lost innocence. Cosmatos'
sequel, Rambo: First Blood, Part 2, is yet another step backward; one
in which the veteran is elevated to a mythic savior whose special
mission is to illustrate that America could have won the Vietnam War
and still can free its soldiers from foreign captivity if it will only throw off
the feminine influences which hold its masculine heritage enthralled.
The retreat from history continues in Peter MacDonald's Rambo 3. in
which Americans are shown that a war like Vietnam could only be
perpetrated by the Evil Empire, and that it is the natural tendency of
Americans to join with freedom fighters against oppression.
All three cinematic spinoffs exaggerate the masculine
characteristics of the American hero and link him in a variety of ways
to a conventionally fictive version of our country's frontier heritage. The
second (and most popular) Rambo film most fully perverts Morrell's
message by blaming Am erica's failure in Vietnam on feminine rather
than masculine failings. The third film inverts Morrell by showing Rambo
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blissfully bequeathing the American macho legacy to a foreign
surrogate son. More than one analysis of recent political events
suggests that such artistic revision supporting the myth of American
power and innocence are not only eagerly sought out, but also acted
out: 'Americans especially tend to live in a timeless and mythical world
in which reality is not allowed to intrude very much upon the Walt
Disney epic which insists that we are heroes, the defenders of freedom
and justice, and the protectors of the weak and oppressed'27.
In 'Reporters of the Lost W ar.' Thomas B. Morgan concludes
that in telling the Vietnam story 'rewriting history is the alternative to
facing up to it.... To come to terms with what happened in reality, not
nightmare or illusion, remains a debt of honor'28. The successive
cinematic transformations of David Morrell's fictional but believable
Vietnam veteran, John Rambo, deny the importance of any search for
historical accuracy. In this case, American popular culture actively
encourages the decision not to face up to the limits of America's moral
and military power by providing a barely qualified .fantastic reaffirmation
of belief in the myth of American innocence, righteousness, and
invincibility.
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AMERicAN V et er a n R e t u r n s t o V ie t n a m
L a r r y L ee R o t t m a n n

For Sister Huynh TN Mai and 2nd Lt. Peter B. Bushey
As all good historians know, the past Is a great darkness, and
filled with echoes. Voices may reach us from It, but what they
say to us Is Imbued with the obscurity of the matrix out of which
they come; and try as we might, we cannot always decipher
them precisely....
Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale
P R E lu d E

This account of my return to Vietnam does not begin with the
invitation I received in 1987 via the US-Indochina Reconciliation Proj
ect. Nor with the decision I made ten years ago to go back if 1had the
opportunity. Not even with my original tour of duty as an American
soldier. In fact, this story has as much to do with fate — or, as it's called
in Vietnam, dinh-menh — as it does with my own plans and goals.
I was born on December 20, 1942, in Jefferson City, Missouri.
(My father was a World War 2 Gl from a small farm near Marthasville and
my mother was a schoolteacher from Kansas City.) That same day,
halfway around the world, in Xom Giua, Vietnam, a small group of
revolutionaries met to proclaim the creation of the National Liberation
Front (NLF). These seemingly unrelated events lay at the foot of a path
that would ultimately bring me face-to-face with Indochina twice.
I went to Vietnam for the first time in 1967, as a young off icer with
the 25th Infantry Division. My second visit came exactly twenty years
later, when I returned as a university scholar in search of materials for
my Vietnam Literature class, as a father who felt a growing responsibil
ity for the children of Southeast Asia, and as a veteran still trying to find
answers to many questions about the war. not the least of which is
“Why?*
Over and over, my day of my birth has been interwoven with
events relating to Vietnam. On December 20 1960, an American
military advisor was killed in an ambush near Tan Son Nhut Airport,
becoming the first "official' US casualty of a war that was to last fifteen
more years'.
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On December 20,1967 I spent my 25th birthday on a combat
operation in W arZoneC nearthe Cambodian border. Five years later,
on December 20,1972, while traveling as a journalist in the People's
Republic of China, I visited the factory in Tsinan where the Chicom
122mm rocket that nearly took my life during the 1968 Tet Offensive was
manufactured. And on that same day, Nixon launched the infamous
1972 Christmas Bombing (officially,"Operation Linebacker2) — twelve
days and nights of high altitude warfare against Hanoi.
Thirteen years later, on December 20,1985, while driving down
Highway 96 to my teaching job at a rural Ozark high school, I encoun
tered an astonishing sight: a legless man with muscular arms “walking'
on his hands along the edge of the road, ponderously propelling his
upper body forward in eighteen-inch “steps'. He was alone, with
nothing to indicate who he was or what he was about, except perhaps
for the camouflage fatigue jacket he was wearing. I was already
behind schedule, so with a honk and a wave, I drove by. But almost
without realizing it, I slowed my car and pulled off the pavement. I sat
a few minutes, torn between being late to school or surrendering to the
undeniable urge I felt to talk to that solitary traveler. In the end, I turned
the car around, and went back.
Bob Weiland is a former 25th Infantry Division medic who was
trekking from Los Angeles to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Wash
ington, DC, hoping to draw attention to the war-related problems of
vets. Bob had been injured by an American mortar round transformed
into a booby trap by the VC. The explosion killed his commanding
officer... the lieutenant who had taken the place of the man who had
succeeded me (Lt. Peter Bushey) when my replacement was killed. (In
thirteen months, three of my unit's lieutenants were KIA, and one (me)
was wounded.) Bob and I walked and talked side-by-side for about a
mile, and made plans to meet at Springfield when he arrived there in
a couple of days. Later that day, I mentioned this story to the school
janitor, Dennis Cooper. He reacted incredulously, for he'd been
wounded in the same ambush and had, in fact, been the guy who had
loaded Bob's “remains' aboard the medivac chopper. Dennis had
been sure that Bob was dead.
On the morning of December 20, 1987,1left the States once
again for Vietnam — a trip which proved to be filled with similar chance
encounters. Most westerners would interpret this long and continued
series of related incidents as simply coincidental, but Asians (and
particularly Buddhists) believe otherwise. They know that dinh-menh
determines which things happen, and in what sequence they occur.
It is, as my friend Anthony Chi Tinh Do explains, an improbable but
undeniable inevitability. I do know that when the opportunity for me
to make a return visit to Indochina came, I wanted to go; felt com
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pelled to go. As Sterling Silliphant has written about the Vietnam
combat experience:
Something In the country, something in Its earth and among
Its durable people, something In Its dawns and sunsets, had
worked a quiet spell, so that It became in retrospect not the
fault of the country or of its people, but the fault of those who
were blind or willful, and you remember Vietnam with
Inexplicable nostalgia as a place, sometime In better days If
they ever come, you hunger to return to2.

The fact that I couldn't afford the trip, or that it would extend two weeks
into my teaching semester, were obstacles I never even considered. I
was going to go.
Travelling by way of Hawaii, Taipei, Korea, and Thailand, I
arrived in Vietnam on December 30, 1987. For the next 24 days I
explored a country I'd never really seen, meeting a people I'd never
really known. I traveled from one end of the country to the other — from
Hanoi to Hu§ to Ho Chi Minh City — from the former DMZto Dalatto the
Delta — going by plane, bus, car, boat, bicycle, and on foot. I visited
schools, factories, communes, offices, museums, libraries, cafes, mar
ketplaces, theaters, farms, hospitals, and private homes. It was a
journey during which I ultimately learned as much about myself as I did
about Vietnam.

I n T r a n sit
12/20/87 AM, Springfield. I depart on the morning of my 45th birthday,
aboard an airline with the same name as my 1977 novel about
Vietnam: American Eagle.
PM, Dallas. Shortly after takeoff, flight attendant Leslie (wife of a
Vietnam vet) approaches me. She says her husband served with the
25th Infantry Division. She thanks me for going back — says she wishes
her husband would too; she feels it would help him. Later, the captain
seeks me out. He's a pilot who flew jets out of Tan Son Nhut Airport in
1967 and 1968. He says returning is “brave'. Says he'd like to go back,
but never will. When I deplane in Los Angeles, both the pilot and Leslie
are waiting for me at the door. “Thanks for going back and under
standing,'they say. Both are misty-eyed. I'm amazed. The journey is
truly underway.
PM, Los Angeles. The currency exchange at the airport has no
Vietnamese money. A black clerk about my age (a vet?) is openly
hostile to my request. He mutters, “Gooks... Communists.' His eyes
bore into me and say, “Traitor... Dupe.'
PM,In Flight. My seatmate is An, known as Andrew. Fled Saigon in 1981.
made his way to Thailand by boat, and thence to America. Just
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graduated from the University of Oklahoma with a degree in Electrical
Engineering. His mother was originally from Cu Chi. and now lives on
the outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City. We chat about our travels. Andrew's
on his way to Japan to visit his fiancee. I feel uncomfortable (why?)
about my trip. I mention Korea, Thailand, but not Vietnam. He nods,
and then asks, would I take a message and some money to his mother?
(How does he know? Does it show?) Hehasnotseenhisfamilyforseven
years. He mails money and medicine frequently, but apparently only
part of it gets to them. Would I deliver a letter with some cash? He
spends the next couple of hours composing his message which I agree
to try to deliver. I leave the plane in Honolulu as Andrew continues the
flight. We embrace. I look back once; he's watching me. I don't look
back again.

12/24/87 PM, Waikiki. Celebrating my 21st wedding anniversary with
my wife Francie, precisely 20 years after meeting her here while on a
five-day Rest and Recuperation (R&R) from the war. I recall very little
about that short week. One day I was eating cold c-rations in a muddy
bunker near Dau Tieng, while angry Asians were trying desperately to
kill me, and then — just 24 hours later — I was having lobster in a luxurious
ocean-front hotel, with smiling Asian waiters at my beck and call. I
remember being tired and jumpy, and threatening to fight the desk
clerk about something petty. I suppose Francie and I walked on the
beach and went souvenir shopping and watched TV and attended
luaus and made love. I slept a lot, and didn't want to talk about the
war at all. Then, before I knew it, I was back in Vietnam. If it weren't for
a few faded photographs that Francie took. I'm not sure I'd believe it
ever really happened. And, in truth, the gaunt, sunburned Gl in those
pictures doesn't look at all like me.
12/26/87 PM, Waikiki. I talk to a wheelchair-bound Vietnam vet at the
Ala Moana Shopping Center. He's bearded and bitter, and his arms
are covered with military tattoos. One reads, “Willie Peter Will Make
You a Believer!'3 He's outraged I'd even consider returning to Indo
china, unless it was “to help teach them commie bastards the lessons
we weren't allowed to last tim e.' “Fuck them motherfuckers,' he
growls over and over, “Fuck them!'
12/27/87 AM, Honolulu. The Currency Exchange has no Vietnamese
money. The clerk, a refugee from Da Nang, is amazed I'd even want
any. “What for?' she asks. Why would anybody want to go there?
PM, In Flight. The airline movie is an American classic, the original
Captain Blood; a swashbuckling pirate tale starring Errol Flynn. I knew
Flynn's son Sean, a free-spirited combat correspondent who disap
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peared in Vietnam while riding his motorcycle toward Cambodia.
(Sean Flynn was a wildman, and he served as the model for the
character of the war-crazed photographer played by Dennis Hopper
in the best movie so far about the war. Apocalypse Now.) Indochina
draws nearer every minute.

12/28/87 AM, Seoul. I'm at the window of my downtown hotel, it's 3:06
in the morning, and I can't sleep. I'm too wired. In the last eight days
I've traveled over 8,000 miles, passed through eleven time zones. And
crossed Into tomorrow at the International Date Line. My body doesn't
know whether it's day or night, or even what day of the week it Is. But
I can manage that. It's where I'm headed that's beginning to get to
me. Up until now, I've been pretty cool about this trip, but tonight is a
maelstrom of memories about Vietnam. I can handle the dreams
okay. Justwakeupandtheystop. Not real. But memories are real, and
the feelings they provoke cannot be ignored. I'm still 2,700 miles and
three days from Vietnam, but just being back in Asia seems too close.
When I finally do get back to Indochina, will I be able to separate the
veteran from the scholar from the man? I don't know. It will surely be
difficult, perhaps noteven possible. Perhaps not even desirable. I think
I'm frightened; not for my safety, but for something more central. I'm
not afraid of what I'll learn about Vietnam, but what I might learn anew
about myself.
12/29/87 AM, Bangkok. From the air. the Thai countryside looks just as
I remember. Green. Lush. Ordered. Clean. Calm. But after landing
and leaving the airport, I see that Bangkok has become a major
metropolis since I visited here two decades ago. Smoked-glass sky
scrapers. Stainless steel office buildings. Eight-lane freeways. Neon
billboards. Smog. Yet Bangkok also remains a city of hustles and
hassles, clamor and confusion. Urine and sweat and rot and rain and
incense and fish. Horns and whistles and bells and shouts and wails.
Happiness and grief and hope and despair and anger and greed.
Where swarms of swaggering and stoned GIs on 3-day leaves from
Vietnam once congregated, knots of bright-eyed and befuddled
American tourists now huddle together, clutching their belongings too
tightly. Bangkok both is, and is not, as I remember it. I am, in that way,
like Bangkok.
The first cinema I pass is showing Platoon, the Oscar-winning
Vietnam warfilm written and directed by Oliver Stone, who served with
the 25th Infantry Division the same time as I did. Outside the theater,
long lines wait impatiently for admission. M ytaxidrivertellsm ethatthe
film has been playing in town for weeks, and it is wildly popular,
especially among teenagers. It is curious that young Thais, not even
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bom when the war was raging, and from a culture which has a
historical enmity for the Vietnamese, would attend Platoon. But then,
I recall one of my 19 year old college students explaining to me that
she'd gone to see the movie three times 'ju st to see what my parents,
teachers, and politicians have been hiding from me all my life.' Maybe
Thais feel the same. Platoon, with its meticulous attention to military
detail, unflinching examination of racism, cowardice, drug use, confu
sion, hate and rage, and unsettling portrayal of the moral quandaries
raised by the war, helped to launch the American resurgence of
interest in Indochina4. I've seen the film a number of times, and shown
it to my Vietnam Literature class, but I still can't watch it without
weeping. And if I can't watch a Hollywood depiction of the war
without coming unglued, then what the hell am I doing going back to
Vietnam?
PM, Bangkok. Briefing by Philip R. Mayhew, Counselor for Political
Affairs of the US Embassy. A cool performance, with just the right touch
of casualness, shoptalk and scholarship. The perfect diplomatic brief
ing by a glib and smooth professional. The most memorable Mayhew
quote for the two hour meeting: 'The US has no vital national interests
in Indochina." That's what millions of Americans in the Peace Move
ment believed. That's what they anguished about, and wrote letters
about, and demonstrated about, and got beaten up about, and were
imprisoned, disowned, divorced, despised, fired, or exiled about.
Cassius Clay (now Mohammed Ali) put it most succinctly when he
publicly refused the draft: 'I ain't got nothing against them Viet
Congs."

12/30/87 AM, Bangkok. In just a few hours. I'll be returning to Vietnam.
It still doesn't seem real. My mind is seething with images, memories,
impressions, emotions, so that even though I desperately need to, I
cannot sleep, not this night. My apprehension is so powerful, I wonder
if it is visible to others, like some sort of dark aura. I was frightened last
time, sure, but also excited and even a bit eager to really see a war, to
test my courage, to measure my machismo. General Philip Sheridan
once said, 'The bravest soldiers I ever had were sixteen year old boys,
small for their age, who couldn't imagine dying." Part of me was like
that. I guess. And even after seeing combat and becoming ac
quainted with the real horrors of war, I still wasn't fully aware of the
immorality of my own participation in it. That knowledge has come to
me more slowly over many years. It is not an awareness that leads to
personal tranquility, but a realization that unsettles me profoundly in a
part of my heart where I rarely allow myself to look. So terrible are these
memories and truths that I've never allowed them to come fully to the
surface. These are memories far darker than the worst nightmares. I
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fear I will finally be forced to confront them head-on before this day is
over. I am not ready. I want to call It off. I want to turn back. I am no
longerfascinatedbyadesire.oracuriosity.tosee Vietnam again. Yet,
I am compelled by circumstance, conscience, and dinh-menh to
return. As I prepare to depart Thailand, my attempts to convert dollars
to dong meet with astonished laughter at the airport. “Keep your US
money,' the clerks advise. “Dong are worthless everywhere, even in
Vietnam."

BAck I n C o u n try
12/30/87 PM, San Bay Nol Bai. At 1:36 PM I return to Vietnamese soil,
twenty years, eight months, four days, seven hours and six minutes after
I first set foot here. Customs is slow and thorough, but not unfriendly. The
hassle of off-loading, processing, etc. is as ponderous and officious an
any government procedure anywhere, and having to deal with it gives
me little time to think about where I am; although I'm certainly aware
of the sometimes hard (and always curious) glances, the NVA uniforms,
the large photos of Ho Chi Minh, the distinctive and unforgettable
sound of Vietnamese voices and music. I know I'm in the reunified
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. I know it, but I don't think I believe it yet.
PM, Highway 2. I climb into a Toyota mini-bus, and head for Hanoi, 30
miles to the southeast. The asphalt road is narrow and rough, and
crowded with heavy Russian trucks (and a few US Army Dodges),
hauling dirt, rock, and construction materials. The land, which is part of
the flood plain of the great Song Hong (Red) River, is flat and I pass
Irrigated fields of rice, corn, potatoes, beans, and lettuce. The Song
Hong is also called the River of Life. Off to the north stretches a row of
small, verdant mountains, the Ngan Son. Alongside the highway,
people are working in the fields. Some are planting rice, bent over
nearly double as they push small shoots into the ankle-deep water of
flooded pxaddies. Others are repairing or readjusting dikes and water
ways. Some are drawing water from irrigation ditches or small streams,
using the ancient method of two people, two ropes, and one bucket,
swinging the bucket up and back in a movement and rhythm as old as
civilization. It isaslow.simple. labor-intensive process. The pace of dayto-day life here is inexorably linked to the land (about 80 percent of the
people live in rural areas) and hasn't changed much over the centu
ries. Little boys herd geese, ducks, and water buffalo and swim nude
in the ditches and streams. Adults and teenagers not in school are all
hard at worktending charcoal kilns, making bricks, gardening, building
or remodeling small masonry houses and working on the roads. In the
tiny hamlets of Phu Vien and Ai Mo the houses are small, with only one
or two rooms. Most cooking, washing, eating, and socializing is done
in tiny hard-packed earthen courtyards framed with flowers and
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bamboo.
For a moment, part of me begins to feel good, almost comfort
able. But I also feel a sense of unease, a sense of unreality. After all, this
is Vietnam. These people are (or were supposed to have been) the
hated enemy. I feel a bit naked without a rifle, flack vest, and steel
pot... and someone to watch my back. Are there crosshairs trained on
me at this very moment? I want to scan the treelines and paddy dikes
for snipers, but I don't.
PM, Yen Phu. Sitting on my bed in Room 235 of the Thang Loi (Victory)
Hotel, watching the sun sink slowly over Ho Tay Lake, I watch the lights
begin to wink on across the water in a small fishing village. The hotel is
a spartan but comfortable facility built out of reinforced concrete and
native teak in the mid-1970s by a Cuban work brigade. I'm glad to
have a private room, for I cannot imagine sharing, my thoughts and
feelings with anyone this evening. I can't sleep, so I leave my room and
stroll overto Yen Phu, which is comprised of many small masonry houses
fronting on narrow, winding stone paths. The residents, used to strang
ers from the nearby hotel, are not surprised to see a six-foot bearded
Caucasian wandering about. They nod and smile. One curious old
lady asks if I'm Lien xo, a Russian.
No, I shake my head. 'To ila n g u o iM y." I'm an American.
"A hhh.' she says sadly, 'x in lo i.' Sorry.
Young children zoom around, running and playing in that highenergy, carefree manner little kids all over the world have. Older girls
playjump rope or nhay lo co (hopscotch), whilethe boys play checkers
or soccer. It's near evening meal time, and women are cooking rice
and vegetables in tiny woks over courtyard charcoal stoves. Some of
the men are returning from the fields or fishing boat docks. Others are
finishing up the last of the day's work in backyard sandal shops,
furniture factories, or brick kilns. I walk back to the hotel after dark,
suddenly very tired. I fall asleep immediately and do not dream at all.

12/31 /87 PM, Hanoi. I'm at a New Year's Eve celebration at the Bo Ho
Restaurant and Dancing Hall. I've just finished a meal of frog legs, beef,
shrimp, snails, chicken, pork soup, eggrolls, rice, noodles, cucumbers,
tomatos, etc., all topped off with lua m oi(vodka) and bia (beer). On
stage the Viet My Band, 13 strong, is playing foxtrots, sambas, and
tangos, while older couples glide elegantly around the floor. But from
the second floor disco, I hear the unmistakable thump-thump of an
electric bass, which suggests even more action. So up the stairs I go.
The disco is packed with hundreds of gyrating teenagers
wearing Reeboks™ and designer jeans. The seven piece rock band
West Division, equipped with modem electronic instruments and syn
thesizers, is playing both Vietnamese and American rock music, includ
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ing songs of the Beatles, Madonna. Whitesnake, and the Doors. The
celebrants, mostly students and young workers, are friendly and talka
tive. They say that life is good and that they are happy. They do tell me
they don't like the fact that buses are old and jam-packed, that
postage stamps are sometimes unavailable, that there is too much
unemployment.that medical facilities are poorly staffed and equipped,
that schools are rundown and overcrowded, that the national food
distribution system is in disarray. But these young people also feel that
the future is bright and they are convinced that the prosperity and
freedom now being enjoyed by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are within
sight for Vietnam. I smoke a “Hero' (popular Vietnamese cigarette),
drink warm Heineken (imported via Singapore) over ice, and watch
the dancing. At midnight, the Year of the Dragon will begin. Since the
dragon was once the symbol of the emperor, and still represents
power, weaith, and good fortune, many new families will arrange that
one of the two children the government recommends per marriage will
be born in 1988. At about 11:30 I excuse myself from the crush of
revelers. Let the country's first postwar generation in a hundred years
celebrate without me. I need to be alone.
My mind is swirling with the pictures of the faces of the nearly
60.000 GIs who didn't live to see this new year; with memories of those
families at Can Tho and Ben Tre and My Lai who were massacred during
the war; with love and longing for my beautiful ten year old son Leroy,
who is growing up with a sometimes strange and haunted father who
gets upset too easily about a place called Vietnam. It's nearly twelve
now, and I'm sitting on the banks of Ho Hoan Kiem Lake. The streets are
relatively quiet. A child runs out to the stoop and sets off a single
firecracker. A solitary orange rocket arches over the water in the
distance. Along the dark, tree-lined streets, fresh incense sticks glow,
their evocative and haunting odor mingling with the other pungent
smells of the night. Most Vietnamese are passing into 1988 quietly at
home. They know it will be another tough year, to be sure, but the
children are sleeping. And no bombs are falling.

1/1/88 AM, Yen Phu. I begin the first day of 1988 by exchanging money
at the hotel. The official exchange rate is 500 dong per dollar (up from
80 just last month, a devaluation designed to encourage tourism).
However, nearly any xich-lo (three-wheeled bicycle taxi) driver can
get you up to 2,500 on the black market. Since an average hotel room
is about 1,250 dong per night, and the local beer is 100 dong per bottle.
US currency (crisp, new $20 bills are preferred) goes a long way here.
But with an annual inflation rate of nearly 700%, prices are still very high
for the Vietnamese, whose average yearly income is approximately
60.000 to 70,000 dong. Breakfast is at 6 In the morning today, so that I
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can get into town in time to be one of the first in line at the state tomb
of Ho Chi Minh. I'm not sure I want to go. but my hosts insist.
AM, Hanoi. Long shadows still shroud the black-slabbed mausoleum
when I arrive. The tomb is located downtown, across a wide lawn of
dark green grass and an equal expanse of smooth concrete. It was at
this spot that Ho Chi Minh announced his country's independence
from France on September 2 1945. The Viet Minh constitution was
modeled after our own Declaration of Independence, and began.
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal....' The poet leader of a tiny country about the size of New
Mexico (but which was able to overcome the might of China, Japan,
France, and the United States), is laid to rest here; preserved for viewing
in a somber air-conditioned marble building similar in style to the
Lincoln Memorial. Vietnam reveres Uncle Ho with the same depth of
feeling that America has for Honest Abe. I've been to Lenin's tomb in
Red Square, and I viewed the body there with a sense of detachment,
levity even, at such a gruesome, melodramatic, and morbid display of
national bad taste. But Ho Chi Minh isn't just a name in a history book
tome. I fought against his countrymen. I heard him speaking over the
radio and I saw him on television and in films. And I witnessed dying VC
proclaiming, 'Ba c Ho muon nam\‘ (Long live Uncle Ho!) I sensed his
presence in the fabric and spirit of Vietnam. He dedicated his entire life
to national reunification and complete liberation from foreign control.
“South and North are washed by the same sea,' he declared. “In our
hearts there can be no boundary.'
I approach his cold and forbidding crypt with a sense of dread.
The glass sarcophagus is located deep in the interior of the building —
a hushed place, beyond the reach of outside light or sound. I enter the
main doorway just as the early morning fog begins to lift. The entrance
leads up a long red carpet, then a left turn on cold terrazzo floors to a
half-flight of smooth marble steps, worn slightly hollow in just thirteen
years by the endless lines who queue up daily to pay homage to their
fallen leader. I tum right, climb another half-flight of stairs, then turn right
for about ten feet. Another right turn, and I enter the exhibition room.
It is cold here, and dark, with slick marble walls and floors devoid of any
decoration, even a name. The body lies at rest in a recessed pit about
six feet below floor level. Ho is sealed inside a large, ornate glass case,
about five feet wide and eight feet long, and his body reposes upon
a bed of rich plum-colored silk, surrounded by a wreath of delicately
carved and highly polished teakwood flowers. Ho is dressed in his
customary olive drab military uniform, bare of medals or any other
Indication of rank. His delicate, small-boned hands rest lightly on his
lower chest and his legs are covered by a dark purple quilt. The body
angles slightly upward, so that even in perpetual repose. Ho seems to
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be overlooking the visitors who line up outside in Ba Dinh Square. The
gentle old face, so often distorted in foreign cartoons, looks back at
me. The famous wispy white goatee lies slightly off to the left, as if blown
aside by a last- second puff of air when the casket was vacuum sealed.
His is, even in death, a proud, princely.fatheriy face; aface to trust. The
eyelids are gently closed, but around his eyes I can see the lines of worry
and grief etched there by 79 years of war. The mouth is sensitive, as
befits a true poet, but it is also firm; a mouth that reflects the personal
resolve his countrymen never saw fatter, even in the most difficult and
uncertain hours. But there is more in this darkened room than just Ho Chi
Minh's body and silent echoes. I can feel it — on my skin and in my
heart. Buddhists believe that the soul hovers above the body in its
coffin, praying forthe forgiveness of those who offended the person in
life. Of course. Ho hasn't been waiting over a dozen years just for my
return, but as I pass out of the room I glance back and picture the very
faintest twitch of a smile, as If Ho was letting me know that he knew I was
here. At this moment I realize where I am and what I'm trying to do. It
Is time to actively start seeking the resolution I've been drawn back to
Indochina for. This is a turning point of signal proportion that I cannot
deny, even if I want to. I leave the mausoleum reluctantly, and walk out
Into a palm-shaded garden where a warm winter sun lights the faces
of a long line of small children waiting their turn to enter the tomb. They
are laughing and fidgeting, a hundred happy sparrows full of life and
song; children who remember nothing of war, or Americans, or even of
Ho Chi Minh.

1/2/88 AM, Hanoi. Meeting with Nguyen Can, the Deputy Director of
the North American Continent Office of the Vietnamese Foreign
Ministry. He says, ’ Great and long-overdue changes are in the wind for
Vietnamese-US relationships.' Can says he sympathizes with the
families of American MIAs, but points out that there are over 300,000
Vietnamese MIAs. And war, he notes, is never a neat business. In the
informal discussion. Can reveals that his favorite American song is Bob
Dylan's ’Subterranean Homesick Blues'.
PM, Hanoi. ’ I thought,' says Ngo Zhi Han, ’that America had gone
crazy.' On my 30th birthday. December 20, 1972, the Christmas
Bombing began, For 12 days and nights, at two hour Intervals, waves
of US warplanes attacked Hanoi and Its environs. Giant B-52s released
their complement of thirty tons of 500 pound bombs from an altitude
of six miles. Ground-hugging F-l 1 Is strafed the city with 20mm can
nons. napalm, and willy peter. ’ I thought,' says Ngo Zhi Han. ’that
America had gone crazy.' Back home in the States, Nixon interrupted
200 million TV dinners to explain that only military targets were being hit.
Most Americans didn't pay much attention to the broadcast. Han
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didn't get the message either, because she was buried in the rubble of
the Kham Tien Elementary School, watching a classmate bleed to
death. "I thought," says Ngo Zhi Han, “that America had gone crazy.'

1/5/88 AM, Highway 1. Driving down the coast of the South China Sea
toward Hu6 and Da Nang. This is the only overland route (along with
the narrow-gauge railroad that parallels it) connecting northern and
southern Vietnam. It was originally constructed over a thousand years
ago by the emperors, who called it “The Imperial Road". Over the
centuries it has been improved by the Vietnamese and various foreign
occupiers. The Imperial Road was first paved by the French in the early
1900s, and then, as relations between the two countries deteriorated
into almost a century of war, became known to French soldiers as “La
rue san jo ie ' (The Street Without Joy)5.
This is one of the most spectacular areas of the country. The
towering and heavily forested Truong Son Mountains come right down
to the water's edge in some places, forcing the road to snake back
and forth as it clings to the rocky precipices. Vietnam is only about 50
miles wide at this point, and the land between here and neighboring
Cambodia is wild and virtually unsettled. Hundreds of waterfalls
cascade down the mountains, cutting deep valleys where small rice
paddies have been painstakingly carved out of the rock. The many
streams form flat deltas when they encounter the ocean, and around
them are tiny fishing villages, usually clustered around a central square
and a Catholic church. In most cases, the beach is so steep and rocky
that spray from the surf is flung high into the air, creating one glistening
rainbow after another.
Nearer the ocean, and usually below the road, lies the railway.
One train a day runs in each direction, loaded with boxcars and
crammed passenger coaches. At five in the evening, the trains pull
onto sidings for the night and the passengers set up camp with plastic
tarps. straw mats, and hammocks. Meals are cooked, clothes are
washed, children play, and just before dark everyone finds an isolated
spot to “collect flow ers' (eliminate body wastes). The train ride from Ho
Chi Minh City to Hanoi covers 1,700 miles in six days, a picturesque but
grueling journey.
PM, Highway 1. This whole trip, though fascinating, is very distressing.
What has been for twenty years a repressed, constipating pain is
gradually — underthe influence of the serenity of Vietnam — become
a cathartic pain, a pain of release — almost as if I were giving birth to
a new awareness. I haven't yet exorcised all my demons (if indeed that
is ever possible), but I know this trip is helping me reach an accommo
dation with them. The most difficult people to face here are notthe kids
(who have no memories of war), northe unruffled elderly, who just want
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to live out the remainder of their lives in peace. No. the toughest to
confront are those of my own generation; the veterans and widows
who've lost limbs and loved ones. The look in their flat black eyes is not
one of hate, but of astonishment; a look which says. “You were our
hated enemy, how can you come back?' That's hard to take, and
even harderto explain. But still, the visit so far has been a wellspring of
release for me.

1/6/88 AM, H u6. 1enter Vietnam's sixth largest city by crossing the Song
Huong (Perfume) River — named after the fragrant lemongrass which
grows in its marshes — on the Cau Phu Xuan Bridge, which connects the
two main parts of Hu6. During the terrible fighting ofTet 1968, guerrillas
and regular NVA forces captured the north bank, including the down
town area, the marketplace, and the ancient Imperial Palace, known
as the Citadel. The south shore was in the hands of ARVNs and US
Marines. In nearly a month of terrible house-to-house, hand-to-hand
fighting, the central portion of one of the oldest and most beautiful
cities in Vietnam was 110 percent destroyed (the extra 10 percent was
added because not only was everything above ground demolished,
but bombs and rockets also plowed up the soil to a depth of five or ten
feet). My friend Randy, a Marine who participated in the battle for Hu6,
describes the final assault to capture Cau Phu Xuan Bridge as a
nightmare he'll never be able to forget. "We tried to run, but we
couldn't.' he recalls, “because we kept slipping on all the blood. Theirs
or ours, I couldn't tell, it all looked the same.' Thousands of farmers,
fisherman, shopkeepers, housewives and students now cross back and
forth over the bridge every day. and no one even seems to notice the
sign at the south approach which states that the still scarred span has
been renamed Hoa Binh, or Peace Bridge.
PM, Hu6. While touring the Citadel (which is being slowly rebuilt), I meet
Duong Hoang Oanh, whose name means Yellow Bird. Oanh teaches
English at the University of Hu£ and is conducting a tour of freshman
students. She and her charges have never met an American before,
but they have studied the US and know that my home town, Jefferson
City, is the capital of Missouri. They sing for me a traditional song called
“Long M e' (Mother's Heart) which compares a mother's love with the
immense ocean, with the sweet sound of gentle streams, with the soft
moonlight of mid-autumn. The chorus likens a mother's lullaby to the
wind breathing through the rice fields in the evening. Oanh loves Janis
Joplin, and thinks that America is “interesting and lovely'.
1/7/88 AM, Hue. Along the northern bank of the Perfume River, down
a narrow, winding dirt pathframed by coconut palms and red blooming
hoagiay. lies the home of Nguyen Van Huong, kitemaker. A bright pink
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Larry Rottm an w ith some of the "Hundred Happy Sparrow s"
outside the tomb of Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi, January 1, 1988. PHOTO BY
HARRY HAINES.
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500 lb US bomb converted into flow er pot. Located in the Thang
Loi (Victory) Hotel parking lot in Nha Trang, January 10th, 1988.
PHOTO BY LARRY ROTTMANN.
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Mr. Nguyen Van Huoung, kitemaker at his workshop along the
Perfume River in Hue, January 6, 1988.
PHOTO BY LARRY
RO TTM ANN.

Along Highway 1, North of Qui Nhon. Grain from the fields is
brought to the roadway for winnowing and shocking. PHOTO BY
LARRY ROTTMANN.
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paper fish in the window catches by eye, and I enter the yard and ask
a young man if I can meet the artist. He introduces me to his
grandfather. I show Huong a wrinkled photo of myself with a big
Missouri bass. He grins appreciatively and slaps me on the back. We
talk fishing a while. Finally I thank him and prepare to leave, but he
takes my hand and leads me upstairs to his cluttered workshop,
overlooking the water. There he proudly shows me his more ambitious
creations. Graceful and colorful birds and dragons and butterflies —
all exquisite. We examine each one carefully. He explains just how
they're constructed. His deeply veined hands flutter through the air,
demonstrating how the kites fly. He shows me the delicate rice paper,
the finely split bamboo, the homemade glue. We drink Boa Loc tea.
Then Dalat wine. Smoke a couple of Hero cigarettes. He takes my
measure. And then, as the room grows dim, he sends his teenage son
into a back room. The boy returns with a dusty but still sinister kite
modeled after a fighter-bomber. It is more than six feet long, silver with
stars on its sides, and has a detachable bomb on each wing. Mr.
Nguyen (somewhat sadly, I think) says it flies quite well but that he's
flown it only once, 16 years ago. When he did, it made the children run
away crying.
PM, Hue. At the State School on Le Loi Street, where Pham Van Dong,
Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ho Chi Minh were once enrolled, I visit Mr. Hoa
Minh's ninth grade physics class. The busy students take a break to tell
me about their studies and their lives. And then, after about twenty
minutes, the teacher asks me answer some questions about my coun
try. I go to the front of the room, steeling myseff against the anticipated
queries about the American bombing of Hanoi, the Marines' destruc
tion of Hue. the massacre at My Lai. A dozen hands shoot into the air,
and I apprehensively select one questioner. “I want to know,' she says
loudly and clearly, 'about Disneyland.'

1/8/88 AM, Phu Bai. There is very little left here of the former US Marine
base, except rusty concertina wire and dilapidated buildings. The
main street downtown features the Big Sound Dancing Club, on its
marquee a picture of the Beatles, circa 1968. Nearby, the local
cinema has a giant hand-painted billboard showing a guerrilla fighter
with a big ivory-handled revolver, shooting at a hovering helicopterfull
of mean-looking GIs.
1/9/88 AM, Da Nang. The waves on China Beach advance and retreat
with an agenda uniquely their own. The tides here are more accurate
than American watches, more punctual than French ministers, more
durable than Japanese calendars, more predictable than Chinese
invaders. The waves on China Beach advance and retreat the way
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wartime memories ebb and eddy around the edges of my daily routine
at home, repeating over and over the gentle whisper of Ho Chi Minh,
"The wheel of life turns without pause... Men and animals rise up
reborn.' The waves on China Beach advance and retreat, and I kneel
on the sand and weep the grief I've hoarded for twenty years.
PM, Da Nang. During lunch at the hotel restaurant I meet Le Minh. He
was a professor of Literature and Letters (Latin and Chinese) at the
University of Saigon until the liberation of 1975. Minh spent several years
in a reeducation camp and. after being released, drifted into the
finance and export business. Although there is officially no trade
between SEATO countries and Vietnam because of the US-imposed
embargo, there is a lot of fudging going on. For example. Minh
arranges for the transfer of Laotian and Vietnamese teak to Japanese
boatyards in exchange for motorcycles and electronic goods. Minh
says that life is slowly getting better and. although he has considered
returning to teaching (where he is badly needed), he feels Vietnam is
on the verge of an economic boom. "Soon.' he says with a wry smile,
“the best communist will be the one who makes the most m oney.'

1/10/88 AM, Highway 1. I'm driving north of Qui Nhon, still insight of the
ocean, although I'll soon turn inland and head west into the central
highlands. The more I travel this road, the more aware I become that
it is much more than an avenue for transportation and communica
tion. Highway 1 is also a 1,500 mile long workbench, and thus a perfect
window on rural harvesting, commerce, construction, distribution, and
socialization. For example, the road is a country-long crop drying
surface. The warm, flat pavement is the perfect place to dry rice, tea,
coffee, corn, wheat, shrimp, fish, manioc, and hemp. All along its
length, farm families spread out their harvests on the paved shoulder,
constantly turning the crops over and over with brooms and rakes. Rice
and wheat and straw are threshed on the highway. Sugar cane is
stacked for cutting and bundling. Baskets are built and sorted. Logs
are piled and graded and peeled and cut up. Coconuts are husked.
Straw mats are woven. Brickmakers stack and sort bricks on the
highway. Stonemasons take their raw materials from the mountains
Highway 1 cuts through, and then shape their building stones along its
edges. Carpenters mill their planks into lumber, then use the wood to
construct furniture right there on the road. Cattle are driven to markel
down the highway. Water buffalo, goats, and pigs are walked to the
fields along its length. Ducks and geese and chickens are herded up
and down the way. The road Is also a playground, soccer field,
badminton court, and basketball arena. And since the road usually is
the main thoroughfare (and often the only paved street) in smaller
villages, it is additionally the town square, festival center, marketplace.

A Veteran R eturns

131

dance pavilion, bus stop, wedding aisle,funeral procession path, teen
hangout and community meeting place.
To get a better feel for the character of Vietnam, I ought to
bicycle (or, better yet, walk) the length of this road. But the trip would
be difficult, mostly because many Vietnamese have never seen an
American. They are fascinated. Curious. Even a bit frightened — not
of me, or of my past military connections, but of my physical strange
ness. My skin color. My height. My beard. My clothes. To stop in any
small town. at any time. is to precipitate a near riot. In minutes the news
is passed. People of all ages come to look at me, to touch me. It's like
being an off-world alien. Everyone wants to see me, to leam about me,
but no one knows who I am or what I'm doing in their village. The kids
approach first, shyly but inquisitively. It doesn't take long for them to
make friends with me. I pass out a handful of Superballs which I have
brought along just for this purpose; and soon the balls are bouncing
wildly all overthe highway. Next come the teenagers, bolder and even
more curious. Then the grandmothers, who can be the sweetest and
the most fun. Sometimes they pinch me hard just to see if I'm real (I leam
to yelp in pain immediately and loudly. They like that). The middleaged men usually hang way back. Many of them are former guerrillas,
and are understandably reluctant to approach. Some feign indiffer
ence. Others edge closer, too interested in an old enemy (whom most
never met face-to-face) to resist the attraction. Grandfathers are
usually the last to arrive but are often the most friendly. The old men are
talkative, eager to discuss farming and fishing. Do you grow rice in
America? How do you catch fish? I show them a nearly worn-out
photo of my son, which is quickly passed from hand to hand. His blonde
hair and open smile draw ohs and ahs from the crowd, and an
aggressive matchmaker offers me a local girl as a potential wife for
Leroy. I pass around the photo of myself with a seven pound largemouth bass, a very large fish by Vietnamese standards. These pictures
are a big hit and make excellent ice-breakers. Soon we're all talking
at once, and laughing as we try using each other's native language.
But a middle-aged woman on the outside fringe of the crowd reminds
me sharply of a the past by shouting an all too familiar phrase: “Go
home.GI. Go home!"
PM, Phu Cat. The 1986 Toyota minibus rocks through the vast dark as
sharp images appear out of the blackness, then disappear: tiny
roadside stands dimly lit by smoky kerosene lamps; ancient Buddhist
shrines faintly illuminated by glowing joss sticks; a young couple side by
side, hand in hand, on bicycles; three sleepy-eyed water buffalo; an
old man pulling a handcart heavily laden with firewood; a group of
laughing musicians walking home from a late performance. Unlike the
working day with its hectic pace, the long night is calm and measured.
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People are at rest. Animals move slowly. But my restless mind fills in the
void between images with dreadful dreams and memories of my first
visit here, twenty years ago. We blow through Tuy An and “Pinkville
North'. Inch up and down CuMong and Deo Ca Passes. It grows late
and I become mellow. Even the turbulent surf of the South China Sea
seems to become more tranquil. War damaged buildings, still unfilled
bomb craters are all invisible at night. My thoughts drift. I think of
peace, of resolution, of the future. Then Vinh, the driver, pops in a wellworn Gl tape and Dylan intones. "All the money you make can never
buy back your soul.' It's still a damn good song, Bobby, but you'll never
know the half of it. Not even the half of it.
PM, Nha Trang. I find it increasingly difficult to sleep on this trip, not
because of poor facilities, but because I'm so keyed up. Time seems
so short that I want to spend it all — day and night — drinking in
Vietnam. Seeing it. Feeling it. Tasting it the way I wasn't able to taste
it twenty years ago. Experiencing Vietnam as it is. At work and at play.
And at peace. I'm having formless dreams, impressions without plot,
images without context. Things I've seen. Pictures I've taken. All the
intense experiences of the last couple of weeks piled on top of that
closely-held collection of memories from the war. My brain and heart
are working overtime; overloaded with complicity and good inten
tions. And even in restless sleep, I seek connections, looking for
answers, searching for a way out of paradox, bridging gaps, forming
and rejecting and reforming hypotheses, shaping responses. I'm like
an over-heated early model computer, whirring and ticking, cumber
some with blinking lights, slow moving mechanical parts, and bulky
tapes that can't keep up with the incoming rush of new information.
I'm backlogged. My input is days, weeks, months ahead of my output.
But I want more data. I'm hungry for it. Wild for it. Desperate for it. I
take it all in. I cannot get enough. And my need is not for percentages
or statistics or numbers or committee reports or government docu
ments or official briefings. I need faces and names. I never got to learn
who these people were the last time. I spent a whole year here before,
but I don't remember a single Vietnamese person. So far on this trip I
have the names and addresses and photos of 81 people whose hands
I've shaken, whose families I've met, whose meals I've shared, whose
kids I've held, whose work I've shared, whose classrooms I've visited.
And these are real people. Not slant-eyed rifle range caricatures; not
blurred images glimpsed through dusty jeep windows, over barbed
wire fences, or through bunkerfiring ports; not gruesome, stiff cadavers
stacked high after a battle or a bombing; not ragged bleached bone
bags rotting under a tropical sun.
I want to meet these folks. To hold them. Touch them. Smell
their life and sweat. I want to know they are alive, especially the
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children. I need to be reassured that we didn't kill or poison them all.
Or destroy their individuality or their collective spirit. I wallow in the
happiness of the children, and am buoyed by their smiles, laughter,
sense of life and purpose. A sleeping baby. A pregnant woman. A
nursing mother. A young couple holding hands and making moon
eyes. These are the sights that make my day. I don't give a damn at
this point in time (and perhaps I never did) about who won the war. But
I need to know that the country is alive and viable. It feels very good
to know that Vietnam lives.

1/11/88 AM, Phan Rang. Whenever I think about my tour of Vietnam,
thefirst thing I remember is the constant,terrible noise. Allthe time, day
and night, in the local villages or big cities or thick jungles or open rice
paddies — unnatural sounds. The crump of mortars, the shriek of
rockets, the whistle of bombs, the clap of artillery, the rattle of small
arms, the clanking of tanks, the squawk of radios, the crackle of flames,
the shouts of men, the wails of women, the screams of children, the
cries of prayer. But it's not like that here anymore. It's totally unex
pected and strange to be in a Vietnam of peace and quiet, to hear
everywhere natural sounds, and not the horrible din of war. The songs
of birds, the grunts of pigs, the ripple of water, the echo of temple
gongs, the hoofbeats of water buffalo, the patter of raindrops, the
tinkle of bicycle bells, the peeping of tree frogs, the jesting of men, the
banter of women, the laughter of children, the murmur of prayer.
1/12/87 PM, Dalat. In the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (officially, at
least) there is no Champa, no Buddha, no Sita, no Thien Hoa, and
certainly no Jesus Christ. But down a crooked side street in Dalat, in a
small bedroom above Dinh Gia Khan's welding shop. I'm shown a
beautifully decorated pine tree and a wall-size hand painted banner
proclaiming “Happy Merry Christmas!' The whole family gladly as
sembles for a group photo. We laugh at jokes, exchange holiday
stories. There are carols playing on a small cassette recorder. And no
one notices that it isn't an authorized holiday.
1/13/87 PM, N’thong Lha. The K'ho people of the remote mountains
along the Laotian border have been weavers for centuries. Their
intricately designed cotton cloth bears traditional patterns reflecting
their environment and culture. In a small stall at the central market, an
ancient darkskinned woman displays tablecloths, door coverings, and
blankets decorated with brilliant birds, animals, and flowers, along with
a single red. white, and blue shawl that clearly stands out from the rest
of her offerings. On a field of the whitest white, horizontal lines of blue
and red are intersected by a hundred unusual geometric shapes.
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Close inspection reveals what was on the weaver's mind as she
shunted the hand shuttle back and forth in her distant village. Giant
silver birds of prey that lay explosive eggs.
PM, Bao Loc. This is a medium sized village located about halfway
between Dalat and Ho Chi Minh City on Highway 20. At an altitude of
3,000 feet, this area is famous for its coffee and tea. I buy two kilos of
strong smelling, air dried coffee beans at the local market for 1,500
dong. While here, I meet Linh Huong, a shoemaker. He shows me a
letter from his brother Pham, who lives in Westminster, California. The
envelope has $3.28 in US stamps on it, and the postmarks indicate it
took about three months for the letter to arrive. Huong is proud of his
brother, who is a computer programmer, but Huong has no interest in
moving to America himself. He shows me a small stack of cassette
tapes sent by Pham; mostly jazz and rock and roll. “Music in Vietnam
is not for amusement, but for the expression of the soul,' Huong
explains. “In America the pace of life is frantic and busy, because you
must be active in the body in order to remain warm. Your music is too
nervous, like yourselves.'

1/15/88 AM, Ho Chi Minh City. Whether you refer to it as Ho Chi Minh
City, as the communists have decreed, or Saigon, as most natives still
call it. this sprawling, bustling town hasn't changed all that much since
1968. I've been here less than 24 hours, but it feels like I never really left.
The smells, sights, character, and rhythm of Saigon haven't changed.
Tthe form of government is different, but this city, which survived, con
quered , or absorbed the influences of Chinese, French, Japanese and
American occupations, has never surrendered its personality. Saigon
is Saigon, and like the other great cities of the world it has a soul uniquely
its own. It feels good to be back.
I'm staying at the legendary Caravelle Hotel, now redesig
nated the Doc Lap (Independence). But Caravelle is still the name
engraved on the building's facade and etched into the room keys and
embedded in the memories and dispatches of the hundreds of journal
ists who made this their temporary home. For nearly thirty years,
correspondents from around the world gathered at the rooftop ter
race bar to sip drinks, exchange gossip, pick up companions for the
night, dance to the music of Filipino bands, and watch the war being
fought in the distance. My room is number 208, overlooking notorious
Tu Do (Liberty) Street — now renamed Dong Koi (Revolution) — and
from my tiny veranda I can see the Saigon River several blocks to the
east, and the docks where cargo ships from Russia, Cuba, Sweden,
and Japan are moored. Four blocks to the west is the towering
Catholic cathedral, in front of which Buddhist priests and nuns immo
lated themselves In order to protest the war. (The first woman to die this
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way was Sister Huynh Thi Mai, who left this message after burning herself
to death in 1966: “I am not mad and I am not unhappy. Life is beautiful
and I wish I could have loved it to the end. But it is right for me to offer
it for our country and our faith. May the responsibility for this act fall on
the wicked men who rule Vietnam.”6) The Caravelle Hotel is located
in the middle of Saigon, fronting Le Loi Boulevard, and just across the
street from the old National Assembly Building (now a concert hall,
where Vietnam's premier rock group. Bong Sen (Soaring Lotus) is
performing nightly).
The most obvious differences between these and earlier Saigon
streets are the absence of GIs, bars, whores, drug dealers, and Saigon
cowboys. There are few motor vehicles now, and there is a 10PM
curfew. Throughout Vietnam, all social activities cease at 10PM,
except on holidays and very special occasions. Since the workday
begins very early six or seven days a week, there are few complaints
about this policy.

1/15/88 PM, Ho Chi Minh City. Located in the incongruous setting of a
palm shaded French villa near downtown Saigon, the National War
Crimes Museum makes a grim tourist attraction. I enter past a long row
of huge American war machines: an M-48 tank, an APC-mounted
flame thrower, a 155mm howitzer, a big pile of aluminum junk that was
once a B-52 bomber, and a 1500 pound “hamburger bom b'. Inside
the first exhibit building I confront a wall size enlargement of Ronald
Haeberle's famous color photograph of the My Lai Massacre victims.
I find myself drawn to this hideous picture, and move close enough to
the nearly life-size (death-size?) images to see the individual bullet
holes riddling the sprawled bodies of women, children and infants —
bullets which came from the smoking-hot guns of teenage GIs. I'm
ashamed to have been in the same army as these men. It breaks my
heart — again — to see such a wanton waste of life, such a terrible
example of US xenophobia. I flee the room to escape those lifeless,
accusing eyes and go on to the next display, which features the results
of chemical defoliation agents, as illustrated by photos of grotesquely
deformed newborns and a monstrous something in a glass jar. And
here, on the wall, is a giant blow-up of a 1971 Boston Globe article
stating: “Larry Rottmann, a former Army officer, testified that he knew
of the presence and use of CBW (chemical and biological warfare)
techniques in Vietnam .'7 Death dealing devices. Bloody children.
Deformed babies. Three-armed, headless fetuses. And, in block letters
two inches tall, my name. Seen by countless thousands of Vietnamese
visitors and foreign travelers. Forever a legacy of my first visit here. Larry
Rottmann... Larry Rottmann... Larry Rottmann...
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1/16/88 AM, Ho Chi Minh City. At breakfast I'm pleasantly surprised to
encounter Dr. Ralph Timperi. of the Tufts University School of Medicine.
He is in-country on a health related project, and Is a former colleague
of Dr. Louis Weinstein, who treated me for war-related Illness in 1971.
Ralph also served with the 25th Infantry Division in 1969.
PM, Ho Chi Minh City. Sua Van Qunh approaches me shyly at the
Saigon Zoo. "You M y?' she asks (my is the Vietnamese word for
American). I nod yes. “You know Bill Sm ith?' she Inquires, and
produces a faded photo of herself and a baby-faced Gl. Inscribed on
the back, in ajuvenile scrawl, arethe words, “Aug. '66. Love, Bill.' “We
engaged,' she proclaims proudly, and shows me a cheap PX wedding
band with the gold plating nearly worn away. "He go States, but he
promise come back for me, so I w a it.' Her smile is strained, her tone
resigned, but still hopeful. We sit together near the Elephant House and
drink warm lemonade. I don't know what to say, so I tell her that
America is a very big place and that I'm sorry but I don't know her Bill
Smith. She sips her drink. Watches me closely. She is painfully thin but
carries herself well for a woman of late middle age. "W e engaged,'
she repeats, “so I w ait.'
PM, Ho Chi Minh City. A meeting with the Most Venerable Thich Minh
Chau, Director of the Buddhist Center, and the monk who supervises all
aspects of Buddhist life in Vietnam. The center provides the three years
of education and training necessary to prepare young people to
become monks and nuns. Since Buddhists have always been antiwar
activists, their presence and programs have historically run afoul of the
various Vietnamese governments, including the communists. Thich
Minh Chau explains:
We are Buddhists first, Vietnamese second. Except for the
teachings of Lord Buddha, we follow the same university
curriculum as prescribed by thestate. There are some problems
o f course, but no restrictions on what we as a religious
movement can believe. Obviously, the precepts of socialism
and Buddhism don't always coincide, so this form of
cooperation Is rather new and unusual. There Is often a failure
of the socialist leaders to understand how this unity o f state
and religion can work, or be carried out. But both of us are
trying to work out these problems.

PM, Cholon. One of the most striking differences between the Vietnam
of 1968 and the Vietnam of today is the cleanliness and orderliness of
the country. My wartime recollections are of a chaotic and filthy
society, and it never occurred to me at the time that such disarray
could be due to the war itself. Vietnam today is clean and wellordered, withoutthe graffiti, litter, and piles of garbage that even some

A Veteran R eturns

137

of the more advanced Third World countries like the Philippines or
Mexico cannot seem to get rid of. Every morning people can be seen
raking their small yards, or sweeping the sidewalks and streets in front
of their homes and businesses. Neatness here is a matter of pride.
Vietnam's cities and roads and parks are much cleanerthan America's.
The legacy of the war is not always obvious, because for the most part
the damaged buildings and bomb-cratered fields have been re
paired. But missing limbs and napalm scars are not infrequent, and
when I look carefully. I see US military hardware which has been turned
to peacetime usage: defused bombs made Into flower pots. Gl steel
helmets used as buckets, jet wingtanks turned into bathtubs and boats,
and aircraft aluminum cut into roofing material, cooking utensils, and
even a merry-go-round.

1/17/88 PM, Ho Chi Minh City. Meeting with Nguyen Co Thach, the
Vietnamese Foreign Minister, at his offices (only the third air-condi
tioned place I've visited; the others were Ho'stom b and the University
ofHoChiMinhcomputercenter). The Minister is laid-back,friendly,and
speaks excellent English. This is more of a conversation than a briefing,
and there are no restrictions on topic. Some observations by Mr.
Nguyen:
Without diplomatic relations, how can the US expect us to
help more with the MIA Issue?... This has become a
neverendlng story... and as long as diplomatic problems exist
between our countries, nothing can be done about our
mutual rmoral wounds.... I agree with James Reston, who
wrote In 1975, that ‘America has withdrawn from the war, but
thew arhasnotyetwithdrawnfrom Am erlca.'... Ourbiggest
problem is that we've tost all control over our economy; for
example, a kilo of steel Is worth only 6 dong, but a single egg
costs 30 dong. This is stupid. The bureaucratic problems that
exist between our countries — student exchanges, MlAs,
Ameraslan children, refugees, etc. — are not good. But not
because of deliberately bad Intentions, but because of the
old wounds (both ours and yours) that remain from the war.
Isn't It time to focus not on the past, but on the future?

1/18/88 PM, Cu Chi. Sitting on the porch of Nguyen Van Sen's
farmhouse, I can see the site where I was stationed twenty years ago.
Sen raises sugarcane, wheat, and rice in fields reclaimed from the
sprawling 25th Infantry Division base camp. In the courtyard. Sen's wife
Kim is winnowing a big pile of rice, tossing it repeatedly into the air so
that the breeze will blow the chaff away from the grain. In the distance
three young girls scramble about on an abandoned US tank. Later, I
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explore a few of the hundreds of kilometers of VCtunnelsthat were built
in this area, some of which ran right under our division's barracks. One
of the longest extended for miles and was never discovered during the
war because it had been constructed directly underthe middle of the
main highway, where no one ever thought to look, and where the US
(who depended on the road) never bombed. For a while I just wander
around the area, lost in thought. I am not unhappy, just reflective. My
capacity for remorse has been exhausted. I'm ready, eager, to start
thinking ahead. About what I might do in the future regarding
Vietnam, rather than continuing to dwell so extensively — to live so
exclusively — in that bitter and confusing period of the past. What I'd
believed was a bottomless well of grief has been dried up. I'm too full
now of new names and faces and places and experiences and ideas
to have room or time for that old sorrow. Maybe my hosts understood
that — expected that — and have arranged the entire visit to con
clude this way, on a hopeful note; or it could be that dinh-menh is once
again at work. Perhaps this reconciliation has been my own personal
agenda all along.

1/19/88 AM, Tan Son Nhut. For the second time in my life I'm leaving
Vietnam behind, and from the very same airport. I remember that I'd
thought we'd all cheer when we lifted off in 1968. but it was just the
opposite. We grew deathly silent and didn't look at each other at all.
I think we were all praying that the plane would not crash or get shot
down. We just wanted to go home. We were damn glad to get out of
Vietnam. This time, however, I feel a great sense of sadness about
leaving. I'm not readytogososoon,so abruptly. But this Air France 747
is full of Vietnamese who are voluntarily leaving their country, most of
them forever, to go to America. They are anxious to depart. Life can
be very hard here. As the plane lifts off .they begin crying and laughing
and clapping and snapping pictures of themselves in their new free
dom. And we're all flying in a luxurious airliner which was made in the
United States and is owned and operated by a company in France...
two nations who fought wars here, and lost.
BAck In ifiE USA
1/22/88 PM, Honolulu. Coming through customs the agent (a vet) is
astonished to see Vietnamese visas stamped in my passport. “You
went back?' he asks. “Really?' He's now only going through the
motions of examining my bags. “You went back voluntarily? I hated
it. Hated it.' He pauses, lost In thought, then turns up the VC pith
helmet, complete with red star, that I'd traded my Bass Pro Shop hat for.
The Inspector is stunned. “Where'd you get this?' he asks, almost in a
whisper. I tell him. “I hated Vietnam .'he repeats. He's lost all interest
in my luggage now. He looks at me, but doesn't see me. I wait. Finally
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the question comes, hesitantly. "What's it like now?' I try to explain, but
it's hot, crowded, rushed. People are pushing behind me, impatient.
The customs agent ignores them. He listens, hanging on every word.
He asks: Have I been to Da Nang? Did I see the airbase? What's the
city like? How are the people? Do they hate us? I tell him that most
do not. He's silent for a moment, then says. "If I were them, I would.'
Finally, the inspector passes me on through, but as I leave he calls me
back, takes me aside, and asks, "Do you think I could go back
sometime?'

1/23/88 AM, Springfield. I land at the same airport I returned to twenty
years ago. On the night I arrived home in 1968,therewasnoonehere
to meet me. (It was three days before Lyndon Johnson announced he
wouldn't run for reelection and fourteen days before Martin Luther
King, Jr. was assassinated.) This time there's a group of TV, radio, and
newspaper reporters waiting for interviews. I try to explain my feelings
about the trip and describe what Vietnam and its people are like, but
the journalists keep asking about the American MIAs and the commu
nist government. I reply as best I can, and emphasize that I'm not a
diplomat, only a concerned citizen and a veteran who went back for
personal reasons. But just like many of their wartime predecessors,
these reporters are more interested in political topics than human
issues, and so they miss the whole point of my trip, and the larger story
of post-war Vietnam8. The question that really needed answering was
asked by Bernard and Marvin Kalb years ago:
The war has numbed us all. It's been going on for so long that
It's grown a culture of Its own. It contaminates everything It
touches — you, me, everyone. And what troubles me ... Is
whether the damage Is temporary or permanent. Can you
wash It off with a shower? Or are you dirtied forever?9

2/7/88 PM, Springfield. I've been back for a couple of weeks now, but
I'm still having a difficult time readjusting. I'm busy at school and, on
the surface at least, am getting caught up with classes, correspon
dence, etc. But I still find myself confused for no apparent reason. I'm
not out of control exactly, but I keep seeing things in a whole new light,
an entirely new reality. I'm almost dizzy with distraction, and all the
routine daily bullshit around me seems totally irrelevant. It's like a
dream where I've left my body and I'm watching myself from a
distance as I go through the motions of daily living. I know I am capable
of controlling the scenario, but it just doesn't seem important enough
to make the effort. I'm still on that journey which, in some basic and
profound way, is altering forever who I am. I need the time and
distance and space to try and put everything into focus, but I'm not
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getting it. I'm wired. Strung too tight. Tuned too high. Colors are too
bright. Sounds are too loud. I'm accustomed now to the pace of life
in Vietnam.whichissloweranddeeperthan in America. I know I wasn't
ready to come back yet. Part of me remained back in Vietnam in 1968,
and another part of me stayed there this time. I 've got to go back soon.
I've been too busy since I came home to examine myself and see
whether I've gained any valuable new perspective. But last night for
the first time ever, I dreamed of Vietnam at peace.
The wheel of law turns without pause
After the rain, good weather.
In the wink of an eye, the universe throws o ff its muddy clothes
For ten thousand miles the landscape
spreads out like a beautiful brocade.
Light breezes. Smiling flowers.
High In the trees, amongst the sparkling leaves,
all the birds sing at once.
Men and animals rise up reborn.
What could be more natural?
After sorrow, comes Joy.
Ho Chi Minh, P riso n D ia ry 9*8654321
1James T. Davis, a member of the US Army 3rd Radio Research Unit, was killed
In action In December 1961, and Is usually listed as America's first Vietnam
fatality. However, US Air Force Captain James B. “Earthquake' McGovern was
shot down and killed while flying supplies to the French at the Battle of Dlen Blen
Phu on May 6 1954. McGovern's name does not appear on the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial In Washington, DC, since only US casualties between 1959
and 1975 are listed.
2 Sllllphant, Sterling. SteelTlger (New York: Ballantine) 1983:
3 “Willy Peter' Is a slang term for white phosphorus, a deadly burning chemical
used In US bombs and artillery shells.
4 Rottmann, Larry. “Vets Remember' (review of P la to o n ), S p rin g fie ld N e w sLe a d e r (22 February 1987).
5 Fall, Bernard. S tre e t W ith o u t J o y (London: Pall Mall) 1965.
6 The first recorded Immolation was Thich Quang Due, a Buddhist monk, who
died on June 11,1963 in Saigon. Immolations were conducted In an orderly
fashion: “Reverend Mother Thich Nhu Hue... has been a nun for 35 years, and
Is in charge of all the nuns In Vietnam... It's she who must give permission when
one of the nuns wants to commltsulclde, and 150 requests await her decision.'
Orlana Fallaci. N o th in g a n d So B e l t .
1 Taken from testimony at the Winter Soldiers Investigation In 1971. Convened
in Detroit, Michigan on January 31 and February 1 and 2, 1971 by Vietnam
Veterans Against the War to provide a forum for soldiers who wanted to testify
to having committed or witnessed war crimes In Vietnam.
8 Interview with the author, S p rin g fie ld N e w s-Le a d e r (.Feb rua ry 2 1988).
9 Kalb, Bernard. The La st A m b a ssa d o r (Boston: Uttie, Brown) 1981:

DispUTiNQ ThE WRECkAQE: IdEO loqiCA l
STRU qqlE AT t He ViETIMAM VETERANS
M e m o r ia l
H a r r y W . H a in e s

Even before its construction, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial
(“The W a ll') achieved public and critical attention. Magazines,
newspapers and television reports gave wide currency to Maya Lin's
winning design, producing a mass mediated aura for the Memorial
before it took shape on the Washington Mall. These early reports, and
the Memorial itself, helped initiate what political elites had long avoided:
an ideological struggle over the meaning of the Vietnam War, the
symbolic political function of Vietnam veterans, and most significantly,
the rationale for American deaths. This ideological struggle continues
to unfold at The Wall, a ritual site where pilgrims enact complex
relationships with casualties and history. The Wall now functions as a
potent and politically volatile sign of the citizen's relationship to others
and to the state1and does not, as Griswold2argues, “separate war and
politics'. On the contrary, the Memorial provides a locus of ideological
struggle, revealing the political nature of the current rejntegrative
phase of Vietnam's "social d ra m a '3 as various ideological blocs
struggle to assign meaning to the war, Vietnam veterans and the
dead.

BREAkiNq t He SU ence
The Wall helped initiate a reintegrative — or healing — process
in the aftermath of what Fox Butterfield4 describes as “a trance of
collective amnesia,' during which the war was officially “forgotten' by
political elites and Vietnam veterans were effectively removed from
public discourse. The “trance' (an example of the productive capacity
of hegemony) served the interests of political power by avoiding a
potentially damaging analysis of the structural relationships and
assumptions5 which produced the war as “an ersatz conflict, invented
for protecting artificially conceived vital interests'6. Additionally, the
"tra nc e ' provided time for the regrouping of political interests in the
immediate aftermath of an ideological crisis. Historian Marilyn Young7
observed:
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The fundamental Institutions which gave rise to the Vietnam
war have hardly changed; what has changed is the credibility
of the Imperialist Ideology which justified that war. From the
viewpoint of the State, that Is the wound that must be healed.

Serving as the anomaly in the reassertion of structural credibility, the
Vietnam veteran was simply silenced; a profoundly tragic process
which David Rabe8 predicted in his politically controversial play. Sticks
and Bones. The absence of a strong political consensus (shattered by
the w ar's ideological crisis) positioned the veteran as a potentially
volatile sign of a failed strategy, what Gibson9 calls “mechanistic
anticommunism'. The process of hegemony silenced the veteran by
providing no position from which to speak about the war. This process
is revealed in mass mediated representations of the veteran as either
a victim or psychotic, two variations on the theme of repression10, and
is strengthened by its indictment of the antiwar movement as the
source of the veteran's discontent.
The Wall, in effect, broke the silence of the immediate postwar
years, returned the veteran to discourse and initiated the ideological
struggle which now characterizes the reintegrative phase. Televised
rituals introduced the Memorial and alsofocused on how veterans and
others used it to enact their sense of loss. These widely disseminated
rituals forced political elites to verbally recognize Vietnam veterans for
the first time since the end of the war and spawned several
“homecoming parades' which Michael Clark11has called examples of
“historical surrealism'. The Wall produced Vietnam veterans and the
war dead as objects of ideological struggle, reflected in subsequent
mass media representations, including Rambo, Platoon, and various
television programs such as Magnum, P.I.; The A-Team; Tour of Duty;
China Beach; and Vietnam War Story. Significantly, the veteran's
return to discourse occurs during a revisionist period, and the process
of hegemony — no longer able to silence veterans — adjusts to the
new conditions by developing therapeutic and disciplinary strategies.
Nowhere are these strategies more evident than at The Wall.

DispiJTiNq TtlE WRECkAqE
Sensingthe potential cooptation of their lived social experience,
the antiwar Vietnam veterans argued against anyattempt to represent
the dead in the form of public architecture. Marine combat veteran
W.D. Ehrhart's12 poem, “The Invasion of Grenada,' expresses an
oppositional view:
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I didn't want a monument
not even one as sober as that
vast black wall of broken lives.
I didn't want a postage stamp.
I didn't want a road beside the Delaware
River with a sign proclaiming:
’Vietnam Veterans Memorial Highway.'
What I wanted was a simple recognition
of the limits of our power as a nation
to Inflict our will on others.
What I wanted was an understanding
that the world Is neither black-and-white
nor ours.
What I wanted
was an end to monuments.

Ehrhart implies "an understanding' which recognizes Vietnam's social
reality, the very thing which US war managers attempted to obliterate
by the deployment of technology and rapid modernization13 and
which hegemony attempts to further marginalize by means of historical
revisionism14. Thomas Roberts15, an activist in the soldiers' antiwar
movement, suggested alterations to what he expected would be the
"typical' war memorial: "Defy the typical motif by situating the slab
sunken, sucking air for meaning.' Roberts envisioned an archlight
beaming across the Mall, illuminating a monumental crater, "the ashes
of 50,000 John D o e s... scattered to the bottom.'
Ehrhart and Roberts responded bitterly to what they saw as the
predictable cooptation of the war dead. They understood intuitively
what Waiter Benjamin14 concluded in the 1930s: "Even the dead will
not be safe from the enemy if he wins.' And they were right to fear the
cooptation of the Vietnam experience by political interests determined
to use veterans and casualties to justify future interventions. But the
ideological struggle centered at The Wall developed in unexpected
and unpredictable ways, and this struggle is worthy of examination.
Since its construction in 1982, The Wall has quickly developed
as a popular attraction in a city accurately described as a “tourist
district'. Elaborate sightseeing rituals are evident, and the Memorial
demonstrates what MacCannell17 identifies as several phases in a
process of "sight sacralization,' in which attributes formerly reserved for
holy places are ascribed to tourist attractions in the modem world. The
ideological struggle to assign meaning to the Vietnam War emerges at
the Memorial in what MacCannell identifies as the “naming' phase18.
Naming activities include public speeches, other administrative
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messages and various news accounts functioning to define the
Memorial and to thereby define the war and veterans. For example.
President Jimmy Carter signed the Memorial's construction authorization
with these words:
A long and painful process has brought us to this moment
today. Our nation, as you all know, was divided by this war.
For too long we tried to put thatdlvlslon behind usby forgetting
the Vietnam war and. In the process, we Ignored those who
bravely answered their Nation's call, adding to their pain the
additional burden of our Nation's own Inner conflict” .

Clearly, the Memorial is to be a sign signifying both a sense of loss forthe
dead and a sense of reincorporation of the survivors. It is the sign of
community refound, as if the Nation is coming to its senses following an
incomprehensible lapse in memory (the trance of collective amnesia).
Carter locates the Vietnam veteran as a carrier of a special “burden,"
a unique repository of America's war-related contradictions. He
names the Memorial as a sign of national expiation, a sign through
which Vietnam veterans are purged of an unidentified “inner conflict".
Hegemony's therapeutic strategy unfolds even before the
groundbreaking.
The Memorial, veterans, and by implication, the war itself are
furtherpsychologized in the naming phase. The idea for a Vietnam War
memorial originated as the response of one veteran to a mediated
version of the war, the feature film The Deerhunter. Former infantryman
Jan C. Scruggs, tormented by flashbacks after seeing the film, formed
the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund in April, 197920. He was joined by
several volunteers, many of them wives and mothers of soldiers killed in
the war. By January 1980, Congress authorized the memorial, and all
one hundred Senators co-sponsored the bill. The Fund announced a
juried competition for memorial designs in October 1980. Texas
millionaire H. Ross Perot provided seed money for the competition.
Submitted designs were required to list the names of all the dead and
missing Americans and to demonstrate sensitivity for the site, close to
the Washington Monument and Lincoln Memoria21!. Thq_se!ection
criteria required that the design be apolitical in the sense of expressing-"
no specific position on the correctness of the war.
From among 1,421 entries (the largest design competition in
the United States or Europe), a jury of eight prominent architects and
sculptors selected the design of 22-year-old Maya Lin, an undergraduate
student of architecture at Vale University. The Lin design was selected
in May 1981, and approved by the National Capitol Planning
Commission, the Fine Arts Commission and the Department of the
Interior. In October 1981, a bitter opposition emerged; a significant
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development in the naming phase. Wounded Vietnam veteran Tom
Carhart, now a civilian lawyer at the Pentagon, called the design ’ a
black gash of shame and sorrow,' and asked the Fine Arts Commission:
Are we to honor our dead and our sacrifices to America with
a black hole?... Can America truly mean that we should feel
honored by a black pit? In a city filled with white monuments,
this is our reward for faithful service22.

Although Carhart's own proposed design (a representational
figure of an army officer holding the body of a dead infantryman to the
sky) had been rejected, his opposition to Lin's design was apparently
based on criteria of stylistic ’ normalcy'. For him, Lin's design was
symptomatic of the disorder. Where the Commission saw ’dignity',
’ nobility', and ’ serenity', Carhart saw ’shame and sorrow ', the
veterans' burden all along. He was joined by author James Webb, a
decorated Marine Combat veteran who later served as Secretary of
the Navy, and Assistant Secretary of Defense. Webb called Lin's design
a ’wailing w a ll'23. Perot also opposed the selected design and
opposition grew when the Chicago Tribune called it ’ a monumental
insult to veterans'. Those agreeing with Carhart and Webb wanted the
Memorial to be white and above ground, similar to other monuments
in Washington, DC.
Congressional opposition gathered, and Interior Secretary
James Watt withdrew his support in January 1981, six weeks before
groundbreaking. Scruggs then drew upon support from national
veterans' groups and influential military leaders to fight the opposition.
Secretary Watt, named by Congress to oversee the design process,
ordered Scruggs to seek a compromise. Throughout January and
February 1981, conflicting sides argued and finally agreed to a
compromise design which included a flagpole and a representational
statue by Frederick Hart. Despite the acrimony of the early naming
phase, the actual ceremony marking off the Memorial was
characterized by these selected statements:
Army Chaplain Max D. Sullivan: ‘ May this place be a holy
place of healing.'
National Commander of the American Legion Jack W. Flint:
’ The suffering and the loneliness (the veterans) bore when
they returned home... are finally at an end. The frustration and
confusion of the American people, long willing but unable to
express their gratitude and appreciation to a generation of
unselfish patriots. Is finally at an end.'
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Executive Director of the Veterans of Foreign Wars Cooper T.
Holt: '(the Memorial will help) create an accord out of our
bitterest military experience since the Civil W ar.'
Virginia Governor Charles S. Robb (President Johnson's sonin-law and Marine combat officer In Vietnam): *I w asn't able
to answer 'why' (when writing to the families of men killed
under his command), and this memorial doesn 7 attempt to
sa y w h y but It does sa y we cared and we remembered.'M
Jan C. Scruggs: "The American people were divided by the
war... but one point that all Americans can agree upon is that
Vietnam veterans deserve recognition and appreciation for
their sacrifices. Let this memorial begin the healing process
and forever stand as a symbol of national unity.'25

The Memorial is named a therapeutic place of healing and
accord, an expression of gratitude and national unity, a unique
physical location where consensus emerges, where suffering, loneliness,
frustration and confusion are purged. The trance of collective amnesia
is broken in 1981, as America “remembers'. But it is a specific kind of
remembering, identified by Governor Robb. The memory istherapeutic
and not his+oric. The most important question Robb pondered mile
writing to the survivors of dead Marines remains unanswered even as
consensus is attained.
Since its introduction in 1982, the Memorial has quickly
developed as the focal point of the national memory of Vietnam. This
memory is produced as the product of ideological struggle and takes
material form in the broad range of activities which now occur at the
site. The Memorial's ambiguous stance generates a shifting symbolic
ground, a fluctuating, constantly renegotiated field in which visitors
enact the meaning of the Vietnam War. Based on his ethnographic
observations at the Memorial site, Ehrenhaus26 categorizes the visitors
according to three types of behavior and how these behaviors embody
particular types of social meaning.
Mourne.scome “insecularpilgrimage'.oftentoleave "artifacts
ofcommemoration' atthesite. The mourners include Vietnam veterans
who treat the Memorial as “sacred ground'. Meaning arises from the
personal truths of remembrance in the liminal encounter of the living
and the dead27.
Searchers have no personal relationships with the names on
The Wall: they search for ways of participating as broadly as possible
in discovering the Memorial's m eanings', and “they use mourners and
their artifacts as focusing lenses'. For searchers, meaning arises in part
from memory, but mainly from the chance and momentary encounters
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with mourners and artifacts of the Memorial's social world.
Volunteerswere initially mourners or searchers, and have made
a commitment to the Memorial as a place of ’ genuine experience'.
They serve as caretakers who help visitors and who watch over
veterans overwhelmed by their encounters28.
As Ehrenhaus' observations suggest, these three groups
constitute an ever changing social and political context for the
Memorial. Their ritualized behaviors help keepthe Memorial's meaning
open and resistant to closure and ideological containment. Their
presence maintains an organic quality in the ideological struggle over
the war's meaning. Foss29 attempts to explain the extraordinary
popularsuccess of the Memorial byfocusing on the design'sideological
ambiguity, a product of the design criteria. Because ’ no one meaning
emerges from the memorial', each visitor must Dring his or her own
meaning to bear upon the names in granite, and each must see his or
her own reflection — the self — among the dead, and this helps explain
the development of the Memorial as a site of pilgrimage. The Wall's
ideological ambiguity acknowledges what Scarry30calls ’the referential
instability of the hurt body'. In her analysis of ’the structure of w a r'.
Scarry focuses attention on the phrases: ’to kill for his country' and ’to
die for his country', the universal ideological declarations in warfare.
The killing and dying constitute ’ a deconstruction of the state as it
ordinarily manifests itself in the body'31, requiring ’the appended
assertion (either verbalized or materialized as in the uniform), 'for my
country". The Wall avoids the ’appended assertion* and assigns no
heroic motivation whatever to the injured bodies recounted in the
names, but otherwise significant by their absence. Only individual
names accumulate as war's wreckage, prompting the NcrtionalReview
to complain: ’The mode of listing the names makes them individual
deaths, not deaths in a cause; they might have been traffic accidents.'
But the list of names makes it possible for the Memorial to
simultaneously comfort the visitor while evoking an interpretation of
profound loss. As a sign of the injured body, the Memorial's names and
how pilgrims acknowledge them work against the political cooptation
Ehrhart and Roberts feared. The injured body, represented by the
individual name, develops as the sign of the deconstructed nation,
and this sign is enacted in the ritual of touching The Wall. By touching
an individual name, the pilgrim acknowledges the injured soldier's
absence from social relationships, locating Vietnam ’as an experiential
and historical fact in the lives of... fam ilies'32 and in other social
networks extending across time. Pilgrims further acknowledge the
injured body by leaving artifacts proclaiming the individual
characteristics of lost soldiers, placing the loss within specific social
settings.
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Each name locates the meaning of war in the lived, individual
experience of a specific casualty, whose absence from social discourse
extends the meaning of war to the community. Each name is a sign of
an injured body, a life lost at a specific moment in time. Because the
names are listed chronologically, and not alphabetically, the reader
must search for a specific name according to the specific moment of
loss. Occasionally, an alphabetical arrangement breaks the precise
pattern of representation, and "we know that here were the men of a
single platoon, wiped out together in a single engagement'33. Instead
of serving as a sign of the structure of war. the injured body signifies
what Gilligan34 calls the ’structure of interconnection*.
Foss35 reports that “supporter and protester of the war alike'
often respond to The Wall with the term "eloquent'. But this eloquence,
this ambiguity, opens the Memorial to ideological struggle and makes
it potentially susceptible to the hegemonic process now evident at the
site (as well as in other cultural forms, including mass media
representations of the war). More than any recent example of public
architecture, the Memorial provides a concrete instance — a perfect
model in material form — of Stuart Hall's36 observation that "no
guarantees' exist in ideological struggle. The design's ambiguity
makes it peculiarly open-ended as an object of struggle, suggested by
its widespread use by a variety of political factions as a symbol of the
war's meaning. By claiming The Wall, conflicting groups claim the
memory — the "lessons^ — of Vietnam for their various agendas. The
meaning of the Memorial remains open. The hegemonic process has
not yet fully coopted it. but not for want of trying.

ThERApy ANd DiscipliNE
Hegemony attempts to coopt the Memorial by therapeutic
means, demonstrated by Veterans Day ceremonies in 1984 and 1988
which administratively normalized the Vietnam veteran. At the 1984
ceremony, President Ronald Reagan officially accepted the Memorial
on behalf of the nation. The acceptance came a few days after the
unveiling of Frederick Hart's representational addition to The Wall and
climaxed a week-long series of events called Salute 2. a sequel to the
1982 National Salute to Vietnam Veterans in which 150,000 veterans
marched through Washington forthe televised opening of The Wall. In
newspapercoverage,Sa/ufe2organizersstressedthetheme "American
Veterans — One and AH', a conscious appeal to integrate younger
Vietnam veterans with older veterans of earlier, more successful wars.
This model of transgenerational positioning would take subsequent
form in film and television representations of the Vietnam veteran
within the conventions of World War 2 combat films, thereby
decontextualizing the Vietnam War by removing it — and Vietnam
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One newswire

was billed as part of a 'healing process' for those veterans,
many o f whom relumed from Southeast Asia to be spat at by
anti-war protesters as 'baby killers' and by veterans of
America's victorious wars as 'losers'37.

Administrative power offers a therapeutic position for Vietnam veterans,
“hailing'38them as World War 2 heroes and demonstrating hegemony's
ability to smooth over ideological contradictions, to make them seem
natural and right, or what Hall39 calls “’good sense,' which — leaving
science to one side — is usually quite enough for ideology*. In Salute
2. acknowledgement of the Memorial is intended as reintegration of
the Vietnam veteran, as well as identification of the veteran's “burden*,
left unspecified by President Carter four years earlier. The theme of
healing and reintegration is stressed throughout the newspaper reports
of the ceremonies and emerges as the central administrative message
in President Reagan's 11 November 1984 speech of formal acceptance,
quoted in detail by New York Times reporter Ben A. Franklin40:
'This memorial Is a symbol of both past and current sacrifice,'
Mr. Reagan said.... 'The war In Vietnam threatened to tear
our society apart, and the political and philosophical
disagreements that separated each side continue, to some
extent,' he said. 'It's been said that these memorials reflect
a hunger for healing.
‘Loyalty and Valor' Praised
* I do not know If perfect healing ever occurs... but I know that
in one sense when a bone Is broken and It Is knit together well,
it will In the end be stronger than as If It had not been broken.
I hope that before my days as Commander and Chief are
ended, the process will be completed.'
'Le t me say this to Vietnam veterans gathered here today,'
Mr. Reagan said, 'W hen you retuned home, you brought
solace to the loved ones of those who suffered the scars.... But
there has been a rethinking there, too. Now we can say to
you, and say as a nation, thank you for your courage."
'There has been much rethinking by those who did not serve,
and those who did.... There has been much rethinking by
those who had strong opinions on the war, and by those who
did not know which view was right. There's been rethinking on
all sides, and this Is good. And it's time we moved on. In unity
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and with resolve, with the resolve to always stand for freedom,
as those who fought did, and to always try to protect and
preserve the peace.'

Hegemony produces a new position for the veteran, who is
"subjected, used, transformed and improved'41 by therapeutic and
disciplinary means. The Memorial symbolizes "both past and current
sacrifices', linking the Vietnam Warto a continuing vigilance necessary
to “protect and preserve the peace*. The cost is great but it is
nevertheless a normal condition in which Vietnam is a specific example
of a general type. Vietnam veterans are “those who fought*, those
who stood “forfreedom*, as Americans have always stood f orfreedom
— and still do. The Vietnam War is normalized in terms consistent with
American political ideology, the deaths are made rational, and the
veterans are whole once again, stronger for their expiated burden.
The message identifies the veterans' burden as “little solace,*
the lack of compassion and acceptance given to combat veterans by
their countrymen once the war was lost. The lack of solace is further
specified as a characteristic of Americans “unable to distinguish
between* a generalized abhorrence for war and “the stainless
patriotism* of Vietnam veterans. The contradictions of the veterans'
firsthand experience42, the war's “counterfeit universe*43are explained
as ‘ philosophical disagreements* in the process of resolution. Where
disagreement existed, a consensus is manufactured which attemptsto
integrate the Vietnam veteran with other veterans and to normalize
the Vietnam War in terms of other wars. For the veteran, the price of
reintegration is the revision of memory to coincide with hegemony's
newly produced consensus. Many veterans are willing to accept these
terms, a measure of their postwar isolation. Hegemony structures “the
field of other possible actions'44open to some veterans, who bring their
interpretation of Vietnam in line with prevailing interpretations, enabling
a therapeutic function of the Memorial. In this way, Vietnam veterans
may become what Hall45calls ‘fully paid-up members of the consensus
club*, the sign of the reintegrated society.

V eterans D a y 1988
The 1988 Veterans Day ceremonies at The Wall, televised by the
C-SPAN cable network, served several political interests. It provided an
opportunity forthe American Legion National Commander. HF “Sparky*
Gierke, to briefly mention the results of a study showing that ‘ almost
two-thirds of those who experienced heavy combat* in Vietnam
‘ reported delayed psychological and other health effects*46. Gierke
told the crowd of about 10,000 persons47: “The problems faced by
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these veterans are real. They are not self-inflicted. They are veterans
who need help but are not getting it from a country they served.'
Psychologically distressed veterans remain an ideological
anomaly in the hegemonic process whereby Vietnam veterans are
hailed as World War 2 heroes. Such veterans signify ideological crisis,
what Lewis48 identifies as a disconfirmation of meaning. Thev continue
to occupy a social role which inherently questions the credibility of the
policies which hegemony now reasserts. Their distress is politically
volatile. Significantly, Gierke insists that the problems are “not selfinflicted', implying a basis for the problems within the structure of the
war itself, but his comments are ignored by other speakers who share
a common objective: the production of Vietnam veterans and the
war dead as signs of ideological certainty — as signs of a reconstituted
consensus. For example, Virginia Senator-Elect Charles Robb reminded
the crowd that the 1984 ceremonies had consecrated the Memorial as
“a holy place', and he linked the reconciliation of veterans to the
broader concept of foreign policy49:
Perhaps In no other area Is the need so acute as In the area
of foreign policy. We have to proceed on a bipartisan basis
for a course of energetic engagement, a policy that vigorously
asserts America's Ideals and defends her interests abroad, a
policy that establishes our role as an Inspiration to oppressed
peoples everywhere.... And It must be a policy that neither
renounces nor relies exclusively on the use of force, a policy
tempered but not paralyzed by the lessons of Vietnam.

Robb'sfinal comments implied what “the lessons' might include.
He called for the nation to “stand for support of democracy ad human
rights and vigorous opposition to tyranny,' an agenda which “the
memory of our fallen brothers and sisters' in Vietnam is intended to
inspire. Hegemony again obscures the contradictions of American
involvement in Vietnam by decontextualizing the structural relationships
betweentheUSwarmanagersandtheSaigongovemment — structural
relationships in which corruption and tyranny were the norms?0. The
Vietnam War dead emerge as signs of political consensus for a
renewed policy of containment,the very policy which failed in Vietnam.
Other speakers developed the theme of reconciliation and
closure. The ceremonies occurred one month after Election Day, and
John Wheeler, Chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund,
called for political unity. The ceremony also marked the approaching
end of the Reagan administration. Behind the speakers podium a
large banner read: “Vietnam Veterans Memorial Thank You Mr.
President!' Wheeler explained that Reagan had intervened in behalf
of the Memorial's construction when Secretary of the Interior Watt had
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moved to block it, and Wheeler added51:
President Reagan brought the Vietnam veterans home. He
brought us home In the sense of according us respect and
opening the door so that we can continue to serve our
country.
In 1981, the separation between Vietnam veterans and our
country was a very deep wound. There had not been a
condition like that anywhere In our country's past. Now, eight
years later, there's been a remarkable reconciliation.

Here, Wheeler comments directly on the therapeutic nature of the
ideological process which began unfolding atthe Memorial and within
other cultural forms once the Vietnam veteran was returned to discourse.
Hegemony, in the form of administrative action, signals a new
acceptance and, for some, opportunities. For this, Wheeler thanked
the President, who called Vietnam veterans “gentle heroes' and
“champions of a noble cause'52:
I am not speaking provocatively here. Unlike the other wars
of this century, o f course, there were deep divisions about the
wisdom and rightness of the Vietnam War. Both sides spoke
with honesty and fervor, and what more can we ask In our
democracy? After more than a decade of desperate boat
people, after the killing fields of Cambodia, after all that has
happened In that unhappy part of the world, w ho c a n d o u b t
th a t th e c a u se fo r w N c h o u r m e n fo u g h t w a s ju s f t (Miles
added)
It w a s. a fte r a ll. h o w e v e r Im p e rfe c tly p u rsu e d , th e c a u se o f
fre e d o m . And theyshowed uncommon courage In Its service.

Perhaps at this late date we can all agree that we've learned
one lesson: th a t yo u n g A m e ric a n s m u st n e v e r a g a in b e se n t
to fig h t a n d d ie u n le ss w e a re p re p a re d to le t them w in. (Italics
added)

The therapeutic strategy takes form as administrative expiation. As in
1984, veterans are reminded in 1988 that they fought for freedom in
Vietnam, but were not permitted to win the war. Here the strategy
relies directly upon what Kimball53 identifies as “the stab-in-tne-back
legend' which holds thatthe Vietnam Warwas “lost' by weak politicians,
civilian strategists, antiwar activists, news reporters and others and is
“founded on arch-conservative and militaristic assumptions and values'.
The strategy is especially powerful in its ability to ascribe an anti
veteran position to its critics, and this parallels stab-in-the-back
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arguments which equate "criticism of containment militarism with
disloyalty'54.
The ceremonies generated a photo opportunity which further
deployed the strategy throughout various media, including the front
pages of the 12 November 1988 issues of the New York Times. Los
Angeles Times, and the Washington Post. The photo provides an
instance of ideological condensation in which the productive power
of hegemony takes material form. The photo shows President and Mrs.
Reagan in the role of mourners at The Wall, identified in the following
captions:
The New York Times: President Reagan and his wife, Nancy,
at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Mr. Reagan said that
despite divisions over the war, 'who can doubt that the cause
for which our men fought was Just?'
Los Angeles Times: Nancy Reagan reaches out to the wall of
the Vietnam War (s/c) Memorial as she and the President pay
a Veterans Day visit.
The Washington Post: As the President looks on. First Lady
Nancy Reagan reaches out to touch wall of the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial.

The photo opportunity extends the process of ideological cooptation
into the rituals which produce the war's meaning. Hegemony claims
The Wall for the specific needs of a reasserted consensus implied in the
President's speech. The ideological struggle focused on The Wall
includes attempts to reassert a consensus which serves power in three
ways: it closes debate on the structure of American policy in Vietnam;
it provides a therapeutic and politically useful reintegration for veterans;
and it facilitates future military interventions based on an improved
and more fully rationalized Vietnam model.
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On the cover of the 7 April 1988 Rolling Stone there is a picture
of Martin Luther King. He's looking toward the future and his head fills
the page, even covering a portion of the Rolling Stone logo — and the
issue carries the headline ‘ Portrait of a G eneration.'
‘ An
unprecedented poll of young Americans: What they think about their
lives, their county and their leaders.' ’ Rolling Stone paints a picture of
a generation whose idealism springs from the example of the civil rights
movement, and whose disillusion is bom partly of the assassinations of
its cherished heroes — Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy — but
"m ore profoundly the bitter disillusionment resuiting from the war in
Vietnam '2. According to the Rolling Stone survey, the lessons this
generation learned from Vietnam were "totally negative'3. The result
of the Vietnam experience is that a generation consumed by the idea
that it could rebuild the nation in its own idealistic image has given up
this dream and retreated back into itself. No longer Interested in the big
issues, most members of the generation prefer to Involve themselves In
local causes like anti-drunk driving campaigns and neighborhood
crime watches.
According to Rolling Stone, the members of this generation
have also turned against the idea of enlisting in the military and fighting
for their country.
Asked to select situations under which they would enlist, 27
percent of the men surveyed could not Identify any situation
that would lead them to enlist; 22 percent said they would
enlist if America's strategic Interests were threatened; 19
percent said they would enlist to keep a third-world nation
from falling to communists; 33 percent would enlist if our close
European allies were attacked; and 73 percent would enlist
If war broke out on the North American continent4.

Rolling Stone concludes that foreign-policy planners are just going to
have to live with this ‘ stunning political fa c t'. They argue that there is
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no longer a patriotic consensus supporting the cold war, and that
skepticism has replaced belief in the necessity of foreign entanglements.
Only 16 percent of the members of the generation think that the U.S.
should have fought the Vietnam War. 55 percent favor staying out of
other conflicts which might resemble Vietnam5. Top on this generation's
list of foreign policy objectives is slowing down the arms race, chosen
by 47 percent.
All of this might be heartening if the rest of the study didn't
present so many troubling contradictions. For example, when asked
why the U.S. had not won the Vietnam War the largest percentage of
respondents (36 percent) said that they "felt the United States failed to
make a great enough military effort.' And the second most important
foreign policy goal (next in line after arms reduction) is stopping
terrorism. "41 percent said they would mildly or strongly favor a
president who was committed to developing Star W ars.'6
Rolling Stone comments on the “split vision' of the generation,
remarking that
This generation favors the Idea of redistributing Income to
produce more equality, but It Is opposed to tax Increases.... It
wants the government to stop terrorism and maintain a strong
defense, but it also wants the country to end global hunger
and stay out of foreign conflicts. ... The future leader who
captures the Imagination of this generation will be the
candidate who breaks free of his or her party's standard
rhetoric and unashamedly embraces these contradictory
yearnings7.

The last sentence in that paragraph is particularly striking.
Standard rhetoric will no longer do. Contradictory yearnings should be
uncritically embraced. A rational stance is no longer necessary, even
as a pretense, asserts Rolling Stone. How have we come to this place?
An indication of where to look for an answer is provided by a
recent study on the Civil War by historian Eric Linderman8. I originally
approached Linderman'sstudy, Embattled Courage, with the intention
of comparing the contemporary process of developing a new improved
image of the Vietnam combat soldier to the similar process of revision
described by Underman. Linderman argues that the Civil War resulted
in the destruction of cherished soldierly ideals in both soldiers and
civilians on both sides. Soldiers, whose notions of honor and glory had
undergone radical change when they were subjected to the rigors of
the battlefield, resented their treatment by the civilians who had sent
them off to war. And civilians, heartilysick of war, wanted nothing more
to do with soldiers. This situation lasted some fifteen years until around
1880 when Americans once again became interested in hearing
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about the Civil War. Linderman argues that
As the Civil War was Incorporated in public ritual and the
reputation of soldiering rose, participation In war became an
Important mark of merit. Honor attached itself less to
courageous or cowardly conduct, battles won or lost, causes
preserved or destroyed than to one's simple presence in the
w ar.... As community ritual magnified the war, the war began
to magnify all those who had fought and lived9.

This reassessment (which came some fifteen years after the
Civil War) seems mirrored in the revisionist histories of the Vietnam War
which began appearing in the early 1980s. The current reinterpretations
seem particularly ominous in light of Linderman's observation that:
"The values young men carried to war in 1898 were again those of
1861.... But the picture of war that sons carried to Cuba was false
because their fathers' memories had become false to the war of 1864
6 5 .'10
With this argument in mind, I began to document and describe
the phenomenon of the appearance of the Vietnam War in public
ritual and popular culture, and correlate that process with our growing
military presence in Central America. The argument seemed particularly
compelling in light of the recent headlines describing U.S. troop
movement in Honduras, and the first hints that we might consider using
military means to secure our access to the Panama Canal.
But the 7 April issue of Rolling Stone forced me to reevaluate
both my argument and my methodology. Pop culture rag that it is.
Rolling Stone had a point: as a generation, we docontradict ourselves.
Somehow, those contradictions must be dealt with. I don't buy the
Rolling Stone ideal of synthesis — the idea that one candidate, or party
or platform might really be able to reconcile all of those conflicting
desires. Many of those desires are mutually exclusive, and anyone who
looks at it rationally ought to be able to see that. But I do think they are
correct in identifying what it is that we want. And this raises new
questions: What is the process which causes clearly drawn ideological
lines to blur and fade over time? What are these clear ideologies
replaced by? How do new ideologies come into being?
The first possibility that comes to mind, of course, is a comparison
with Kuhn's” description of scientific paradigms — old paradigms do
not fall apart gradually, but are replaced only when a complete new
paradigm emerges and when the powerful proponents of the old
paradigm have died off. Kuhn's explanation, however, is not sufficient
for understanding the gradual process of paradigmatic metamorphosis
which seems to be occurring as this generation shifts piece-meal from
one ideological stance to another.
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Another problem with Kuhn isthat ideologies cannot be equated
with scientific paradigms; the purpose of an ideology is not to explain
a given set of phenomena, but to provide a social, cultural and
political framework with which a human being can assimilate and
interpret events. Ideologies 'renderotherwise incomprehensible social
situations meaningful,' they ’ construe them as to make it possible to
act purposefully within th e m '12. Exchanging one ideology for another
is almost always the result of some discomfort, some problem, with the
original ideology.
The decision to shift from one ideology to another is not made
at the level of group decision, however. Psychologist Daniel Goleman
provides us with a description of one of the important factors shaping
ideological shift in his book Vital Lies. Simple Truths: A Psychology ofSelf
Deception. Goleman attempts to tackle the difficult question of how
people choose their particular versions of reality in order to cope with
the anxieties of their day-to-day lives13. ’Technically speaking,' he
says, "c o p in g ' is the term for a range of cognitive maneuvers that
relieve stress arousal by changing one's own reaction rather than
altering the stressful situation itse lf.'14 He adds: ’ If the locus for anxiety
in the world is immovable, then that leaves room for change only in
how one perceives the w o rld .'15 Certain areas of thought, or events,
are blocked out or revised — seen in ’shadow'.
Though coping mechanisms occur on an individual level, they
have a cumulative social effect:
The collective mind Is as vulnerable to self-deceit as
the Individual mind. The particular zones of shadow for a
given collective are the product of a simple calculus of the
schemas shared by Its members. The areas of experience
blanked out In the most Individual minds will be the darkest
zone for the group as a whole.
Cultures and nations offer the best examples of this
principle writ large. ... An index of a culture's uniqueness, 1
suggest. Is Its blind spots, the particular elements of reality the
cultural 'we' represses to ease anxieties16.

If this is an accurate assessment, the examination of the popular
culture generated by a nation or a people takes on entirely new
meaning and significance. The nature of this shift might best be
explained by a use of the methaphor of the patient-therapist
relationship. The duty of the therapist is to be an objective listener, an
outsider, a mirror to the patient who is revealed to him or herself
gradually during the course of successful therapy. The therapist listens
carefully to what the patient says, and takes even more careful note
of what the patient does not say. As a patient's coping methods are
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gradually made conscious, the patient then has the opportunity to
discard mechanisms which were once successful but which may now
be self-destructive or damaging.
Popular culture reflects the unconscious decision of a society to
represent or repress particular events and conditions. A culture's
representations may provide the best map forthose who are interested
in studying its blind spots. Susan Kappeler, a feminist theorist who writes
chiefly about the implications of pornographic representation, has
thought deeply about the significance of representations as cultural
objects. In Pornography and Representation, she explains that:
Representations are not Just a matter of certain objects —
books. Images, films, etc. The structure of representation
extends to ‘perceptions' and self-images, the anxious pose of
the bourgeois community In front of the camera of public
opinion.... Representation Is thus one of the most fundamental
structures of conceptualization, centered on the subject. Just
as fiction Is not Just a matter of stories In books, but of narrative
conceptualization In general ... perception Is the
representation of something to oneself, a conflation of the
author and the audience In one single subject. Perception
externalized Inserts Itself Into the structure of communication
between different subjects: author and audience may be
separate Individuals. It will therefore be expedient to look at
representation in the context of communication17.

Popular culture mediums do not simply reflect the ideas and
opinions of the mass culture, but are part of an ongoing dialogue
between members of that culture, shaping and being shaped by their
individual anxieties and fears.
This process is described quite well by Jean Elshtain, who
asserts:
Narratlvesof warand polltlcsare Inseparable from theactMties
of war and politics; each — writing about and doing war and
politics — are practices existing In a complex, mutually
constitutive relationship. I espouse no vulgar notion of mimesis
here. Rather, stories of war and politics structure Individual
and collective experiences In ways that set the horizon for
human expectations In later epochs.... The politics of the text
distorts by expressing exaggerated fears and hopes —
amplifications that go on to become embedded In practices18.

And this brings me back to the Rolling Stone survey. If we take
their challenge seriously and try to create a coherent ideology out of
the generation's “contradictory yearnings' we are certainly doomed

162 Vietnam Generation
to failure. The challenge is, itself, a part of the problem — a gesture of
faith in illusion, a declaration of the need for a new coping mechanism.
We must, instead, question the ideological framework that supports
such a challenge.
The metaphor of the therapist seems, once again, peculiarly
suitable. A therapist notes his patient's delusions, but does not
participate in them, will not be drawn into the conversation on the
patient's terms. The mental health care worker who operates on the
level of societies rather than individuals might properly be called a
“cultural therapist." And it is as a cultural therapist that I will approach
the problems posed by Rolling Stone.
The cultural therapist, examining the survey results gathered
from questions about the Vietnam War, would formulate certain
important questions: 1) What are the bases on which this generation
has decided that the U.S. should not have been involved in the
Vietnam War? 2) What fears oranxieties are reflected in this generation's
reluctance to involve itself in foreign wars which it perceives to be
similar to the war in Vietnam? and, 3) In what terms are these issues
addressed?
The third question is the most crucial, and it is certainly the one
which would benefit most from the examination of a cultural therapist.
The terms of a discussion limit and define appropriate topics and
arguments. For example, the Rolling Stone survey asked which one of
four factors best explained why the U.S. lost the war in Vietnam:
36 percent said they felt the United States failed to make a
great enough military effort. Twenty percent cited the a ntl war
protests and the lack of support In the United States for the
war. Another 20 percent felt It was because of the lack of
adequate military and civilian support from our South
Vietnamese allies, and 8 percent said It was because of the
strength and numbers of the opposing communist forces'9.

What is the framework for the discussion here? Distinctly missing
are any factors which might be part of a moral or ethical discussion of
American involvement, or which might offer some kind of historical
perspective. The designers of the survey cannot be held entirely
responsible for their omission, which is reflected in the culture as a
whole and has been noted by other Vietnam War scholars. The
tendency to limit discussion of the Vietnam War by confining the arena
of discussion has been recognized by both traditional and popular
culture historians. The following two quotes illustrate this observation.
Historian William Gibson notes:
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(In the 1980s) The w a r... disappeared as a topic for study and
political consideration and Instead became dispersed and
Institutionalized in the complex of medical, psychiatric, and
legal discourse. Itwasaslfanewserlesof medical and Judicial
problems with no traceable origin had appeared In American
society. Orrather.although It wasack nowledged that Vietnam
was the origin, once the word 'Vietnam' was mentioned, the
war itself was dismissed and discussion moved on to how an
Institution could solve the problem20.

In popular culture discourse, as well, the terms of the discussion
have been limited in the ways that Michael Clark describes:
The motive underlying Rambo: First Blood. Part 2 and all the
other back-to-Nam films Is ... a desperate wish to restore the
community broken apart by that w a r... these films possess an
undercurrent of bitterness and Indignation at the betrayal of
Innocence that reflects the more profound and utopian
longing behind the poignant conclusion of The Deerhunter.
the sappy optimism of The Lady from Yesterday, and the
sentimental realization of personal correspondence
embodied In the most recent memorials. The utopian impulse
behind all of these works has come to dominate popular
representatlonsof the memory ofVletnam despite the lingering
political animosities stemming from that war. and the only
uncertainty that remains now seems to be whether that
Impulse will find expression In the xenophobic vengeance of
a chromed steel jungle knife, or the sentimental family Ideal
of a letter home2’.

Both of these observations shed some light on the fears and
anxieties reflected in the answers to questions about Vietnam in the
Rolling Stone survey. By leaving out moral and historical questions and
focusing on the psychic damage the war has caused Americans, we,
as a society, can successfully avoid dealing with the difficult issue of
responsibility and leave our collective self-image intact. The extent to
which we are able to delude ourselves is stunning. In an August 1987
New York Times article about the city of Hu6, journalist Barbara
Crossette penned a line which promised absolution to any remaining
Americans who had moral qualms about the war: ’ Sometimes,' she
wrote, "the Vietnamese seemed to be blaming Americans less for
what happened here than Americans blame them selves.'22
On a societal as well as an individual psychological level, the
penalty for repression is repetition. In Goleman's word's: "On the one
hand, we forget we have done this before and, on the other, do not
quite realize what we are doing again. The self-deception is complete. ' a
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These words from J. Glenn G ray's classic World W ar 2 narrative.
The Warriors seem to most clearly represent the dangers of that process
of self-deception:
I am afraid to forget.... What protrudes and does not fit in our
pasts rises to haunt us and makes us spiritually unwell In the
present.... We may become refugees In an Inner sense unless
we remember to some purpose. Surely the menace of new
and more frightful wars Is not entirely unrelated to our failure
to understand those recently fought. If we could gain only a
modicum of greater wisdom concerning what manner of
men we are, what effect might it not have on future events?24
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